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Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES
2 February 1975

Helms Order to Withhold Watergate Data Reported

Former Subordinate in C.I.A. Also Told House Panel That Justice Department Was Denied Access to Key Witness

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 — Richard Helms, while Director of Central Intelligence, ordered a high official of the agency to withhold Watergate information and deny Justice Department access to a key witness in the first six weeks after the break-in on June 17, 1972, according to previously unpublished testimony.

The official, Howard J. Osborne, who was director of security for the C.I.A. before he retired in late 1973, told a House Intelligence subcommittee in May, 1973, that Mr. Helms decided that a series of letters sent to the agency by James W. McCord Jr., a member of the team that broke into Democratic party headquarters at the Watergate complex, should not be forwarded to the Justice Department.

Hunt's Role

Mr. Helms made his decision at a time when the agency was under subpoena from the Justice Department to forward "all communications" related to Watergate.

The McCord letters, sent between July 29, 1972, and early January, 1973, warned the agency that officials of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President were planning to contend that the break-in was a C.I.A. operation.

In one of the letters, Mr. McCord said, "I have the evidence of the involvement of [former Attorney General John N.] Mitchell and others sufficient to convince a jury, the Congress and the press."

Mr. Osborne also said that Mr. Helms had instructed him not to inquire into the agency's involvement with E. Howard Hunt Jr., another Watergate participant.

Mr. Helms further directed, Mr. Osborne said, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation not be permitted to interview Karl Wagner, a C.I.A. employee, who had knowledge that John D. Ehrlichman, then the chief White House adviser on domestic affairs, had authorized the agency to establish a working

relationship with Mr. Hunt in July, 1971.

"You forget about that," Mr. Osborne quoted Mr. Helms as having told him in late June, 1972. "I will handle that. You take care of the rest of that."

At the time, Mr. Osborne had been designated by Mr. Helms as the official directly responsible for coordinating and expediting the C.I.A.'s communications with the F.B.I. about Watergate.

Mr. Helms and other high-level C.I.A. officials repeatedly stressed in their public statements that their actions regarding Watergate were not illegal, but legitimate steps to protect the agency from possible adverse publicity and to prevent the leak of highly classified information about the agency's operational procedures.

Mr. Osborne testified before the House subcommittee that he had told Mr. Helms he felt "very strongly" that the first McCord letter should be turned over to the F.B.I. However, Lawrence Houston, the general counsel to the C.I.A., testified that he had advised Mr. Helms that the agency had no legal responsibility to do so.

Ehrlichman Link

The three United States Attorneys who originally prosecuted the case for the Justice Department did not learn of the Ehrlichman link to the C.I.A. for five months. They also were not told of the McCord letters to the C.I.A. until May, 1973.

The House subcommittee began hearings in the spring of 1973 shortly after C.I.A. involvement with the White House "plumbers" became known. The panel eventually concluded that the agency had been misled by the Nixon Administration.

The testimony was declassified late last year, without public announcement, by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan, the subcommittee chairman.

Mr. Helms told the Representatives that "everybody was instructed to help with the F.B.I. investigation in the agency, and every lead was checked. . . . All the records were gone through and all the things were

Mr. Helms was not directly asked about Mr. Osborne's alle-

gations, but William E. Colby, then Mr. Helms's deputy and now Director of Central Intelligence, repeatedly told the subcommittee that the agency's failure to provide all known information to the F.B.I. was based on its concern "that it would somehow be involved in the Watergate case and there was quite a lot of publicity and public information in the press. . . . I think the concern [was about leaks to the press.]"

Mr. Helms, who headed the C.I.A. from 1966 to 1973 and is now Ambassador to Iran, could not be reached for comment. A State Department aide said he was traveling and would not return to his post in Tehran, from which he has been on leave, until later this month.

Widespread Pattern

Mr. Osborne's testimony about the initial high-level C.I.A. reaction to Watergate was part of what a New York Times inquiry has shown to be a more widespread pattern of C.I.A. noncooperation than previously known. The inquiry, which included interviews with former Federal investigators and an analysis of published C.I.A. Watergate testimony and documents, was begun shortly after the published allegations last December of C.I.A. domestic spying.

No evidence was found linking the C.I.A. to advance knowledge of the Watergate break-in, but the testimony and documents indicate that the intelligence agency followed the course it did in part because of a fear that some of its domestic cover firms as well as its 1971 domestic activities on behalf of the White House would be uncovered.

The C.I.A. is currently facing intensive investigations by House and Senate committees stemming from its admitted involvement in "questionable" domestic spying activities. In addition, an eight-member commission set up by President Ford and headed by Vice President Rockefeller is in its second month of hearings into the domestic spying allegations.

Among the key new findings of the inquiry were the following:

A number of high-level C.I.A. officials, including Mr. Helms and Mr. Colby, were informed on June 19, 1972—two days after the break-in—that a transcript of an internal C.I.A. tape recording showed that Mr. Ehrlichman had authorized the agency in 1971 to begin its support activities on behalf of Mr. Hunt, who was then a member of the White House security force known as the "plumbers," then investigating Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. The transcript was discussed at a C.I.A. meeting that day.

Mr. McCord had served as a member of the C.I.A.'s counterintelligence branch since 1952 and was involved with preventing the penetration of the agency by agents from the Soviet Union. Mr. McCord was working for the agency's office of security in 1967-68 when, according to the transcript, it infiltrated 10 agents into radical groups in the

Washington area in apparent violation of the C.I.A. charter barring it from domestic activities. At least four former high-level C.I.A. counterintelligence officials have resigned since the first published allegations of C.I.A. domestic activities.

None of the high-level C.I.A. officials, including Mr. Colby, informed Federal authorities of the repeated White House efforts in June, 1972, to involve them in the successful attempt to limit the initial F.B.I. Watergate inquiry. The officials also did not immediately disclose that they had been asked to provide bail funds for the original Watergate defendants.

None of the high-level C.I.A. officials involved in the initial deliberations after Watergate informed James R. Schlesinger, who replaced Mr. Helms as Director of Central Intelligence in February, 1973, of the extent of the agency's domestic activities on behalf of the White House in 1971. Mr. Schlesinger learned of Mr. Hunt's plumbers role from a C.I.A. liaison officer in early May, 1973.

Questions Left Open

The inquiry also left open questions about the objectivity and thoroughness of the initial inquiry by the House Intelligence subcommittee. In its report on its hearings, published Oct. 23, 1973, the subcommittee did not note, for example, that Mr. Helms ordered Mr. Osborne not to turn over the McCord letters.

The C.I.A. also did not inform the Justice Department that in July, 1972, it had received confidential information on the Watergate break-in from Robert F. Bennett, the president of Robert R. Mullen and Company, a Washington-based public relations firm that provided "cover" for C.I.A. employees overseas and had hired Mr. Hunt after his retirement from the agency in 1971.

According to a report published last year by Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee, the C.I.A. paid half of Mr. Bennett's attorney fees stemming from his grand jury appearance after the Watergate break-in.

In a recent interview, Seymour Glazer, one of the original Watergate prosecutors who retired last year after serving 14 years with the Justice Department, characterized the C.I.A.'s post-Watergate actions as the efforts "of an intelligence agency serving some alien Byzantine power rather than one devoted to the best interests of the people of this country."

"Most of the facts may be known to the Government now," Mr. Glazer said, "but the public isn't aware of what the C.I.A. has done. The whole venture was one of keeping information from us."

"I frankly was amazed by the conduct and the mentality I found in the C.I.A. Anyone who believes in candor must appear to be quite naive to them. And they must have appeared to be naive to them."

The most critical C.I.A. fail-

ure, Mr. Glanzer said, was the agency's decision not to produce the six letters sent by Mr. McCord after being served with a Justice Department subpoena compelling the agency to produce "all communications" relating to Watergate.

"The McCord contacts would have been vital," Mr. Glanzer said, because Earl J. Silbert, the principal United States Attorney investigating Watergate, "had selected McCord as the weak link—the only person who had information and might be made willing to talk."

"The letters were an indication that there was some way of reaching the man," the former prosecutor said.

Mr. McCord, who had earlier rebuffed an attempt to begin plea bargaining, repeatedly warned the C.I.A. in the letters that attempts would be made to place the blame for Watergate on the agency.

Upon learning in May, 1973 of the McCord letters, Mr. Glanzer said, the prosecutors told one high-level C.I.A. official—not Mr. Helms—that he was a potential target of a grand jury investigation. The official resigned within days, Mr. Glanzer said.

Cox Takes Over

At about the same time, however, Mr. Silbert and Mr. Glanzer were succeeded in the Watergate investigation first by Archibald Cox, the Watergate special prosecutor, and the C.I.A. actions did not become a public issue.

In Mr. McCord's first letter to the C.I.A., which was sent to the office of Mr. Helms six weeks after Watergate, Paul O'Brien, an attorney for the Nixon re-election committee, was quoted as having said that committee officials had initially informed him that the break-in was a C.I.A. operation.

"He says he did not know otherwise," Mr. McCord's letter said, "until one of the defendants told him the facts and he says he blew up over it."

The letter said that there would be an attempt to depict the Watergate break-in as a C.I.A. operation and suggested that the Watergate prosecutors were leaking anti-agency material to the press.

Mr. McCord closed the letter with the following statement, which, given his extensive knowledge of counterintelligence operations, may have led to varying interpretations inside the agency:

"The fact remains that I have lived in Washington since 1942 and know certain things about the District of Columbia from first-hand knowledge, having lived there in the past, that I wanted you to be aware of."

The letter initially was dismissed as crank mail, Mr. Osborne told the House subcommittee in May, 1973, but was subsequently identified through Mr. McCord's handwriting. Mr. Osborne then recounted the following events:

"I showed the letter to Mr. Helms. I told him that I felt very strongly that the letter should be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Helms, after some reflection, decided that he would

like to have legal opinion on the matter and summoned Mr. Lawrence Houston, general counsel of the agency, to his office and had him read the letter.

'Legal Obligation'

"After he had finished reading the letter, the ensuing discussion, to the best of my recollection, centered about whether the agency had any legal obligation to forward the letter to the Justice Department or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"Both Mr. Helms and Mr. Houston decided that there was no such obligation, and I was told to take no further action on it. Mr. Helms instructed me to restrict knowledge of the existence of the letter to an absolute minimum—number of people."

When Mr. McCord's subsequent letters were received at home by a C.I.A. employee in late December, 1972, and early January, 1973, they were brought to Mr. Osborne, who, as he told the subcommittee, was authorized by Mr. Helms to file them.

The letters were turned over to the Watergate prosecutors in May, 1973, after Mr. Schlesinger ordered all C.I.A. employees to come forward with any evidence or information in connection with the White House plumbers or other domestic C.I.A. involvement.

Mr. Osborne acknowledged to the committee that he had been troubled by Mr. Helms's order not to forward the McCord letters.

"We had been working very closely with the F.B.I.," he testified. "I have always given them everything. I have never held anything from them."

'He Was My Boss'

"At the time I don't think I really agreed with it [the decision to withhold the letters]. But, you know, I worked for Mr. Helms, he was my boss. I would do the same thing with Mr. Schlesinger."

A review of the published testimony indicates that Mr. Helms was never specifically asked about his request that the McCord letters not be forwarded.

Mr. Houston, however, was questioned by the House subcommittee about his counsel to Mr. Helms after receipt of the initial McCord letter in August, 1972. He defended his action by noting that he had been involved in many cases where persons under indictment threatened or hinted at a C.I.A. involvement.

In the case of the McCord letter, he added, he considered it to be a similar warning or threat that there "might be an actual attempt to involve the agency in the defense of those arrested in the Watergate incident."

Since the C.I.A. had no prior involvement in the Watergate break-in, Mr. Houston explained, and since any threat of bluff was best countered, in his opinion, by ignoring it, "therefore advised the Director of Central Intelligence that we had no legal responsibility to pass the letter on to any other authorities and that we would work with the United States Attorneys when the defense actually made a formal attempt to

involve the agency at the trial. The Director agreed."

Mr. Houston subsequently acknowledged under questioning, however, that when Mr. Silbert and Mr. Glanzer requested the C.I.A. to supply information in October in anticipation of a C.I.A. defense at the Watergate trial, the agency still withheld the letters.

Nedzi Interrogates

Then there was the following exchange with Representative Nedzi.

NEDZI: Isn't this really suppressing evidence?

HOUSTON: No, sir, I did not consider it evidence at all.

NEDZI: It was not evidence of agency involvement, but it was certainly information that could very well have been useful to the conduct of a complete investigation, and I think that the agency's obligation goes beyond just defending itself.

Mr. Osborne also testified that he was ordered by Mr. Helms not to inquire into Mr. Hunt's links to domestic C.I.A. activities in 1971.

After being assigned to find out what possible involvement, if any, the C.I.A. had had in the Watergate break-in—an assignment he received from Mr. Helms on the evening after the break-in—Mr. Osborne recalled being approached by a young C.I.A. officer, Mr. Wagner.

Mr. Wagner had served in 1971 as an aide to Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., the C.I.A. Deputy Director at the time and the recipient of Mr. Ehrlichman's request for agency help for Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Wagner learned at a staff meeting that Mr. Osborne had been assigned to the investigation, Mr. Osborne said, and "called me and said he had something he wanted to tell me but he had to check with the Director first. The Director called me on the telephone that same day and said, 'You forget about that. I will handle that. You take care of the rest of it.'"

"I was specifically excluded" from knowledge of the C.I.A. involvement in the Ellsberg burglary, "and I am delighted I was."

Mr. Colby told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in July, 1973, then considering his nomination to be C.I.A. Director, that a transcript of a July 7, 1971, Hunt-Cushman conversation—in which Mr. Ehrlichman's role was mentioned—was discussed at a high-level agency meeting on June 19, 1972.

Fact Not Relayed

However, Mr. Colby said, when the C.I.A. formally informed the F.B.I. three weeks later that it had supplied false documentation and other materials to Mr. Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy, another Watergate defendant, it did not relay the fact that Mr. Ehrlichman had been involved with Mr. Hunt one year before Watergate.

Instead, the Senate testimony showed, the C.I.A. said only that the materials had been supplied to Mr. Hunt in response to a "duly authorized

extra-agency request."

At one point during the Senate hearings, Mr. Colby told Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, that the information was not supplied because "it was not all that important who made the phone call from the White House to General Cushman about this little one assistance for Mr. Hunt."

Mr. Ehrlichman's name was provided to the Justice Department on Nov. 27, 1972, in response to a specific question from Mr. Silbert. In a later memo about that meeting, Mr. Colby wrote that he "had danced around the room several times for 10 minutes to try to avoid becoming specific on this."

Mr. Colby further disclosed during the Senate hearings that on June 28, 1972, Mr. Helms has issued an order requesting that the F.B.I. not interview Mr. Wagner and another C.I.A. official who also knew of some C.I.A. aid to Mr. Hunt in 1971.

At the time, Mr. Helms justified the order, according to the Senate testimony, on the ground that the F.B.I. should "desist from expanding this investigation into other areas which may, eventually, run afoul of our operations."

'A Lot of Leaks'

In his July, 1973, testimony before the Senate Watergate committee, Mr. Helms referred to that order, telling the Senators that "there was starting to be a lot of leaks out of the F.B.I. for the first time on matters of this kind." Mr. Helms later had this exchange with David M. Dorsen, an assistant chief counsel on the committee:

DORSEN: And to your knowledge, was any relative information withheld by the C.I.A. to the F.B.I. and Justice Department, information that you were aware of while the events were taking place in June, July or August of 1972?

HELMS: Sir, I do not believe so. Does the record show that there was anything of this kind?

DORSEN: No. I am not suggesting that at all. I am just asking for your knowledge. I have no knowledge to the contrary.

HELMS: Well, I do not either, but I just want to be sure that my recollections tracked with the facts.

In his earlier testimony before the House subcommittee, though, Mr. Helms said he had prevented the F.B.I. from interviewing Mr. Wagner, whom he did not mention by name, because he had not wanted information about Mr. Hunt's involvement with Mullen and Company, the public relations firm, "from being spread all through the Government, that we had people under cover there."

However, no evidence was presented in any other hearing suggesting that Mr. Wagner, if questioned by the F.B.I., would have discussed anything but Mr. Hunt's reliance on the C.I.A. in 1971 in connection with his White House plumbers work.

Furthermore, C.I.A. documents published last year by

the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry showed that information about the secret use of Mullen and Company was supplied by the C.I.A. to the F.B.I. on June 21, 1972, four days after the Watergate burglary.

Colby Testifies

During testimony before the House and Senate in 1973, Mr. Colby, who had been placed by Mr. Helms in overall charge of the C.I.A.'s handling of the Watergate inquiry shortly after the break-in, made a number of apparently contradictory statements.

During the House Intelligence subcommittee hearings in May, 1973, Mr. Colby was asked why the C.I.A. had not been more responsive in providing information to the F.B.I. He again cited C.I.A. concern over possible press leaks and said the agency had decided to "handle as much of the material that was subject to misunderstanding in an oral fashion rather than in a written fashion."

Yet, Mr. Nedzi, in discussing the meeting between the C.I.A. and the Watergate prosecutors in October, 1972, asked Mr. Colby whether he thought the Justice Department had been made "completely aware of all the facts that you had, is that right?"

Mr. Colby responded, "yes,

they were totally informed."

Mr. Colby was then executive director of the agency.

In subsequent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, 1973, Mr. Colby said that he had known of the White House attempts the year before to get the C.I.A. to provide bail funds for the Watergate defendants, and about other contacts, but had not told the Justice Department during the October meeting.

'Edge of Propriety'

Asked why, Mr. Colby said he had not considered the White House's contacts to be potential wrongdoing.

"Their requests were, it seemed to me, on the edge of propriety," he said, "and the C.I.A. responsibility was to hold itself very specifically to the facts and act within its proper authority, and the C.I.A. did that."

It was those actions, revolving around the efforts of Mr. Ehrlichman and H. R. Halde- man, then the White House chief of staff, to get the C.I.A. to attempt to halt the F.B.I. inquiry into Watergate, that led to President Nixon's resignation last August. A White House tape recording showed that Mr. Nixon had directed his aides to attempt to involve the C.I.A. in the cover-up.

While supporting the actions taken by Mr. Helms in the months after Watergate, Mr. Colby also told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the basic decisions involving C.I.A. policy had been made by Mr. Helms.

"The basic philosophy of keeping the C.I.A. out of the misunderstanding of being involved and consequently handling the material through the top level of the F.B.I. and the Justice Department [and not through F.B.I. field agents and United States Attorneys] was a decision in which I shared," Mr. Colby testified, "It was obviously Mr. Helms' decision because he was in charge."

The fact that Mr. Schlesinger, who is now Secretary of Defense, had not been briefed by Mr. Helms and other high-level C.I.A. officials about the extent of the agency's involvement with Mr. Hunt and the White House plumbers was made explicit in a statement published last July by the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry.

Schlesinger Told

In the document, a C.I.A. official who was serving in a liaison position at the White House in May, 1973, recalled how he apparently was the first to inform Mr. Schlesinger about the C.I.A.'s involvement in the

preparation of a psychological profile on Dr. Ellsberg and other matters.

"He seemed surprised and unaware of any such link," the unidentified C.I.A. official said. "I was sure that someone had compiled the facts about the agency's involvement with Hunt and the Watergate and that it should be available somewhere in the agency if he had not already seen it."

"He seemed dismayed and bewildered that something like this could have happened and that he did not know about it."

On May 9, 1973, a few days after the discussion with the C.I.A. liaison official, Mr. Schlesinger issued his order calling upon all C.I.A. employees to produce any evidence of domestic wrongdoing.

It was this request, reliable sources say, that not only led to the discovery of the McCord letters and more Watergate links, but also produced the evidence of other domestic activities—such as the infiltration of C.I.A. undercover agents into dissident groups and the accumulation of files on more than 10,000 American citizens who were opposed to the Vietnam war—that are being investigated by the Senate, the House and the Ford Administration.

WASHINGTON POST
2 February 1975

Circle of Friends Supports Helms

By William Greider

Washington Post Staff Writer

For that small circle of influential people, the ones who help shape America's foreign policy and share national secrets, the intimate dinner party the other night in honor of Richard Helms was an especially tender moment.

"Touching and moving," said one who was there.

Assembled in the Chevy Chase house of columnist Tom Braden and his wife Joan were some perennial notables:

Averell Harriman, the patrician statesman; Stuart Symington, the senator from Missouri; Robert S. McNamara, who once ran the Pentagon and now runs the World Bank; Henry A. Kissinger, whom everybody knows. Even the outsiders were prominent ones: NBC's Barbara Walters and Israel's Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, among others.

They were gathered to cheer up an old friend, a comrade wounded by recent events, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who is now confronted with embarrassing questions about the secret agency's domestic surveillance activities.

After the smoked salmon and crown roast of lamb, the glasses of rich red wine were raised in his honor. Symington toasted the "splendid job" which Helms had done in seven years as America's intelligence chief. Harriman seconded those sentiments.

But the high point was the brief and melodramatic speech of Robert McNamara, Defense Secretary during the long struggle in Vietnam, a man who

shared with Helms the anguish of the Johnson years.

McNamara wanted all in the room to know: whatever Dick Helms did, whether it was over the line or not, the former Secretary of Defense supported him fully. That moment of fraternity moistened some eyes around the table.

According to the etiquette of important dinner parties, no one is supposed to speak afterward of what was said by whom, especially to the press. Yet, somehow, the story of McNamara's toast is circulating, confirming what many already suspected—that Richard Helms has been shaken by the current CIA controversy and that the established circle is drawing the wagons up close in his defense.

That message was already whispering around Washington, in part because the Secretary of State was telling friends and associates on the dinner-party circuit that he was dismayed by what has happened to Helms.

"An honorable man," Kissinger says solemnly, then he adds a word or two of private rebuke for the present CIA Director William E. Colby, who made the public disclosures of CIA domestic spying, and even for Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, who investigated the subject when he held the CIA job briefly before Colby.

These are glimpses of the private and almost visceral political currents which now surround the CIA controversy, a struggle as intangible as smoke, yet with real significance for the players. Helms is in foremost jeopardy, not simply because most of the ac-

tivities of debatable legality happened during his tenure, but also for what he said or didn't say about CIA activities while under oath before various congressional committees.

On a political level, the situation is perilous for Colby too, who now must answer the agency's critics more fully at forthcoming hearings without totally alienating the CIA's traditional friends or his own troops within the agency. In a secondary sense, the struggle threatens Kissinger and Schlesinger too, who now represent the natural institutional rivalry between the Defense and State departments, who both played a direct hand in the CIA's past.

As one close partisan described it: "A fairly byzantine happening by some fairly byzantine people."

Helms' difficulties stem from his bland assurances, given regularly in recent years to congressional inquiries, that the CIA did not do such things as penetrating domestic political organizations or spying on radicals. Then, after the New York Times account of domestic spying was published Dec. 22, Colby eventually made a public recitation on the subject, acknowledging what Helms seemed to have denied.

According to close friends, Helms is not so concerned about the arguable illegality of any surveillance activities which occurred under his direction or even by his recorded statements denying that the CIA conducted domestic spying. Those questions are loaded with ambiguities, they point out, which would make any legal action difficult

to pursue.

But Helms has been more worried about his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on CIA involvement in Chile, back when he was confirmed as ambassador to Iran in 1973. Sen. Symington, a member of that committee, asked Helms then: "Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the government of Chile?"

"No, sir," said Helms.

"Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?"

"No, sir," said Helms.

"So," Symington asked, "the stories you were involved in that war are wrong?"

"Yes, sir," Helms answered. "I said to Sen. Fulbright many months ago that if the agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth the election might have come out differently."

When Colby appeared in private last spring before the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence, he told a different story—that the CIA had provided \$11 million for "covert action" in Chile aimed at blocking Salvador Allende's election in 1964 and 1970, as well as "destabilizing" the government in 1973 when a military coup toppled the Allende government.

Helms appeared again before the Foreign Relations Committee two weeks ago to explain the discrepancy. Now on his way back to Iran, he is convinced, according to friends, that he satisfied the committee members that no perjury had been committed. The various issues, however, must still be explored by others. The circus now has three rings—select committees on intelligence in both the House and Senate, plus the presidential CIA commission.

The difference between Helms and Colby is partly a question of personal styles, but it is also the changed climate in post-Watergate Washington, where both Congress and the press pursue hints of scandal more zealously than when Helms was director from 1966 to early 1973.

In broad outline, their careers seem quite similar—Ivy League educations, veterans in World War II, lifetimes devoted to climbing the secret career ladder inside the "Company," as the CIA is sometimes called among friends.

But, though both served in "Clandestine Services" and both held the post of deputy director of operations, Helms and Colby came from different sides of the spy shop.

Helms was schooled in the "intelligence end," Colby was a "political action" man, two subspecies with an inherited distrust of one another. The intelligence folks collect and analyze, while the "political operations" men run secret guerrilla wars and "covert action" against foreign governments. They tend to regard the intelligence types as ivory tower tenants, removed from the real world; while the intelligence people often look on them as a bunch of wild men. In any case, the personal relationship between Colby and Helms over the

years was correct and cordial, never more than that, according to associates.

When old colleagues describe Helms, he emerges as a man of deeper intellect, more flexible, more cynical, quite skilled at crossing the sliding sands of Washington's bureaucratic struggles. Colby is more obvious, more straightforward and even moralistic, according to friends and nonfriends. Helms is the urbanity of the Chevy Chase Country Club; Colby is the Boy Scouts in Springfield, Va., where he lives.

"Dick is resentful," said one ex-officer. "He resents the change in performance with regard to Congress, to the press, to openness which he never engaged except in the coziest way."

While Colby opts for on-the-record interviews with the news magazines, Helms' style was, more often, a friendly off-the-record lunch at the old Occidental Restaurant. On Capitol Hill, Helms left behind a reputation as masterful at salving both hawks and doves during the war in Vietnam, as well as never revealing too much about what the CIA was doing.

When the House subcommittee was questioning him privately on Watergate in 1973, Helms displayed the charm which won such praise. After a lot of back-and-forth about what was legal or illegal for the CIA, Helms finally closed the subject with this appeal to personal faith:

"Gentlemen, don't you honestly believe, all of you, as I do, that you've got to be honorable men to run anything like this, particularly an intelligence operation?"

The notion that "honorable men" could be trusted to run the CIA, without much questioning from Congress, was badly shaken in the Watergate episode, when it was disclosed that the CIA under Helms alternately went along with and resisted various questionable demands from the Nixon White House. Rumors lingered and the traditional secrecy of the agency helped them grow.

Helms, for instance, has been dogged by stories that somehow a closer link existed between him and E. Howard Hunt, Jr. one of the Watergate burglars, including the yarn that the CIA director personally lent Hunt \$20,000 or \$30,000. As it happens, Helms explained that in secret testimony at the time:

"The guy was in very serious financial straits. In an organization like CIA, particularly in the clandestine side of it, anybody who gets in debt constitutes a vulnerability. I mean for a recruitment from the other side, if nothing else. All drunks are a threat. Drug people are a threat. Homosexuals are a threat. Anybody who has a really distinctive blackmail possibility."

"So the logical thing to do was to make available those institutions in the Central Intelligence Agency to help out employees who unintentionally get in some kind of financial difficulty and one of the ways of doing this is something we call the Public Service Aid Society, which contains a fund

of money administered by some directors into which people give voluntarily to build up a fund so that people in a jam can get this stuff without paying interest and so forth."

The members of Congress also learned something of the intrigues involved in operating the agency, like the tape recording systems in Helms's office and the "French Room" next door where conferences were held and another in the deputy director's office. Helms had that one dismantled when Gen. Vernon Walters, a Nixon man, became deputy director because "I thought at the time I didn't know Gen. Walters very well. I wouldn't have any control over it."

When Helms was cleaning out his files after 25 years in the agency, he destroyed all of the non-Watergate tapes, including one conversation he recorded with President Johnson.

"I do recall at one time having a very active conversation with President Johnson about a whole lot of things he wanted me to do about Vietnam," Helms told the subcommittee, "and my finally, in desperation, pushing this button in order to get straight what he was trying to tell me to do."

After Helms was abruptly fired by President Nixon a month after the 1972 election, the popular assumption was that his resistance to letting the CIA take the rap for Watergate was a special motive. It was also widely assumed that Henry Kissinger approved the move or at least acquiesced in it, particularly the subsequent shake-up of the agency which was carried out by Schlesinger.

Helms professes not to know what the motives were for his abrupt dismissal. (His friends say he has never blamed Kissinger). But he did tell the Armed Services subcommittee this much:

"I was never on the team. I was left over from President Johnson's administration and I had served in four years in President Nixon's and I rather gather they wanted their fellow on the job. I put the 'their' in quotes."

At this point, the plot gets much too byzantine to explain fully. Schlesinger, an outsider, took charge of the CIA with expressed orders to "shake it up," which he did. The personnel level was trimmed sharply ("brutally," according to some old hands), and, among other things, Schlesinger ordered a full audit of the CIA's domestic activities. That produced the documentation which through no apparent fault of his, eventually surfaced in public.

When Colby succeeded Schlesinger in the fall of 1973, he inherited the new leaner look which Schlesinger gave the agency, plus its new problems of public relations. When Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Intelligence subcommittee, called Colby for an examination on Chile, the new CIA director told all. When it leaked out, Helms was the embarrassed one.

Now, however, Colby is presiding over a sharp division within his own ranks, not to mention the hostile politicians outside. As one associate put it: "A lot of people think he's gone too far already. He's made a lot of concessions which will be very hard to reverse later on. Worse, there's a great disillusionment within the agency. They all feel unappreciated and exposed."

On the other hand, many see Colby

as a skillful CIA "political operator," trying to navigate through the treacherous waters, to ameliorate the new pressures from Congress and the press, without sacrificing the agency's essential powers.

"He is the essence of a political operator who goes to a country overseas and tries to find the levers of power and hopes to influence them," said one former colleague. "He's very much a realist. He asks: who's running the country? It's not the President and the White House — it's Congress and the press. Well, how do you influence them? You can't do it with the old Cold War rhetoric or by telling the

press it has no business knowing about intelligence activities. So Colby is trying to get a handle on these political and social realities. He's operating on the same principle he would in Afghanistan."

Even Colby's admirers, however, can envision an unhappy ending for the director if he misreads the pressures, if he tells so much to the inquiring members of Congress on Capitol Hill that his own bureaucratic strength is exhausted downtown.

Among other questions, for instance, the investigators will pursue whether Kissinger, as Nixon's national security affairs adviser, had any part in order-

ing the CIA to spy on reporters in 1971 and 1972 because of national-security leaks.

Schlesinger, as Defense Secretary, has been standing back from the fray, but his department, the Pentagon, has an important stake in what Congress winds up doing to the CIA and the "intelligence community" generally.

In short, while the dinner-party chatter enlivens the struggle, it is a defensive game at this point. One former CIA official described the situation:

"Everyone, to use one of Helm's phrases, is hunkering down and looking out for himself."

WASHINGTON POST

3 February 1975

Tom Braden

'Imperial Presidents' and the CIA

"I'm going to keep very quiet," said Richard Helms, speaking of the investigation into the Central Intelligence Agency. "But if it looks as though it's all going to be my fault, I shall have a great deal to say."

There is an implication here which recalls another Helms remark, made when he was summoned home from Iran two summers ago to testify on the subject of the wig and the camera lent to Howard Hunt and on Richard Nixon's attempt to use CIA as a foil for halting the investigation into Watergate.

"Who would have thought," Helms said then, "that it might someday be judged wrong to carry out the orders of the President of the United States?"

They hint—these two remarks—at the imperial presidency which historian Arthur M. Schlesinger has described.

They hint of Lyndon Johnson, large, powerful, domineering, thinking of himself as law. They hint of Richard Nixon, sly and stealthy, plotting how to retain beloved trappings of power. Johnson, one can imagine, would order the thing done without a thought as to whether the thing was legal. Nixon, one can imagine, had more consciousness of evil. He would sneak the thing through. The end was the same: The end was corruption.

It is all very well to say that Richard Helms should have risen to the occasion: "Mr. President, I won't do that. If you insist, Mr. President, my only course is to resign."

When authority gives an order it is easy to find reasons why authority may be right. More important, the President is the Commander-in-Chief. Does a soldier quit the field of battle when the general orders a foolhardy attack?

Maybe the problems of the CIA are battlefield related. Its leaders were steeled in war and most of them were steeled in a very special kind of war. Most of them came out of OSS, as the wartime secret intelligence agency was called. This meant, first of all, that they had volunteered to carry out very unusual orders.

It also meant that they were unusual people, given to taking great personal risks, desirous of operating alone or in the company of two or three others, impressed more than most soldiers can be impressed with the absolute necessity for secrecy and the almost certain penalty which awaits the slightest breach of it.

It meant one more thing which may be important to the CIA story. The OSS men, who became the CIA men,

thought of themselves as their country.

Dropped alone in groups of two or three onto unfamiliar and enemy-occupied lands, they were, whether in Norway or in Southern France, in Holland or in Thailand, all that there was of America.

And while they may well have been on the run, hunted and harried from one hiding place to another, they took more pride than most soldiers learned to take in the fact of what they were. They were America. That and the death pill in their pockets were all they had.

Is it not possible that men who have learned to do everything in secrecy, who are accustomed to strange assignments and who think of themselves as embodying their country are peculiarly susceptible to imperialistic Presidents? Have they not in fact trained themselves to behave as a power elite?

"For 28 years," Richard Helms remarked the other day, "I had the idea certain that I was serving my country." That's a proud thing to be able to say. What a shock it must be to such a man to be told that from time to time during those 28 years he was wrong.

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WASHINGTON POST

14 February 1975

Rockefeller Commission

9 CIA Panel Lawyers Named

Nine staff lawyers were appointed by Vice President Rockefeller yesterday to serve the presidential commission investigating the Central Intelligence Agency.

They will serve under David W. Belin, a Des Moines, Iowa, lawyer who is executive director. The nine lawyers include two who have served as clerks to Supreme Court justices and one who is active in the American Civil Liberties Union.

The four senior counsel:

Harold Baker, 45, private attorney from Champaign, Ill.; Ernest Gellhorn, 39, a law professor at the University of Virginia; Robert B. Olsen, 48, a private attorney and ACLU board member from Kansas City; and William W. Schwarzer, 49, a San Francisco trial lawyer who is a World War II military intelligence veteran.

The four counsel:

Marvin L. Gray Jr., 29, assistant U.S. attorney in Seattle, Wash., and former law

clerk to the late Justice John M. Harlan; George A. Manfredi, 31, private attorney in Los Angeles; James N. Roethe, 33, private attorney from San Francisco; and James B. Weidner, 32, partner in the New York law firm of Rogers & Wells.

Named as special counsel was Ronald J. Greene, 32, an attorney with the Washington firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering and a former clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 February 1975

CORRECTION

The New York Times, through an editing error, incorrectly reported yesterday that the Central Intelligence Agency was under a Justice Department subpoena in early August, 1972, when Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, ordered the agency to withhold information. The subpoena, ordering the C.I.A. to produce all Watergate communications, was not in effect at the time.

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, Feb. 2, 1975

The Names in CIA Files: Some Belong, Some Don't

By Harry Rositzke

Rositzke, who retired from the CIA in 1970 after 27 years with the agency and its predecessors, initiated its liaison with the FBI on Soviet espionage matters. He is author of "The U.S.S.R. Today" and "Left On!"

THE HALF-DOZEN inquiries into the charges of "domestic spying" by the Central Intelligence Agency face a challenging task on a confusing terrain.

From a wide range of legitimate counterintelligence activities involving American citizens, the investigators will have to sift out those cases in which the CIA violated its charter by using secret agents against Americans within the United States.

The legitimate operations cover a broad array of activities in which Americans voluntarily or otherwise fall within the purview of the CIA, with their names properly entering its files.

Countless private citizens, for example, have been "cleared" by the CIA before they are asked to participate in secret or covert operations. Thousands of Americans have helped establish such CIA-sponsored organizations as the Committee for a Free Europe, to set up foundations for channeling funds to covert operations, and to create the proprietary companies that supply logistic support for CIA paramilitary operations.

Hundreds of others have helped CIA make contacts with resident foreigners who are of interest for future intelligence use abroad, or in building up new identities and getting jobs for Soviet and other defectors being resettled in this country. In each case, the FBI and other federal files must be checked, and in some cases a security investigation is carried out as well, before an American citizen is cleared for contact.

Any violations of CIA authority in this security-investigative area can be examined by the committees on a case-by-case basis—an unauthorized telephone intercept or microphone installation, a surveillance conducted to investigate a reported plot against the CIA director, the use of informants to report on the plans of Washington demonstrators.

FBI-CIA Cooperation

THE TERRAIN is far more confused in the area of secret domestic activities of the CIA's Operations Directorate, especially the Domestic Operations Division (now the

Foreign Resources Division) and the Counterintelligence Staff. The Domestic Division has been carrying out intelligence operations against foreigners in the United States since the early 1960s. The Counterintelligence Staff has, since 1946, exercised overall responsibility for CIA's worldwide counterintelligence program. Both have worked closely with FBI.

Internal security, the responsibility solely of the FBI, does not involve the domestic scene alone. Any country's internal security service must have the cooperation of its foreign intelligence service to do its work effectively. This cooperation is not always easy, but for those familiar with conflicts between the domestic and foreign services in England, France or Germany, the differences between the CIA and the FBI are relatively modest. In any case, they have had only minor repercussions on the working level.

It is in this area of domestic counterintelligence that the committees will find it most difficult to establish normal and proper patterns of FBI-CIA cooperation, an essential first step toward detecting what is improper or illegal.

The patterns are clearest in the most specific form of counterintelligence — counterespionage. Here the targets are persistent and easily identified: the actions of any hostile intelligence service directed against the American interest.

For 30 years the CIA and FBI have worked closely against the Soviet and East European intelligence services, especially the KGB, exchanging information about Soviet intelligence officers and providing each other with leads to suspect agents. In the past 15 years the volume of hostile espionage operations has climbed perceptibly. During the 1960s, KGB officers were making more than 200 attempts a year to recruit Americans stationed abroad. In the late 1960s more than 300 KGB officers were stationed in New York City.

The demarcation line between responsibilities of the two agencies has always been clear in the minds of CIA operations officers. The investigation of suspect Americans or foreigners is the exclusive province of the FBI within the physical confines of the United States, of the CIA

abroad. From the operator's point of view, there are no "gray zones" in this area.

CIA-FBI cooperation in counterespionage matters is mostly a one-way street, for the great majority of Soviet, East European and Cuban espionage operations against the United States are mounted overseas. From its own sources abroad, from its liaisons with friendly security services, from Americans recruited abroad by a hostile service, the CIA has supplied more leads for the FBI to follow up in the United States than conversely.

In most cases these do not involve American citizenship. For example:

- CIA/Vienna reports from an agent-source the dispatch of a Soviet "illegal," (a staff officer under private cover) to the United States. The FBI takes over his surveillance at the port of entry.

- CIA/Paris forwards information on a Soviet espionage net in New York City from a Russian who has walked in to the Paris embassy. The FBI conducts the investigation that leads to the arrest of Col. Abel.

Other cases initiated by CIA involve the return of a U.S. citizen from his overseas post:

- An American technician in Italy has been recruited by a KGB officer for the purpose of getting computer data from his home office. The follow-up in Italy is CIA's job; on his return to his headquarters, it is the FBI's job.

- An embassy file clerk in Tokyo is approached by a young KGB officer and accepts his proposition under the direction of the CIA station. When she is about to return to Washington, the FBI is informed, and it can request that the operation be terminated overseas or elect to take over the handling of the "double" in Washington.

A "Chance" Meeting

COOPERATION between the two agencies on counterespionage targets within the United States has been even closer when the CIA can contribute a means of access to a Soviet or East European intelligence officer stationed in New York or Washington. In effect, the operation becomes joint.

A senior East European intelligence officer in New York, the resi-

dent in charge, is found to have been the deputy of a defector who has started a new life in Latin America. The defector is brought to the United States by CIA and telephones the resident's wife, with whom he had an affair in the old days. He is most cordially received, and has several night-club meetings with the couple during which he proposes that the resident cooperate with the Americans. The meetings are closely observed by both CIA and FBI officers. Another joint operation involved an American citizen whom the CIA was preparing for a Latin American assignment. A file-search reveals that at one time he knew fairly well a secret KGB courier who is making a three-day stop in New York City. The American is brought from Pittsburgh and a "chance" meeting with the courier is arranged at an airline terminal, with both FBI and CIA officers in attendance.

These and similar counterespionage operations against foreigners offer a simple paradigm for counterintelligence operations against American citizens, the immediate issue before the inquiries. The basic operating rule is the same: Dealing with American dissidents, militants, or terrorists within the United States is the FBI's job; supporting FBI operations abroad is CIA's job.

Here again FBI-CIA cooperation is mostly a one-way street, but now running in the other direction. Since the targets are Americans on the domestic scene, the main flow of leads is from the FBI to CIA for overseas action. Only occasionally does a CIA operation abroad come up with a lead for FBI action at home.

Over the years the FBI has made countless requests for overseas action on American Communist leaders traveling abroad to determine whom they visited, what instructions they received in Paris or Prague, what funds they might bring back. Other FBI targets have been reported on by CIA during their attendance at peace rallies or other Soviet front meetings in Europe.

In the 1960s these requests mounted and broadened in scope as the New Left, on and off campus, began to create turmoil on the American scene.

Thus, a leading anti-war militant makes a trip to Paris, apparently to visit the North Vietnamese delegation. Whom does he meet? What do they talk about? Any other contacts?

A Black Panther on the run flees to Algiers. Does he plan to return? With whom is he in touch? Any contacts with the Soviet or Cuban em-

bassies?

A student activist in Chicago flies to Bonn to make contact with the leader of a revolutionary German student group. Why?

These requests can be multiplied by the hundred. They are often easy to satisfy with the help of friendly foreign security services that have as great an interest as the FBI in running down the international contacts of their militants and revolutionary groups. Sometimes the answers can be obtained from CIA agents whom the local station has inserted in the wide-ranging Soviet and other Communist establishments to monitor their non-diplomatic activities.

Terrorists and Smugglers

DURING THE SIXTIES some CIA stations in Europe also began to pay more attention to such non-Communist organizations of the New Left as the "proletarian" socialist parties and the Trotskyists, Maoists and Castroites, which sprang up in great profusion. Many were concentrated on university campuses, and CIA agents within them were able to answer questions on their outside connections, including those with parallel organizations in the U.S. movement.

The names of any Americans that came up in these operations were given the amount of investigative attention they deserved—by the CIA while they are overseas, by the FBI when (and if) they came home.

It is perhaps also worth noting that this same clean-cut division of labor applies to the handling of counterintelligence operations against international terrorists and drug-smugglers, with the leads coming mostly from the CIA to the FBI:

- A CIA agent in a Latin American terrorist group learns of plans for attacking an American embassy (action CIA) or sending a team to New York City (action FBI).

- A CIA penetration of a heroin ring in Istanbul comes up with the name of an American connection. If the connection is in the United States, the action goes to the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration.

It is against this pattern of normal practice that the inquiries can best assess individual cases in which the CIA (or the FBI) may have overstepped its authority. Such cases are likely to fall into that narrow area in which CIA officers carry out operations within the United States that are normally handled by the FBI.

In a typical case, a CIA officer in Europe develops over a two-year pe-

riod a close relationship with one of his agents, a Communist organizer in the European maritime unions. The organizer is sent for six months to Baltimore to work with the local maritime unions, and the FBI is informed. After a working-level discussion, the FBI agrees that the CIA officer continue to handle him because of their close relationship. His reporting goes to the FBI, and the FBI asks the CIA officer for any information it wants from his contact with the organizer.

Another type of case comes even closer to the thin line between CIA and FBI jurisdiction. In this situation, an American student is being prepared for an assignment to France, where he will attempt to report on Soviet and North Vietnamese contacts with the New Left. CIA helps him develop a cover for his role as a student activist by having him associate with radical groups on an American campus. With his bona fides as a "radical" established, he will be more readily accepted by student activists on a French campus.

In cases of this sort CIA's domestic actions are directly connected with its foreign counterintelligence responsibilities. Whether they fall into a white, gray or black area will be a subtle question for the inquiries to determine.

Ground-Level Questions

THE INVESTIGATORS have a three-fold task: to establish facts, judge their legality or illegality, and recommend executive or legislative remedies if they are needed. The operational facts come first. The issue of "domestic spying" is surrounded by so much confusion and suspicion that the inquiries will do the nation little good unless they come up with the facts that will settle questions in the public mind. If civil liberties were violated, whose, how and when? If the CIA or the FBI overstepped its charter bounds, who did what where? If someone broke the law, who did what?

Answers to these ground-level questions may be of more importance to the citizen than recommendations for remedial legislation, tighter oversight, or broad injunctions to the President to ride closer herd on his secret agencies.


It is only by coming up with hard facts that the presidential and congressional inquests can gain public respect and allay public suspicion of their own and the CIA's competence and integrity.

NATIONAL REVIEW
31 JAN 1975

CIA in Wonderland

In the beginning God created Terra, and set her spinning through space and time. More recently a mixed crew of demigods has launched a substitute planet, Media, of their own devising. Like those multiple space-time continuums in science fiction, Media and Terra intersect at various nodes, but elsewhere their realities, in spite of superficial similarities, have little in common: cf. the standard Media rerun of the Vietnam reality—as presented, say, in nightly TV broadcasts—or the two versions of a school busing dispute.

The current CIA flap appears to us as a Media epi-



"My god! I was followed all the way to the office."

sode with only the flimsiest attachments to Terran reality. In appropriate demigod mode, the *New York Times*, burning to get even with the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* for their Watergate triumphs, created this new CIA turmoil out of next to nothing, and in a trice it reverberated throughout all Mediadom. Never was there a more numerous crop of anonymous sources and anonymous victims. In Media, no less than 10,000 innocents have been practically shoved into the furnace by CIA storm troops. (In Terra, meanwhile, not one single citizen has complained of personal harm or damage from their vile machinations.) In *New York* magazine, Media-nite Tad Szulc poured out 6,000 horror-struck words about what "might" be in "the White House tapes and documents," what the Pentagon may have ordered some time or other, what "one possibility" is according to what "some knowledgeable State Department officials" say, what "is widely known in Washington," and about "the extraordinary combination of a coverup of the CIA's domestic activity . . . with esoteric intrigues within the Agency itself" that, "if this theory is correct, we may be facing."

Interestingly enough, in Szulc's own Media epic there are two brief intrusions from the Terran continuum: "The dividing line between the Agency's foreign and domestic counterintelligence work . . . is completely blurred, particularly since J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI's late director, suspended all counterespionage cooperation with the CIA in 1969. . . . That which CIA officials speaking privately have conceded to be the 'grey area' of operations is the surveillance of American citizens suspected of contacts with foreign intelligence. Although the 1947 National Security Act, which created the CIA, specifically forbids domestic police functions by the Agency, it is argued that such activity is simply an extension of foreign counterintelligence." On the basis of which quotations a sober Terran might conclude: even granted the CIA exceeded its mandate, this would seem to be at least as plausibly attributable to differing interpretations of the laws and regulations, and to practical necessities, as to the criminal desire of protofascist plotters.

President Ford seems to have estimated this fume and fuss at its true value. His Blue Ribbon Commission consists, for the most part, of solid and reasonably well informed types who know what goes on and are able to distinguish real events in Terra from pseudo-events in Media. We may hope and expect that they will gradually anesthetize the frothing patient that the President assigned to their clinic.

We should note, however, that, once it was raised, many persons here and elsewhere joined this hue and cry against the CIA, not to sell newspapers or TV programs nor to correct abuses dangerous to liberty, but to destroy CIA and to make it impossible for the U.S. to maintain any sort of effective counterintelligence and counterespionage function. Ex-agent Philip Agee, the creep whose book, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, has just been published in Britain, is one of those who do not disguise their objectives. He has named hundreds of CIA agents, collaborators, and cover organizations he says he came to know about on a Latin American assignment, and he states he has done so with the deliberate purpose of blowing their identities and wrecking CIA operations. And this is often the effect of the exposures or alleged exposures (which can be equally damaging) now being made daily by those who insist they have only the patriotic aim of protecting the citizens of the U.S. from police state practices.

You cannot have a confidential agency unless it operates confidentially. Before tossing aside the possibility, it would be well to reflect on some of the things we as persons and as a nation confront at the moment: global and rapidly growing clandestine terrorist organizations; nuclear weapons on land, on and under the sea, and in the air, all immune to direct inspections; international revolutionary and subversive organizations pledged to the destruction of our nation and our society—to name a few not likely to be exorcised by Media editorials.

TIME
10 FEB 1975

THE PRESIDENCY/HUGH SIDLEY

L.B.J., Hoover and Domestic Spying

As the mists of a decade of White House conspiracy are rolled back, there is a better view of Lyndon Johnson. The new trails of CIA and FBI domestic spying, however uncertain as yet, lead back to his Oval Office and that towering figure of contradictions. Those ravaged patrons of Richard Nixon are quick to suggest that L.B.J. was as bad as or worse than the disgraced 37th President. But that has not yet been proved.

What seems more likely is that there was an unusual combination of people and events in the mid-1960s. There was J. Edgar Hoover, the aging head of the FBI, who kept in his private safe the hottest files on important people and dribbled the information out to Presidents when it served his power-hungry purpose. Hoover knew his man; Johnson had a voracious appetite for gossip. Then there was Cartha (Deke) DeLoach, Hoover's deputy, who felt that he might be named Hoover's replacement under Johnson. DeLoach became a courier to the White House of the juicy gleanings from the FBI.

And then there was Johnson, schooled in the tangles of Texas politics, tutored by Master Plotter Franklin Roosevelt, tempered in the Senate's school of the deal, and ultimately a man who believed that there were no accidents in politics, only conspiracies. He armored himself with intimate knowledge of those he believed conspired against him, which was almost everybody. "I don't trust anybody but Lady Bird," he once said, "and sometimes I'm not sure about her."

He never accepted the findings of the Warren Commission and believed always that John Kennedy's assassination was a conspiracy by Communists in retaliation for a reported effort by Kennedy to have Fidel Castro killed. He believed that the race riots in the ghettos and the peace marches in the streets were being paid for by the Red Chinese. "I know there is Chinese Communist money there," he kept telling his aides.

L.B.J. was convinced that Bobby Kennedy had bugged him all during the time that he was Vice President. He frequently called the CIA "Murder Incorporated" because he believed that the CIA had gone ahead and killed South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem against Kennedy's wishes. He had a further notion that the CIA was somehow linked with the Mafia.

He read and reported with relish the findings of the Treasury in the biggest tax cases. He bragged once that he knew within minutes what Senator William Fulbright, then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, had said at lunch at the Soviet embassy or what Soviet contacts had told other members of Congress at cocktail parties. He insisted that the Soviets were building Viet Nam opposition in Congress and the press. He slapped his thigh with delight when he got a report from the FBI about a prominent Republican Senator who frequented a select Chicago bordello and had some kinky sexual preferences, all of which were reported in detail. The information came from a madam who was an FBI informer.

As the 1968 Democratic Convention approached, the FBI sent Johnson almost daily reports on the people and events of that unsettled time. One Johnson aide remembers that there was information about the activities of Congressmen and Senators. The FBI reports were often included in the President's night reading, and sometimes they were such "garbage," as

one man said, that Johnson aides thought they were not fit for the President to see. They were sent back to the bureau.

Shortly after Johnson took office, the transcript and tapes of Martin Luther King's bedroom activities were spirited to him. He read the accounts, which an aide described as being "like an erotic book." He listened to the tapes that even had the noises of the bedsprings.

When a Johnson assistant once defended King's antiwar activities, L.B.J. exploded: "Goddammit, if only you could hear what that hypocritical preacher does sexually." The aide tried to joke. "Sounds good, Mr. President," he said. A huge grin appeared momentarily on Johnson's face, but he quickly caught it and returned to his threatening self.


An aide remembers being with Johnson and Hoover when Hoover was reporting on important people linked to the gambling world. Johnson was fascinated, but hesitant. How did Hoover know these things? he asked. Because of wiretaps, Hoover told the President. Then Hoover would drop a tidbit or two. Johnson was all ears, but he would protest, "All right, all right," as if he wanted Hoover to stop. Hoover did not stop. He kept on talking, and L.B.J. kept on listening. Johnson was hooked and Hoover knew it.

Yet for all of this, Johnson sometimes denounced bugging as if it were original sin. "The worst thing in our society would be to not be able to pick up a phone for fear of it being tapped," he told one of his men. "I don't want any wiretapping," he said when he was designing the Safe Streets Act. However, Senator John McClellan talked him into including a provision for wiretapping. The Congress then provided more authority than agreed upon, so Johnson ordered the Justice Department not to use that power.

At one point Johnson became so angry at Hoover and the bureau that he ordered his Secret Service detail chief, Rufus Youngblood, to go over to Justice and

take over the FBI. Youngblood went there, wandered around for a few days, but the order was never formalized. Two of Johnson's closest friends warned L.B.J. that Hoover was disregarding the civil liberties of many people. It was then that Johnson gave his pungent summation of why he kept Hoover: "I would rather have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in."

None of the Johnson men remembers any written orders to the FBI or the CIA on all this dirty linen. The material just came in, and Johnson seemed to understand. But then there came a day when that changed, at least with the FBI. After Johnson had announced that he would not seek re-election in 1968, he learned from an intelligence report that Anna Chennault, widow of famed World War II Flying Tiger General Claire Chennault and a money raiser for the 1968 Nixon campaign, had got in touch with the Saigon government. It was suspected, at the least, that she was urging them not to cooperate with Johnson in his last days, but wait for Nixon to be elected. The belief in the White House then was that a high Republican traveling with Vice Presidential Candidate Spiro Agnew had got to Mme. Chennault to urge her to carry the message to Saigon. When Johnson demanded to know who the contact on the Agnew plane might have been, the FBI's proven ability to detect such sources suddenly and mysteriously faltered. As one of Johnson's most trusted men put it last week, "The power had passed." Indeed it had. Another conspirator was about to enter the White House, and the FBI was getting ready for him.



HOOVER & JOHNSON AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN 1967

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
2 FEB 1975

Intertel—CIA cover or Dem spies?

By Harry Kelly

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—The name on the door of the second floor is Intertel. It is a name of intrigue, mystery, and controversy.

It inspired suspicion in the heart of White House spy Jack Caulfield. He contended Intertel was a Democratic espionage operation with an "old boy's network" in all the agencies of the Nixon administration.

Intertel, as a blue-ribbon private security firm, has been involved with all the headline names: Howard Hughes, I. T. T., Las Vegas, Caribbean gambling, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Mafia.

NOW IT IS under the eyes of two Senate investigating committees with former Nixon assistant Charles Colson telling two senators in an out-of-prison interview that he believes Intertel has been a Central Intelligence Agency cover.

"That's bull," says Intertel President Robert Peloquin, onetime Navy intelligence officer, National Security Agency aide and Justice Department official in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

Colson reportedly contended in his talk with Senators Lowell Weicker (R., Conn.), and Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) that he once had been warned in the White House that "you can't tell where the Hughes Corporation begins and the CIA leaves off." Hughes has been a major Intertel client.

INTERTEL IS housed on the second floor of an office building a short walk from the White House. The building has become a little seedy with age and its first floor has been disemboweled by subway construction.

Its appearance only adds to the shadowy charisma of Intertel, less well known as International Intelligence Inc. It is to private eyes what the Federal Bureau of Investigation is to Sam Spade.

TIME
10 FEB 1975

Leapin' Johnson Lizards

Re CIA "Revelations and Resignations" [Jan. 13]: Wow! For security reasons, in '62 during the Kennedy Administration a Domestic Operations Division (DOD) was set up in the CIA! Holy Democrat! And—wiretaps in the '60s! Leapin' Johnson lizards! Not only Watergates, but also Demogates!

Will Bartlett
Dover-Foxcroft, Me.

The information on citizens in the CIA and FBI dossiers [Feb. 3] gives these agencies power over Americans. At the same time, the secrecy with which these agencies operate denies citizens information, and therefore power, over them.

Intertel was organized after Richard Nixon entered the White House as a management consulting firm specializing in security and background investigations.

ITS ROSTER of employees includes a former supervisor of the FBI's internal security investigations, the deputy director of security for the State Department, chief of the National Security Agency's special projects section, a supervisor of intelligence activities for the FBI, chief of the former Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs' intelligence division, and chief of the Internal Revenue Service's intelligence division.

Intertel's director of intelligence is Edward M. Mullin, formerly of the narcotics bureau, the FBI, AND CIA.

Intertel has been caught in a corner of the tangled web of Watergate.

COLSON, WHO FOR months has been trying to lay Watergate at the door of the CIA, was brought from detention to the Alexandria courthouse to talk to Weicker and Baker.

In addition to claiming that the CIA used or owned Intertel, Colson reportedly contended that when Nixon once demanded he investigate the possibility of CIA involvement in Watergate, he was warned off by J. Fred Buzhardt, a former Defense Department counsel and White House lawyer.

Sources quoted Colson as saying Buzhardt told him some CIA and Hughes operations had intermingled and he should stay away for fear of involving "some important Republicans."

THE SOURCES acknowledge the likelihood that the CIA used as a cover in overseas operations the Hughes Corporation which also manufactured technical or scientific equipment for the intelligence agency.

As another background link, a hoodlum testified that ex-FBI agent Robert

Maheu, who managed Hughes' hotel and casino operations in Las Vegas Nev., tried to hire him to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, saying he was acting for the CIA.

Some Intertel people think the reason Colson thinks—or says he thinks—Intertel is a CIA front is that Hughes hired another firm which was a CIA cover.

HUGHES EMPLOYED as a public relations firm in Washington the Mullen Co., which had close links with the CIA. It afforded cover for CIA operations, employed former CIA agent and White House "plumber" E. Howard Hunt, and its president, Robert Bennett, reported his knowledge of Hunt's activities to a CIA case officer soon after the Watergate break-in, well before Hunt's involvement became public.

As further fuel for the Senate investigation of the CIA, according to sources, classified CIA documents that Baker used in compiling an early report on the agency's links to the Watergate scandal make several references to Intertel. The sources declined to disclose what is said in the still-classified documents.

Reportedly there is "no solid evidence" in the material—which Baker hopes the CIA will ultimately declassify—that Intertel was used by the CIA.

INTERTEL OFFICIALS Peloquin and General Counsel Tom McKeon deny it categorically.

"We are not owned by and never in the existence of the organization been employed by the CIA," Peloquin said.

IN THE BACKGROUND is the theory of Senate Watergate investigators, issued in a staff report, that the Watergate break-in may have been an attempt to discover whether Democratic National Committee Chairman Lawrence O'Brien had any damaging documents linking Hughes and Nixon. O'Brien had also been on the Hughes payroll.

In the case of the CIA, even its budget is secret. The Constitution's requirement that "a legal statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time" has simply been disregarded.

We need two reforms. We need an end to all political dossier building by the FBI, the CIA and all other government agencies. We also need full information on what our agencies of government are doing.

A government with information about us that denies us information about it turns the very idea of a democracy upside down.

Aryeh Neier, Executive Director
American Civil Liberties Union
New York City

WASHINGTON POST
3 February 1975

Chilean Cites '71 Kissinger Assurances

By Lewis H. Diuguid
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Ambassador Orlando Letelier charged last week that Henry A. Kissinger took the initiative to assure him personally in late 1971 of nonintervention by the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile, although the public record now clearly indicates involvement by the agency.

Letelier, ambassador here for the government of President Salvador Allende, was imprisoned for a year by the military junta that seized power in September, 1973. He is now a lecturer at American University.

Kissinger's initiative in December, 1971, followed allegations of a CIA role in the first major anti-Allende demonstration in Santiago, the women's march of the empty pots.

"Kissinger asked me to assure President Allende that there was not a single person involved either directly or indirectly," Letelier said.

Letelier first made the allegation in a television interview, saying the assurance of nonintervention was made by a high official. Asked to confirm that the official was Kissinger, Letelier did so.

The meeting took place following a dinner at the home of columnist Joseph Alsop. Letelier said he was told Kissinger would come with a special message for him. "He drew me aside to say that there were no CIA people involved in any internal Chilean problem," said the former ambassador.

A spokesman for the State Department said Kissinger "had no recollection of any conversation" such as Letelier describes, and does not recall meeting him at the Alsop residence.

Alsop does remember the dinner but he said he did not remember Kissinger coming.

When the 1971 women's protest against food shortages took place, pro-Allende newspapers in Chile and elsewhere noted the similarity of the demonstration to those by women in Brazil, allegedly with CIA backing, prior to the 1964 coup ousting a left-wing government in that country.

Letelier said he believed Kissinger's assurances, passed them to Allende and used them as a basis for counseling restraint in later instances when his government suspected U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs.

Kissinger at that time was the presidential adviser on national security affairs. In other encounters, Kissinger in-

dedicated personal respect for Allende and said he was considering a visit to Chile, according to Letelier.

However, according to Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), CIA Director William E. Colby testified before a House subcommittee last April that the Forty Committee of the National Security Council authorized \$5 million for anti-Allende efforts following the election of the Marxist in late 1970.

The government has not specified what form that activity took, beyond a press conference statement by President Ford last September, indicating that the money went to support opposition parties and newspapers.

State Department authorities privately contend the CIA efforts were aimed at keeping an oppressed opposition alive, not at bringing down the Allende government. They deny that any aid went to strikes or demonstrators such as the women.

Letelier said that in retrospect he sees evidence of a wide U.S. role, an "infernal machine" of outside intervention that he contends was decisive in Allende's fall.

Letelier also said he believes that the CIA was responsible for the May, 1972, break-in at the Chilean embassy. No arrests were ever made in the break-in, which came a month before the intruders were caught at the Watergate. He noted that Chile was then in critical negotiations with the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. on nationalization of its properties.

Two months earlier, columnist Jack Anderson had published documents revealing ITT efforts to engage the CIA in efforts to prevent Allende's ascension to the presidency.

Letelier said the only item of importance stolen from the embassy was his mailing list, but he said other rifled documents undoubtedly were photographed.

By mid-1973, Letelier indicated that Chile had further indications of CIA involvement. He cited statements by an American saying he was a former CIA agent who sought a Chilean passport in return for revelations of anti-Allende activities.

Letelier said that he could not recall the man's name, but that Chile assisted him in reaching Sweden after taking his testimony in Santiago.

An American pilot later called the embassy offering to sell information on flight of arms to rightist Chilean guerrillas, Letelier said. The offer was turned down but the general data conformed with the government's own findings of alleged CIA activities, he added.

BALTIMORE SUN
4 February 1975

An emotional Kissinger blasts Post on lying story

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Henry A. Kissinger, his voice strained from emotion, yesterday attacked the Washington Post for its handling of a charge that he once lied to the former Chilean ambassador to Washington.

The Post said in its Monday editions that the ambassador, Orlando Letelier, said that Mr. Kissinger had falsely told him in 1971 that the Central Intelligence Agency had absolutely no involvement in Chilean politics.

Mr. Letelier was at the time representing the government of Salvador Allende. He said that Mr. Kissinger took him aside at a dinner party given by Joseph Alsop, the columnist,

"to say that there were no CIA people involved in any internal Chilean problem."

William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified to a congressional committee last spring that the Forty Committee, which oversees American intelligence activities, authorized the expenditure of \$5 million for activities against the Allende government. Mr. Kissinger is chairman of the committee.

Mr. Kissinger said yesterday that since the Post carried his denial well into the body of the story, readers would be left with the impression that he had lied.

BALTIMORE SUN
11 February 1975

CIA Prescience

Domestic spying may not be the only way in which the CIA has viewed its mandate a bit too broadly. A recent CIA move to initiate a privately-conducted study of mass transit research in Europe would seem to be an example, especially since the Department of Transportation probably long since has gathered the information and would give it to the CIA free of charge. But the concern motivating the study makes sense. In a letter outlining the study, the CIA says that economic, ecological and other concerns may "drastically alter future ground and air transport requirements," and that most new mass-transit technology is being developed abroad. U.S. industry, the letter says, may be facing dangerous competitive threats if it doesn't catch up. No CIA investigation is needed to tell the nation that rail and mass transit technology here has been largely moribund while the Europeans and Japanese have been forging ahead with super high-speed trains, magnetic levitation and tracked hovercraft. But in displaying its interest, the intelligence agency is displaying prescience of a kind American industry still seems to lack.

During that period the Forty Committee chaired by Kissinger authorized \$2.5 million more for Chile, some of it to influence an important election, according to the Harrington account of Colby's testimony.

Despite the evidence cited by Letelier, Chile made no formal accusation against the United States. Letelier left Washington to become foreign minister and then defense minister. By August, 1973, he said, the government had

taken up a new round of talks aimed at settling differences with the United States.

Left-wing Socialists advised Allende against negotiating with a country they believed was seeking to overthrow his government, but Letelier said Allende went ahead, in part as a concession to the armed forces which sought conciliation.

The talks in August produced no public results and the coup came Sept. 11.

WASHINGTON POST
3 February 1975

Meg Greenfield

Invitation to a Bonfire

Everything has its usefulness, including, I suspect, the muscle-bound and accident-prone inefficiencies of our federal government. Consider only the saving incompetence of the Watergate crowd. Frustrated in their attempts to get the great engine of government to do the dirty work for them, in the end they foundered on their own weakness for bureaucratic complication and excess: too many records, too many participants, too much organizational structure, too much junk.

These thoughts are prompted by the current controversy in Washington over the dossier-making and/or file-keeping issue. You do not, I think, have to resolve the still-open questions concerning the latest charges against the FBI and the CIA to accept one general proposition. It is—as any small businessman or student-loan applicant or war protester can tell you—that government at all levels has long since crossed the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate intelligence gathering and file making on American citizens. For the CIA and the FBI are far from being unique among Federal agencies in having investigators in the field or in amassing vast amounts of material of questionable relevance and propriety in their files. And that is where the saving sprawl and ineptness of government come in. For it may be accounted one of the blessings of our time that for all its snooper and storage capacity, the government does not necessarily know what it knows—or even how to find out.

I offer in evidence a personal reminiscence from the Kennedy years. The episode, set off by an angry letter from Bertrand Russell to The New York Times, has always struck me as being both illuminating and oddly reassuring. Lord Russell, feeling more scourgelike than informative, in effect had only this to say: it was a sad commentary on America's pretensions to democracy that, for all our talk of freedom, the government had locked up poor Don Martin for expressing his dissent and now was refusing to let him out of prison—for shame.

Don Martin? Evidently along with a posse of other reporters, I rang the appropriate assistant to the Attorney General and asked who Don Martin was and what the Department of Justice had done to him. "God, don't we wish we knew," came the reply, followed by assurances from the harassed aide who was working on it that I would be placed prominently on the "call-back" list of journalists who wanted to know.

Time passed, and so did my faith in my prominence on the list. So I did the obvious, reasonable thing—which is somehow outside government's grasp. Figuring it sounded like something the American Civil Liberties Union would know about, I called a lawyer there and was told at once that Don Martin was a youth who had been jailed for his part in a "row-out" protest against our nuclear-submarine facility in Groton, Conn. I was referred to young Mr. Martin's attorney who, after a helpful chat, in turn put me on to the federal judge in the case. The judge discussed the public aspects of the case and then suggested that I seek Justice Department permission to speak to a person he named over there who was familiar with the status of efforts to secure the youth's release.

No one who works in Washington will be surprised at the greeting I received from the (now frantic) Justice Department aide whom I called to

The writer is deputy editor of the editorial page. This column originally appeared in Newsweek.

seek that permission several hours after our original exchange. "Look," he blurted into the phone, "we're working on it, and we will call you back. We are 90 per cent certain it's something that came out of the civil-rights demonstrations in Albany, Ga., but we want to nail it down."

One cheer, then, for government's inefficiency as keeper and producer of the files. Even when it ought to know, it often doesn't. Still, one cheer is plenty. For this built-in bureaucratic maladroitness has its limits as a virtue—and also its potential as a vice. It's not just that fancy computer retrieval systems now threaten to make the utilization of government files much easier. The fact is that bureaucratic incompetence and point-missing have also managed to stuff government's files with irrelevant, damaging and false information concerning thousands of citizens.

The late Francis E. Walter, who was chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee during the time of some of its worst excesses, once told me that his own name had turned up on one of the committee's dragnet lists of potential subversives, owing to a contribution he had made to a Spanish

Civil War refugee program. He found this fact inexpressibly funny. But anyone who has ever tried to straighten out a case of mistaken identity with a credit bureau or who has followed the nightmare experiences of those public and private figures who have sought to expunge from the record half-hidden libels that have plagued their careers will know that these things are anything but funny. The Fibber McGee's closet of government-acquired information on the personal lives of citizens may be—happily—a model of disorder and inaccessibility, but from time to time someone is going to open the door.

The recently enacted federal privacy statute attempts to diminish some of these dangers. But since it is limited in scope, and leaves enforcement of new curbs on government agencies largely to the agencies themselves, I think its effect is bound to be modest. For we can take it as the nearest thing we have to an immutable law that institutions involved in intelligence gathering and record keeping can almost always think of a reason to pursue their inquiries, and almost never of a reason to close or destroy the files. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that even as members of Congress express their outrage over the FBI's prying into their private lives, there has been no congressional groundswell to dismantle the notorious files (on others) of the House Un-American Activities Committee, which was allowed to amble along, pursuing its inquiries and making its official notations until just a few weeks ago.

The sad fact is that there is hardly an agency or branch of government or political group or faction that has not somehow contributed to the condition in which we now find ourselves, including, I would add, those of us who have urged an enlarged governmental role in people's affairs over the past few decades—without thinking about this predictable result. Now we are well beyond the point where inquiries into the possible malefaction of certain government employees or passage of modest statutes can have much effect. For we have to decide not just how we wish to control this intelligence-gathering mania in the future but what we wish to do with the mountain of existing government files that clearly exceed the bounds of any decent national purpose or need. On the theory that we can't count on Washington's incompetence forever, I am for a bonfire.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 February 1975

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
2 FEB 1975

COLBY WITHHOLDS DATA ON POLICE AID

Asserts Programs of Local
Agencies Would Suffer
From C.I.A. Disclosure

By DAVID BURNHAM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 4—William E. Colby, two Director of Central Intelligence, has refused to identify police departments he says his agency assisted until two years ago because "such publication could hamper current police programs."

Mr. Colby, in a letter to Representative Edward I. Koch, Democrat-Liberal of Manhattan, said, "Confidentiality of relationships is generally a prerequisite to good intelligence. If we are forced to violate the trust and confidence under which these relationships were established, our reputation and effectiveness as a serious intelligence agency will be seriously impaired."

The Central Intelligence Agency is currently facing investigations of allegedly illegal involvement in domestic intelligence activities by committees of the House and Senate and a panel established by President Ford.

Mr. Koch first inquired about the C.I.A.'s relationships with police departments two years ago following publication in The New York Times of reports that high ranking officials in the New York Police Department had undergone training at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va.

For Dozen Departments

As a result of Mr. Koch's inquiry, the House Government Operations Committee initiated a limited investigation that resulted in the C.I.A.'s admission that it had provided assistance and training to "a dozen city and county police departments."

The agency, though it insisted that the contacts with the police departments did not violate its charter, announced, in a letter to the House committee dated Jan. 29, 1973, the termination of all such activities.

About this time, the identities of several additional police departments that had been trained or otherwise assisted by the C.I.A., became known. Besides New York, they included the departments in Washington, Boston, Fairfax County, Va., and Montgomery County, Md.

It was a letter from Mr. Koch on Jan. 9 of this year about the identity of the remaining seven departments the agency had assisted that prompted Mr. Colby to refuse to name them.

After making his request, Mr. Koch said, "With the recent press reports concerning the extensive activities of the C.I.A., I would think that the



MARIANNE MEANS

Colson & the CIA Probe

During two long prison conversations, Charles Colson has given Sen. Lowell Weicker, R-Conn., a vivid account of White House-influenced covert activities conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency during the Nixon administration.

The senator plans to volunteer the substance of those conversations to the new Senate committee to investigate CIA operations of the President's commission to probe the agency's alleged domestic surveillance activities, which is chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.

When Colson was a ruthless and powerful White House assistant pulling the strings of some Nixon team "dirty tricks," Weicker would have nothing to do with him. Their distaste was mutual. But now that Colson is behind bars, convicted of obstructing justice, Weicker has been to visit him twice.

Furthermore, Weicker has indicated to associates that he is convinced Colson is a different man, capable of being a credible witness in areas of his personal knowledge. If the investigating bodies also believe that, either or both may ask Colson to testify.

After Colson pleaded guilty to one count of obstructing justice in return for the Justice Department dropping all other charges pending against him, it was widely expected that he would provide significant information about the Watergate crimes. While a member of the inner Nixon crowd, however, Colson apparently operated somewhat independently of the others. If he knew of any bombshells implicating the president, he never dropped them.

Colson has not been fully interrogated under oath in public, however, about his knowledge of specific CIA operations. According to sources close to Weicker, Colson has now made several allegations about CIA domestic activities, at least one of which purportedly implicates Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

In the White House, Colson apparently dealt with CIA personnel occasionally. E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former CIA agent who is one of the convicted Watergate burglars,

operated from an office inside the White House listed as under Colson's general supervision. John Dean accused Colson of ordering Hunt to forge a State Department cable linking the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 with the late President Kennedy, but Colson denied the charge.

When the grim specter of prison began to loom over him, Colson dramatically became a religious convert. Despite the fact he went off to jail clutching two Bibles, not all those who used to know him are satisfied that he has sincerely reformed. But Weicker appears to believe that new and more noble impulses now motivate Colson to tell the truth.

It is interesting that it should be Weicker who has become Colson's contact with the outside world. Weicker was the most outspoken Republican on the Senate Watergate Committee, the first to denounce the Nixon crowd and the first to call for the resignations of H.R. (Bob) Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. He accused the Nixon Administration of hurting the Republican Party and "dragging politics into the gutter" and urged the internal Revenue Service to re-examine Nixon's tax deduction for his vice presidential papers, all back at a time when other GOP politicians were gingerly pussy-footing around the problem in hopes that it would vanish into thin air.

He has done his own investigations from time to time and independently disclosed the other day that a former CIA agent had viewed assassination equipment displayed by a Virginia firm which wished to sell it to the government.

He did not, however, seek a spot on the new Senate committee probing the CIA. "I don't want to be known just as an investigator," he told associates. But colleagues point out that Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, who made the selections, was not pleased by Weicker's Watergate performance and views him as an untrustworthy maverick.

It doesn't matter. Weicker runs his own show anyway.

information I am requesting could not possibly be considered classified."

According to the C.I.A. and the New York Police Department, 14 New York policemen, including former First Deputy Police Commissioner William H. I. Smith, received training in the computerized handling of intelligence information during September, 1972.

The training for the other departments reportedly included the detection of wiretaps and other secret recording devices, the techniques of secret surveillance and methods for finding explosive charges.

The C.I.A. said it did not believe the training activities violated either the letter or spirit of the 1947 law establishing the agency, which said it "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement or internal security functions" in the United States.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1975

ROCKEFELLER SEES LONGER C.I.A. INQUIRY

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 (AP)—Vice President Rockefeller said today that his commission's investigation of alleged domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency might require more than the three-month period set by President Ford.

Speaking to reporters at the end of the commission's fourth weekly meeting, Mr. Rockefeller said "we'll do our best" to complete the inquiry by April, but added that "we may have to ask for additional time."

The panel heard further testimony from Richard Ober, who

once reportedly headed a counterintelligence group, which the C.I.A. director, William E. Colby, has conceded kept files on 10,000 American citizens.

Mr. Rockefeller described Mr. Ober as the "former chief of the special operations group of C.I.A.," but refused to discuss Mr. Ober's testimony.

Mr. Ober, now on the staff of the National Security Council, again declined to make any comment to reporters. It was his second appearance before the Rockefeller commission.

Earlier, the commission heard from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., formerly No. 3 man at the agency and now a professor of political science at Brown University.

Tuesday, Feb. 4, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

Helms Ordered McCord Letters Kept From FBI, Inquiry Told

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

James W. McCord's letters to the Central Intelligence Agency written after the Watergate break-in were withheld from the Watergate prosecutors on orders from CIA Director Richard M. Helms, according to sworn testimony.

Helms ordered the letters held by the CIA, despite the strong recommendation of CIA security director Howard J. Osborn that they should be turned over to the FBI, after the agency's general counsel told Helms that the CIA had no legal obligation to give them to the FBI, according to testimony before a House subcommittee.

The letters, written between the Watergate break-in and the start of the first Watergate trial, could have had a "significant effect" on the investigation, according to acting U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert, the chief prosecutor in the first Watergate trial.

The CIA's failure to turn Watergate conspirator McCord's letters over to the investigators was called "a suppression of evidence" by Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, during closed hearings in May, 1973. Testimony from those hearings was recently made public.

Helms ordered McCord's six letters to be held by the CIA after the agency's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, told Helms "that we had no legal responsibility to pass the letter on to any other authorities" according to Houston's testimony.

Houston testified that in his experience as general counsel to the CIA since 1947 criminal defendants had attempted to construct a defense by involving the CIA. In many cases, Houston said, this attempt was a bluff and the bluff collapsed when the CIA waited out the situation.

Where the defense was actually presented, Houston said, the CIA countered it by presenting documentation or witnesses to refute the claim.

Houston did not, however persuade Nedzi during his testimony that the CIA had acted properly in withholding the letters from the FBI, the prosecutors and the Justice De-

partment.

In a session that at times became heated, Houston admitted that part of his motivation was to keep the CIA from being linked publicly to the Watergate affair.

Osborn, during his testimony on May 24, 1973, recounted how a letter signed only "Jim" in an envelope addressed to Helms with no return address had come to his desk about Aug. 1, 1972—some six weeks after the Watergate break-in. At first dismissing it as "crank mail," Osborn said he then recognized the signature as that of McCord, who had worked for Osborn at the CIA.

Osborn testified that he showed the letter to Helms and said that he was "reasonably sure" it was from McCord. "I told him that I felt very strongly that the letter should be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

Helms, Osborn said, decided to get Houston's legal advice on the matter.

"I participated, I stayed in and remained in that conversation when Mr. Houston and Mr. Helms discussed the legal aspects of it," Osborn testified. "At the time, I don't think I really agreed with it, but, you know, I worked for Mr. Helms, he was my boss."

In one letter dated Dec. 29, 1972, and addressed to one of McCord's former CIA colleagues, McCord asserted: "I have the evidence of the involvement of (former Attorney General John N.) Mitchell and others, sufficient to convince a jury, the Congress and the Press."

When Houston argued that the CIA had no legal responsibility to turn the letters over to the FBI or prosecutors, Nedzi told him that he agreed "that you had no direct legal responsibility at that time to do this," but that "the reasonable thing to have done would have been to immediately notify the FBI that such a letter was from a defendant...."

Houston said that it was "very obvious from the newspapers that any information that went to the prosecutor's office was appearing in the papers very shortly after that...."

And since the last thing we wanted to do was interject ourselves into the case and stir up newspaper stories and rumors that we had been involved, I felt that I wanted to deal with this matter with the Department of Justice and the prosecuting attorney when the issue arose as it subse-

quently did...."

The issue arose when Silbert told the CIA he was concerned that a defendant might bring the CIA into the case and asked Houston's deputy, John Warner, a series of questions about the CIA.

The answers to Silbert's questions, contained in what Houston described as an "elaborate report," went not to Silbert but to his superiors at the Justice Department. Houston then did not mention McCord's letters, he testified, because "I honestly didn't think of it."

At another point, Houston asserted that the letters were "not pertinent to the FBI's interest."

"Why wouldn't you let the FBI make that determination?" Nedzi asked Houston.

Houston also attempted to justify his recommendation by explaining, "I was not asked to give it (McCord's letter), I was asked whether we had to give it, and in my opinion I said, 'No.'"

"Your opinion, in my judgment," Armed Services Committee chief counsel Frank M. Slatinshek told Houston, "was very, very poor."

Nedzi told Houston that he understood the desire to "keep the agency's skirts clean," but he added, "under these circumstances, the desires seem,

to be somewhat excessive because I do think that in effect there has been a suppression of evidence."

Osborn also told the subcommittee that while investigating the contacts of the Watergate conspirators with the CIA, he had been told by Helms to "forget about" a matter involving the loan by the CIA of a wig, tape recorder and other materials to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. Osborn said Helms told him, "I will handle that. You take care of the rest of it."

Helms' sworn testimony before the Senate Select Watergate committee appears to conflict with the testimony given by Osborn and Houston. Helms was asked on Aug. 2, 1973 by assistant chief counsel David Dorsen if "any relative information (was) withheld by the CIA to the FBI and Justice Department, information that you were aware of while the events were taking place in June, July or August of 1972."

"Sir, I do not believe so," Helms replied, "Does the record show that there was anything of this kind?"

Dorsen replied that he had no evidence to the contrary. "Well," Helms said, "I do not either, but I just want to be sure that my recollection tracked with the facts."

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 4 FEB 1975

"ABC News Closeup," which plans to present a TV report next May on the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday that it had received permission to take its cameras inside the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. The program, however, does not expect to reveal any secret information.

Av Westin, a vice president of ABC News and director of TV documentaries, said:

"The Central Intelligence Agency has broken a precedent by agreeing to our request to admit cameras for an extensive look at the agency. We will have access to examine and film specific elements in the intelligence gathering operations."

William Colby, CIA director, and other agency officials and employees will be interviewed on the documentary, Westin said. "Our purpose is to develop an objective, balanced report on the CIA covering its functions, its policies and its methods of operation."

WASHINGTON POST
12 February 1975

Soldier, Agent, Tax Man, Spy

By William Greider

The author is a member of the national staff of The Washington Post.

SEPARATE scandals, as they become known one by one, read like a rough draft of "1984."

The U.S. Army was uptight about Oleo Strut, a GI coffeehouse outside Ft. Hood, Pa., and so Oleo Strut was put under surveillance by military intelligence agents.

The FBI, among other things, was busy trying to penetrate the Black Student Union at Pennsylvania Military College, a quiet campus in Chester, Pa.

The IRS was scanning the tax returns of the Cummings Engine Foundation, looking for violations because that tax-exempt foundation gave some money to black activists and New Left theoreticians.

The CIA, which is supposed to gather intelligence on foreign powers, instead was listening columnist Jack Anderson and his associates.

Those disjointed fragments are now beginning to form a more coherent picture: over the past eight years, the American government devoted enormous energy to a secret activity—spying on American citizens. It was done with videotape cameras and electronic bugs, with undercover agents and paid informers, with fancy computers and with the tacit consent or even encouragement of two Presidents from both political parties.

As usual, Sam Ervin, the retired senator from North Carolina, said it well: "Unfortunately, in the heat of political crisis, government and the men that wield its power become frightened by opinions they dislike. Their reaction is to combat those views by any power they have at hand—except the power of better ideas and better government."

The Fear Reflex

HOW DID IT happen? What is to prevent its happening again? If the new congressional committees on intelligence seriously confront the complex history of these episodes, they will find that the most important questions are still largely unanswered.

The issues of legality which surround government surveillance are at best unsettled and, even now, civil libertarians argue that there is no firm legal barrier to prevent similar controversies if the nation finds itself in a future period of domestic turmoil.

What is the long-term danger? It may sound melodramatic to invoke the image of George Orwell's "1984." And yet, if society fails to punish political spying or to build strong preventives into the

enough to envision the eventual acceptance of these practices as legitimate activities, not just in times of social stress, but always. That path would surely lead to a society quite different from the American ideal, a place where unorthodox ideas and free expression are permanently inhibited by the government's computer memory.

It is still not entirely clear what decisions produced this explosion of surveillance and dirty tricks. There are at least two competing theories. One, which might be called the theory of "spontaneous combustion," suggests that these various branches of government, watching the same frightening events, reacted individually but in similar ways. The other theory holds that the CIA or the FBI weren't acting irresponsibly on their own passion but were following "orders from above."

Although the factual evidence isn't settled, at least this much is clear: that these activities grew out of common reflexes of fear, that the regular inhibitions of decent men or traditional legal restraints which are supposed to prevent such abuses of power proved inadequate, not just in the CIA or the Justice Department or the FBI, but in the White House. Cities were burning. Radicals were, indeed, planting bombs in public buildings. The citizens' protest movement against the war in Vietnam—which seemed so impotent in terms of changing government policy—was most effective in frightening the men who made that policy.

Looking back, the circumstantial evidence does suggest that all of these activities were interrelated, at least to some degree. In a sense, that is mitigating testimony for the individual agencies. If one concludes that all of these bureaucracies were responding to the same alarm bells, then it is more difficult to portray the CIA or the FBI as a secret police force that has run amok in a democratic society.

Two Periods of Reaction

THE SIMPLIFIED history of events runs like this:

There were two distinct periods of fear when the federal government mobilized to gather intelligence on society's trouble-makers, whether they were anti-war demonstrators or black activists in America's central cities.

The first was in late 1967, after a tumultuous summer of urban riots, when the Justice Department under Attorney General Ramsey Clark formed its Inter-Divisional Infor-

mation and President Johnson's White House expressed to various departments—from the CIA to the Pentagon—the need for better intelligence on the domestic discord.

A lot of things started in those months: In the spring of 1968, for instance, the FBI ordered its 59 field offices to develop "ghetto informants," at least one for each of the bureau's 8,000 agents. It also launched its now-infamous COINTELPRO operations aimed at disrupting New Left groups. It broadened its regular surveillance, including wiretaps and paid infiltrators, on both black and anti-war groups.

The Army, in that same period, issued an "intelligence collection plan"—distributed to 300 federal offices—which authorized surveillance on the premise that riots were caused by "militant agitators" and "rabble-rousing meetings and fiery agitation speeches of extremist civil rights groups." Military intelligence was equally interested in monitoring "subversive" efforts like the underground newspapers and GI coffeehouses which were fostering "resistance to the Army."

The CIA, as the public recently learned, also participated in its own limited way. The intelligence agency "inserted" 10 agents inside dissident groups in the Washington area, on the pretext that it was protecting CIA buildings against assault.

The second time of crisis within the government—which is better known probably because it was well exposed during the Watergate scandal—came in the summer of 1970 when a young White House aide named Tom Charles Huston wrote his famous memo calling on all agencies, from Justice to the CIA to the Pentagon's National Security Agency, to sign up for a broad and explicitly illegal campaign of surveillance. All but J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI were willing.

The CIA, by its own account, became active again, planting a dozen or so agents inside "dissident circles," allegedly to search for foreign connections. The Internal Revenue Service, meantime, had initiated in the summer of 1969 its own "special services staff," collecting names of political dissenters and investigating their taxes. And the FBI was sending its agents onto college campuses, with orders to start files on every Black Student Union in the nation.

Tantalizing Leads

IN BOTH PERIODS, the record is studied with tantalizing leads, essentially unresolved, which suggest that these various programs were more closely coordinated than anyone has quite admitted. For instance:

- When Ramsey Clark issued his first marching order for the IDIU, he noted: "You are free to consult with the FBI and other intelligence agencies in the government to draw on their experience in maintaining similar units, to explore the possibilities of obtaining information we do not now receive."

- Clark's assistant attorney general for civil rights, John Doar, suggested trading information with the poverty program's agencies, the Internal Revenue Service, the Narcotics Bureau, the Post Office, and the Alcohol, Tax and Tobacco unit of Treasury.

- The Army's various intelligence collec-

lors shared their information with Justice on a regular basis and, indeed, got frequent requests for data. After Army photographers, posing as "Midwest Video," took films of the demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago, Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher asked for copies.

- An Army "collection plan" issued in 1968 listed the CIA among the cooperating agencies which would provide information.

- The IRS, when it launched its super-secret program aimed at radicals, started with 77 names and quickly grew to a file with 11,458 names. About 55 per cent came from the FBI, but IRS also "coordinated" with the Defense Department and sought Secret Service files. The IRS targets included those on both the left and the right—local chapters of moderate civil rights organizations, a Black Muslim temple, a Jewish organization, labor unions, a law students' association, three universities, even a branch of the Republican Party.

- When the CIA got into the business, it received names from Justice's IDIU and the FBI. In turn, the CIA traded its own data with metropolitan police departments all over the country, most of whom have their own "red squads" to look after political dissenters.

- At various times, many of these agencies were called together to "coordinate," though officials of each insisted later that they were not familiar with the particulars of what others were doing. Thus, for example, former Attorney General Clark has denied knowing about the Army spying, though his own IDIU got data from it, or even knowing about the FBI's COINTELPRO, though it was in his own department.

- Victor Marchetti, formerly a high official at CIA, recalled recently that in 1967 President Johnson was pushing the intelligence community to pursue the anti-war movement more actively and that Director Richard Helms resisted much of the pressure. "Helms came in one day [to a daily CIA meeting] and said the military would handle most of the action and the FBI would help out," Marchetti related. "In the CIA, you get the feeling this was a put-off story, the cover story. I learned subsequently the agency was training local police forces in this country. If you were going into domestic intelligence work, it would make sense to train the police and maybe penetrate them."

During the Nixon years, Huston assembled all of the agencies at the same table. The Nixon administration claimed that the so-called Huston Plan was never implemented, but the same organizations—the FBI, the CIA, NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service and the White House—met weekly for two years afterwards under the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, a group launched by Robert Mardian when he was assistant attorney general for internal security. In 1972, after the Army had pulled back from its massive spying, it still lent a hand to Mardian's IEC, including three counter-intelligence analysts sent to help out at the national political conventions.

The "Deniability" Principle

WHO REALLY KNEW what was going on? The bureaucratic principle of "deniability" seems to have permeated the government, and it is hard to reach precise conclusions. The civilian managers at the

Pentagon, for instance, insisted later that they were misled by Army intelligence people who blandly asserted that the bulk of the intelligence information was collected by the FBI and merely passed on for Army analysis. There are a lot of internal documents which seem to corroborate that claim.

On the other hand, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze approved 100 new slots for Army intelligence in 1968 (trimming the Army request from 167). What were all those jobs supposed to be for? And in early 1969 Army General Counsel Robert E. Jordan tried to persuade the Nixon administration to adopt a new inter-agency policy restricting the military role and shifting the main responsibility for spying to the Justice Department (the effort failed). Why make that policy fight if no one grasped what was going on?

Who knew about the Army spying? In the summer of 1969, after the change of administrations, the new under secretary of the Army got a phone call from Fred Vinson, former assistant attorney general in Ramsey Clark's Justice Department. Vinson, according to an Army memorandum, "had indicated that he was concerned about the Army's role in domestic intelligence activities and that he understood the Army had 'two separate computerized intelligence setups.'" How did a Justice Department official know what Pentagon officials claimed not to know?

In short, while investigations have not yet pinned down the precise relationships between these various surveillance activities, it is clear that the traditional jurisdictional lines between agencies became almost meaningless. The "files" are interwoven. They fed upon each other. The computer tapes traveled freely around town, from Pennsylvania Avenue to Langley to an IRS computer in Rockville.

Undoing the damage which those files can inflict on individual reputations, careers, credit ratings or whatever is not so easy. The Army, for instance, issued what it regards as very tough regulations in early 1971, halting general surveillance and requiring all intelligence units to "clean" their files, to reduce the holdings drastically and to re-verify periodically any information which is still there.

Two years later, however, when Pentagon inspection teams went out, they found some curious items.

At Travis Air Force Base, the intelligence office still held data such as an "estimate of Enemy Situations," including reports on several local dissident groups "which were targeted against Travis AFB and which were thought to pose a real or potential threat to the base." Another California air base still had a list of "enemy forces" covering leftist groups dating back to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade of the Spanish civil war.

At the Presidio Army headquarters in San Francisco, the files still contained a listing of local personalities whom the local military intelligence officers regarded as worth watching—Communists, socialists and others.

At Fort Dix, N.J., the inspectors found lists of organizations and people dating back to 1964. In Hawaii, military intelligence was still keeping tabs on "Liberated Barracks," a GI underground newspaper which the files proclaimed was "targeted against the military" and, therefore, subject to surveillance under the new rules.

In Washington, the Pentagon announces periodically that it has discovered yet an-

other file system or computer bank that was supposed to be purged in 1971. Just a few weeks ago, they found a microfilm library on civilians at the Forrestal Building.

In bureaucratic language, when a file is "purged," it does not necessarily mean that it has been "destroyed." Sometimes the material is simply stored elsewhere in a "non-active" status. The CIA, for that matter, has been "eliminating" names from its own counterintelligence files on 10,000 Americans, but that does not really settle things. So far, about 1,000 names have been removed from the active index, but Director William E. Colby noted that these "could be reconstituted should this be required."

Except for official good intentions, there is not much to prevent any of these agencies from again launching a general surveillance of citizens they regard as "dangerous" to the national survival. The CIA, for instance, has acknowledged halting some activities of dubious propriety, but it has not conceded that any of them—from burglary to opening private mail—was illegal.

Attorney General William Saxbe condemned the FBI's COINTELPRO as a deplorable use of government power—but FBI Director Clarence Kelley refused to do so.

The Army's tougher regulations require approval for covert operations at high levels in the civilian management, but the rules still permit something called "Aggressive Counterintelligence Programs," as well as "clandestine" operations defined as "illegal," if Pentagon officials decide the "threat" is serious enough.

The fact is that, despite strong opinions on the impropriety of these activities, the questions of their legality have not been settled by Congress or the courts. One test of sincerity for the various intelligence agencies will be whether they support legislation making political surveillance by them an explicit offense. Last year, when Sen. Ervin proposed such a limitation for the military, the Pentagon helped block the bill. In the meantime, a long list of cases is working its way through the courts, intended to define the citizen's protection against an overly curious government.

Is it legal for any government agency, for instance, to commit a burglary—entering private premises without a warrant—even to ensure that an employee is not leaking national secrets? The Fourth Amendment says not, and there is no law which authorizes such tactics. The CIA might claim some vague authority inherent in its charter responsibilities—"the protection of intelligence sources and methods"—but John Ehrlichman lost in court when he invoked a similar "national security" argument as the defense for the Ellsberg burglary.

Breaking-and-entering, however, is probably the clearest of the issues. Opening private mail, for instance, is widely regarded as forbidden without a search warrant, but one government official says there is a national security exception which might cover the CIA's extended "mail cover" programs.

Conflicting Commands

WHAT ABOUT political spying generally, or keeping files on citizens who have not been charged with any crime, much less convicted of one?

The question, even when applied to the CIA, is more complicated than it seems. It is true that the National Security Act of 1947 prohibits the CIA from any "internal security" functions, but the charter also authorizes the agency not only to protect

"intelligence sources and methods" but to perform "such other functions" which the National Security Council assigns it. Thus, the CIA charter has one restrictive command telling the agency to stay out of domestic surveillance—and two loopholes which might be used to justify just about anything in the name of "national security."

The question of what those words mean has been litigated only once, apparently, and the CIA won. According to Thomas B. Ross of the Chicago Sun-Times, co-author of "The Invisible Government," a federal judge held in a 1966 civil libel suit involving a CIA agent that the agency does have authority to collect its foreign intelligence inside the United States.

"The fact that the immediate intelligence source is located in the United States does not make it an 'internal security function' over which the CIA has no authority," Judge Roszel C. Thomsen declared. "The court concludes that activities by the CIA to protect its foreign intelligence sources located in the United States are within the power granted by Congress to the CIA."

When Sen. Ervin's subcommittee investigated Army spying, Ervin concluded: "There is no question that military surveillance of civilian political activity is illegal, at least in the sense that it was not authorized by law."

But William Rehnquist, who was then assistant attorney general, argued that the President's constitutional responsibility to see "that the laws be faithfully executed" gives the executive branch not just authority to prosecute crimes, but also to prevent them. Under that inherent power, he argued, surveillance aimed at preventing violence or civil disturbances was legitimate.

Rehnquist, as it happened, got another chance to express his views on the same matter after he became a Supreme Court justice. Over the protest of ACLU lawyers, he cast the deciding vote in *Tatum v. Laird*, ruling against a challenge to Army spying which contended that the mere act of military surveillance "chilled" the First Amendment right of free political expression of Arlo Tatum, an anti-war activist who was "targeted" by military intelligence.

The Supreme Court held that a citizen could not sue the government for spying unless he can prove that the surveillance damaged him in some tangible way. Now the American Civil Liberties Union lawyers are

moving forward with new cases intended to show just that. Among the plaintiffs are Americans living in Germany who were under Army surveillance in 1972 as members of the Berlin Democratic Club and who had their security clearances held up as a result.

"The Army files," says ACLU lawyer John Shattuck, "all state that these people were doing things that might pose a threat to the military. What these people were doing was campaigning for George McGovern."

Showing "Probable Cause"

DESPITE THE SETBACK of the Tatum case, Shattuck is generally optimistic about the series of lawsuits now aimed at limiting the government's discretion in surveillance, including the one against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for the 17 "national security" wiretaps authorized by the Nixon administration in 1969 and another to be filed soon against the CIA's counter-intelligence files.

"We're trying to have the courts set standards that would prohibit the CIA, the FBI and the Army from having a free hand to do whatever they want to do," Shattuck says. "They are operating essentially without authority in all of these areas. The only thing they can point to is the kind of generalized authority."

Meanwhile, the ACLU is pushing Congress to draw the toughest standards of all. A variety of reform proposals has been introduced, ranging from flat prohibition of political spying to strict procedural systems requiring a court warrant for any surveillance of private citizens by any agency. Shattuck wants to have both.

Thus, if a government agency perceives a possible crime or even a potential crime, it would have to demonstrate "probable cause" before a federal judge to secure a warrant. "If the executive branch is so paranoid that it believes the courts are a security risk, then we're really in bad shape in this country," Shattuck says.

The Busing Case

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES in the past have successfully resisted any legislation in that direction, partly on the practical ground that the FBI, for example, might have to take every investigation before a judge to prove that it's criminal, not political.

Beyond that, the distinctions between criminal and political sometimes become highly debatable. In the 1960s, for example, the FBI penetrated and disrupted the Ku Klux Klan without much complaint from liberals.

The anti-busing controversy in South Boston right now offers a better example of the dilemma. Nick Flannery, director of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, wrote to the Justice Department last month, complaining that the FBI was not aggressive enough in its surveillance of an anti-busing organization which he feared would stimulate violence.

"At the very minimum," Flannery wrote, "the bureau should have developed informants in ROAR [for Restore Our Alienated Rights] and its agents should be at South Boston High and elsewhere, depending on their intelligence data to act upon violations of law, as they are committed, rather than investigating after the fact on the basis of complaints."

Yet that is precisely the sort of rationale which led the Army and the FBI and others to spy on anti-war organizations and black groups in the late 1960s—the fear of violent protest. They were "political" organizations. So is ROAR. The Justice Department is caught in the middle again.

But the close cases are not the heart of the controversy. So much of the surveillance activities of recent years have been so massive and aimless in scope that the connection with possible criminal charges is tenuous or non-existent. Sen. Ervin's admonition to the Internal Revenue Service might just as well apply to the other agencies. "The purpose of the IRS," Ervin warned, "is to enforce the tax laws, not to enforce political orthodoxy."

In a way, the remedy for legitimate law enforcement interests—as opposed to aimless desires for political surveillance—might be just what the ACLU has proposed: a clear definition of the purposes for which a government agency can spy on someone. If that agency cannot convince a third party, such as a federal judge, that it has in mind a legitimate investigation of crime, then it ought to keep hands off. Obviously, this would inhibit the investigators and, no doubt, it would reduce the amount of surveillance undertaken. That is precisely what's needed.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

9 February 1975

U.S. ENVOY IN PERU SAYS CIA HAD NO HAND IN RIOTS

LIMA, Peru (UPI)—U.S. Ambassador Robert W. Dean Saturday issued a statement denying allegations in Peruvian newspapers that agents of the Central Intelligence Agency had helped instigate violent riots in Lima.

"As the representative of the government of the United States in Peru, I state categorically that neither the CIA nor any other agency of the U.S. government has been involved in any way in these lamentable events," Dean said in a communique distributed to all Peruvian news media.

Twenty Peruvian military judges Saturday began hearing the cases against 1,300 persons arrested for stemming from riots earlier this week

that were touched off by the army's repression of a police strike.

Embassy officials said that Dean's statement was partially motivated by concern for the safety of the American community in Lima because of attacks on the embassy during the rioting.

"When you have 47 windows smashed, an embassy Jeep burnt up, a bullet fired at the embassy and at least two attempts to put the torch to the embassy and send it up in flames, you begin to grow concerned about anti-American feeling and want to do what little you can to modify it," a U.S. diplomat said.

Military justice prevails under the

NEW YORK TIMES
11 February 1975
**TOP EX-C.I.A. AIDES
HEARD BY INQUIRY**

By LINDA CHARLTON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10—James J. Angleton, the former chief of counterintelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency, was the principal witness today at the fifth weekly meeting of the Presidential commission investigating alleged illegal domestic activity by the C.I.A.

Mr. Angleton, who refused to comment before and after the closed meeting, testified from about 2 P.M. until 4:45 P.M. Earlier, the panel heard from Vice Adm. William F. Raborn Jr., who testified for more than an hour.

Admiral Raborn, who headed the agency from April, 1965, to June, 1966, was asked by reporters if the C.I.A. had undertaken any illegal domestic activities during his tenure.

"Not to my knowledge," he replied.

In response to another question, he said that he believed the investigation would be "useful" to the C.I.A. rather than damaging.

His appearance was viewed as more or less routine, since the panel has heard testimony from all part directors of the agency.

Mr. Angleton, however, is viewed as a key witness in the investigation. He resigned in December, after 31 years with the agency. This followed the first news articles about the agency's domestic activities, which are prohibited by its charter.

Six Members Present

Only six of the eight members of the panel, which is headed by Vice President Rockefeller, were present for today's meeting. C. Douglas Dillon, former secretary of the Treasury, was absent for the second week in a row, and Ronald Reagan, the former California Governor, missed his fourth consecutive meeting. Speaking schedule has permitted him to attend just part of the first commission meeting. Offered to resign. Mr. Rockefeller dissuaded him, however, and transcripts of the testimony are being sent to a military installation near Los Angeles, where they can be kept in secure files, for Mr. Reagan's convenience in reading them. Mr. Reagan is expected to be at next Monday's meeting, as he will be in Washington over the weekend for a conference.

In a related development today, Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, announced that he planned to introduce tomorrow a bill authorizing the General Accounting Office to audit the expenditures of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies in the Federal government.

"The C.I.A.," Mr. Proxmire said in a speech prepared for the Senate, "and other intelligence agencies have protected themselves from Congressional view by not allowing audits of their programs."

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feb. 11, 1975

Chief of Staff Of CIA Probe 'Independent'

By William Greider
Washington Post Staff Writer

David W. Belin, the Iowa lawyer who is chief of staff for the presidential commission investigating the CIA, describes himself as "a philosophical independent conservative" with polite emphasis on the "independent."

People familiar with Belin's career as a Des Moines lawyer and a Republican Party strategist, plus his wide-ranging intellectual interests, predict that his temporary tenure in Washington will confirm the point.

Belin will not yet discuss the investigative strategy of the commission's staff, which is still being assembled, but he has set this goal:

"The No. 1 requirement is to have an independent staff of high capability and integrity."

Belin himself has a streak of independence in his past.

A Republican party loyalist, he campaigned for the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1968—but declined to do so in 1972, when the GOP victory was overwhelming.

On the touchstone issue of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Belin was a "dove" long before that became a popular political position, indeed, even before President Johnson's Democratic administration entered the war.

On legal issues, he calls himself a "strict constructionist," but he played a role in winning a Supreme Court decision in 1967 that extended the constitutional right of competent legal representation for the poor. Belin also took a strong hand in the legal fight for reapportionment of Iowa's state legislature.

As a lawyer, he has concentrated on corporation work but his clients also include two Democratic congressmen from Iowa—Edward Mezvinsky of Iowa City and Berkley Bedell of Spirit Lake.

Among other things, the 46-year-old lawyer helped Bedell, a wealthy fishing tackle manufacturer, organize a private foundation called the Research Foundation for a Better America, it has given money to such varied projects as a self-help housing program run by Chicago blacks and a Quaker bail-bond release project in Des Moines.

Belin's service as one of 14 staff lawyers on the Warren Commission investigation of the John F. Kennedy assassination is what led to his appointment for the current inquiry. He got to know Gerald Ford, who was a member of the Warren Commission, and is the author of "November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury," a book that examines the assassination evidence and rebuts critics of the Warren Commission report, though it also takes issue with some of the commission's own decisions.

Last month, Belin was offered a job in the Ford administration. He turned it down, but the White House returned with a request to take on the staff assignment with the commission chaired by Vice President Rockefeller. He and Rockefeller are not old friends, but Belin did provide political advice for Rockefeller's presidential campaigns in 1964 and 1968.

The commission, now a month old, is still getting security clearances for its staff, expected to be seven to 10 people. Belin said he took special care in selecting lawyers of substantial experience.

"We have to have a dual concern," he said, "a concern for the protection of effective intelligence gathering and for the individual rights of Americans and I expect every member of the staff to share those concerns."

The commission originally was given a deadline of April 1 but Rockefeller has hinted that the inquiry may need more time. Belin isn't concerned about time; he informed his law firm back in Des Moines—Herrick, Langdon, Belin, Harris, Langdon and Helmick—not to expect him back before July 1.

Belin, Phi Beta Kappa at the University of Michigan and an honors graduate of the Michigan law school, started out to be a concert violinist. He was born in Washington, D.C., and grew up in Sioux City, Iowa. After two years in the Army, including service in Japan as a violinist, he turned to business and law.

Belin's view of the current controversy is shaped in part by his close familiarity with the Kennedy assassination, his strong positions on Vietnam and his subsequent concern about Watergate.

"I look back on Nov. 2, 1963, as a tremendous psychological turning point," Belin said. "During the early '60s, there was a vibrant feeling in the country, a feeling of hope about the government and the people. Then with the assassination, followed by Vietnam, followed by Watergate, you have so many people who say, 'a plague on both your parties.' There's a great skepticism, a great cynicism that people have about government. I don't."

The CIA investigation, Belin hopes, will "make some small contribution to the restoration of credibility in government."

On Vietnam, Belin said he and his wife, the former Constance Newman from Grand Rapids, Mich., were "doves" dating from the 1950s when she wrote a research paper at Michigan on the impossibility of maintaining French colonialism in Indochina.

"I was very, very anti-Lyndon Johnson and his approach there," Belin said. In 1968, he campaigned enthusiastically for Richard Nixon and served as chairman of the Iowa Lawyers for Nixon. But when they asked him to take a comparable position in the 1972 campaign, Belin declined.

"There were many Nixon policies that were very sound, the rapprochement

WASHINGTON STAR
13 February 1975

Charles Bartlett:

Poking at the Turtle

with China, for instance," Belin said. "I felt the domestic policy they were following was wrong, particularly the approach of Agnew in attacking young people."

Belin is writing a second book, this one about the Republican Party and whether it has a future.

"One of my arguments," he said, "is that the Republican Party, which is so closely identified with business, does not take a very business-like approach in the marketplace of voters. We all knew that young voters were going to be important, yet Vice President Agnew attacked them. When the kids were raising cane about the war in Vietnam, a very legitimate concern, and Agnew attacked them, Mr. Agnew and I parted company."

Belin voted for Nixon in 1972 but became "very concerned" afterwards as the Watergate scandal developed, partly because one of his pet interests is openness in government. Belin's work on the Warren Commission staff taught him how difficult it sometimes is to get information from government agencies and he hopes that lesson will serve him in the CIA inquiry.

When Belin was appointed, his hometown newspaper, the Des Moines Register, sent him off to Washington with this high praise:

"He is a man of integrity and we believe he will insist on freedom to dig out the facts. If he finds he cannot get the facts from CIA, we believe he will so report to the public. If the commission does not agree with his findings, he also will make that evident to the public."

All that Belin will say on that question is that he is "a philosophical independent conservative."

WASHINGTON STAR
8 February 1975

Ikle Worried Over CIA Probe

The nation's ranking arms control official is concerned that U.S. intelligence agencies might not be able to do their jobs in the future if zeal to expose improprieties of the past damages their effectiveness.

Fred C. Ikle, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in a speech in Cleveland yesterday that the CIA cannot perform its role in arms control verification unless the law permits it to do the

The CIA is being poked at like a turtle on the beach. And it will be nice to get it back where it belongs, swimming under water.

The turtle-baiters are presently bent on establishing that the intelligence agency and its former director, Richard Helms, were more responsive than anyone admits to the presidential paranoia which caused Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to push their investigative talent into gray areas.

On a story like this, the press moves in like a ship's crew hitting shore on Saturday night. When they spot a joint, they barge in, break up the furniture, rough up the customers and move on. When the joint turns out to be an institution wrapped in mystery, the binge becomes a crusade. And at the end of the escapade, those who are left to survey the shambles wonder how it all began.

Perspective gets lost in the excitement. So it is important to make two points about Helms. He was plainly fired by Nixon as director of CIA, a job he dearly loved, because he failed to cooperate in obscuring the Watergate crimes. Nixon dumped him as soon as the election was over and tried to cover the deed by having two loyalists, John Scali and Charles Colson, spread the word that Henry Kissinger, absent in Paris, wanted Helms out. The truth was that Kissinger had argued hard for Helms's retention. He is said now to be deeply angry at the present CIA director, William Colby, for seeking purity by making it easier for the wreckers to move in on Helms.

REGARDING HELMS' lack of candor with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it should be remembered that in the days of bitter divisions over Vietnam, it was not safe for any executive official to entrust volatile information to the full committee's care. This disarray caused the Senate to make a formal decision against including the Fulbright committee in the congressional review of CIA affairs.

Senators are still asking themselves

how much a politician can afford to know about the nation's spies. One aspect of the problem was well put by Sen. Clifford Case, R.-N.J., when he said recently, "I have been very skeptical of an oversight committee because I can't see what good a committee does if it can't tell what it knows."

Similarly if Helms had conveyed to the senators all the ugly facts of cash payments to anti-Communist elements in Chile, those preoccupied with their public images would have faced an awkward choice. They could keep quiet and share responsibility for the exercise or they could explode and stir an international ruckus. The CIA can only be objectively and comfortably monitored by politicians who are not liberals running for president.

THE HARD fact is that members of Congress have not given the CIA enough constructive attention to inhibit presidents from misusing its agents. Thus the overdrawn allegation of a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation" arose from the agency's penetration of the anti-war groups in the Vietnam era.

If these penetrations exceeded the limits of the national security act, it was because President Johnson kept pushing Helms to probe. Helms's status at the White House was not helped by his necessity to keep reporting that he could find no alien elements.

There is a role for Congress and a need to establish some new rules. But it is hard to see how Congress will solve any problems by poking at the turtle about controversies that arose from the old rules.

IF CONGRESS and the press manage to break up the joint, the winners will be the Soviets. Another consequence will be the loss of civilian control over intelligence estimates of Soviet military strength.

So those who want tight limits on defense budgets will be big losers if the turtle doesn't make it back into the sea.

necessary "detective work."

Arms control would come to a dead end if the CIA is hamstrung by ongoing investigations, he said. "We cannot have arms control without good intelligence capabilities," Ikle declared.

"Verifiable arms limitations, such as agreed to in SALT, give us and our adversaries a firmer basis on which to predict what forces each side will deploy," Ikle said. "Unfortunately, the means of veri-

fication used for strategic arms limitation cannot necessarily serve to verify other types of arms control agreements."

He said the Soviet Union does not make public enough information on its military budget so that other nations can make estimates about Russian military procurement programs. As an example, he said, the 1974 Soviet defense budget was announced by Moscow as 18 billion rubles, while the U.S. estimates it was about 60 billion rubles.

WASHINGTONIAN
FEBRUARY 1975

JAMES ANGLETON: The Spy Forced in from the Cold



One summer evening several years ago, five men stood casting for trout in a secluded Midwestern river. Four were Americans; all practiced anglers. The fifth was a Russian, obviously an amateur. His line kept snagging on boughs, yet he enjoyed himself hugely, standing rubber-booted in the swirling water and nipping vodka from a flask.

The host was James Angleton, who recently resigned after 31 years as chief of counter-espionage for the Central Intelligence Agency. The Russian was a high official of the KGB (Soviet secret service), who had defected to the US. The others were CIA.

In such tranquil spots Angleton, a keen student of human psychology, often has reaped his richest rewards. Defectors are fearful of pursuit and assassination, torn by conflicting loyalties. Angleton, a soft-spoken yet firm man, spends months helping them unwind, winning their confidence—and eventually extracting valuable information. It was through defectors that he uncovered such top-grade British KGB spies as Kim Philby and George Blake.

"Jim's forte is patience," said a veteran colleague. "I've seen him in a river at dusk, the rain coming down, casting slowly hour after hour, trying different flies until the trout strikes. He outwits and outwaits them—as he does with spies."

A few weeks ago Angleton and his three top deputies—representing among them 120 years of combined counter-espionage experience—were forced out following *New York Times* charges that the CIA had staged "massive" and "illegal" intelligence operations against American anti-war dissidents during the early Nixon years. More than 10,000 files on Americans were compiled, the paper claimed. Angleton's counter-espionage branch was singled out as the culprit.

Angleton has steadfastly denied that his relatively small staff had any reason—let alone the manpower—for the time-consuming, onerous task of running surveillance on Americans inside the US. Under the law, he has told friends, only the FBI has the authority and the resources for such work. "He could have cared less about the kids protesting the Vietnam war," one CIA watcher said.

However the CIA, in accordance with its statutory responsibilities, did keep an eye abroad on dissident groups, such as the Black Panthers, who were tracked from Algiers to Moscow to North Korea, where they took demolitions training before filtering back into the US and going underground. Such Americans were reported to the FBI, Angleton has insisted.

As to the charge of compiling 10,000 files, CIA colleagues have pointed out that the agency has automatic access to all FBI files—more than 100 million—and would have voluminous files on all Americans who have ever had contacts abroad with enemy or friendly intelligence services.

The identification of Angleton's unit in the original *New York Times* story of December 22 had the earmarks of authoritative guidance from highly placed sources within the CIA. Since then, however, the *Times* appears to have shifted the focus of its charges to another CIA unit—the Domestic Operations Division—with which Angleton and the counter-espionage staff have no connection.

There are grounds for believing that Angleton's dismissal caps 18 months of growing tension between him and new CIA director William E. Colby. Colby's CIA career has been spent primarily in covert labor activities and in the Far East. He has told his staff that he must devote 95 percent of his time to briefing the White House, Congress, and the news media. He is said to have little time for or interest in the complexities of counter-espionage.

Congress, in creating the CIA in 1947, specifically barred it from "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions." These were reserved for the FBI. But at the same time, with characteristic imprecision, Congress ordered the CIA to "protect" intelligence sources and methods and to perform at the National Security Council's request additional services of "common concern" and "such other functions and duties" as the NSC might require. The gray areas here are obvious.

Since spies and other subversives are travelling increasingly in and out of the US, the system works only when CIA-FBI liaison is good. For 20 years Angleton worked closely with his friend Sam Papich, the FBI liaison officer. But in 1969 the late J. Edgar Hoover, incensed that President Lyndon B. Johnson had failed to defend him from charges by Senator Edward V. Long of Missouri that the FBI was tapping his phone, preemptively ended virtually all FBI liaison—not only with the CIA but with all other US in-

telligence agencies.

"It was a disgrace," said a knowledgeable intelligence source. "Nixon found out about it on taking office but he didn't dare tangle with Hoover, who was popular in the country and on the Hill. Besides, Nixon was more uptight about anti-war militants and rioters in the cities than about foreign spies."

Angleton, the eye of the current storm, is a most unlikely spy-catcher. Six feet tall, stooped, his thick, grizzled hair parted almost in the middle, he gazes out through his bifocals with the courtly, faintly quizzical charm of a New England professor. He dresses conservatively. His voice is quiet, meticulous, but assumes a faint rasp when he's angry.

His character is one of sharp contrasts. Children and animals seem to instinctively love him, but by profession he had to be suspicious of the adult world around him. He was obsessed with the KGB and with preventing any penetration of the CIA by a "mole"—the spy who works his way into an intelligence agency, as described so vividly by John le Carré in the best-selling novel, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*.

He has lunch nearly every day at La Niçoise in Georgetown, preferring fish, particularly fresh flounder, accompanied by a bottle of French wine. Once as a practical joke, someone at the restaurant put a microphone in the flowers on his table. Angleton almost immediately noticed it, looked at his companion with a finger to his lips, and removed the vase.

For years he has moved in an aura of discreet mystery, an enigmatic character even to his CIA colleagues, though his staff swear by him. His wife Cecilie, grown son, and two daughters long have been accustomed to his frequent, unexplained absences. He claims that for years they thought he worked "somewhere high in the Post Office."

As befits one in his curious trade he often works when others sleep. Not infrequently he will drop in on a friend at ten at night, sitting until two AM, chain-smoking, sipping bourbon and water, now and then rubbing a hand over his forehead and eyes, chatting tirelessly, his mind fully alert. He is discretion personified, turning away awkward questions with an elliptical answer. Even at two AM he sometimes will phone an intelligence contact and, in murmured tones, announce his impending arrival.

For weeks he will disappear, then arrive at the home of friends, bearing a magnificent cattleya orchid raised in his own greenhouse in suburban Virginia, or a bit of semi-precious stone he has been polishing, or an intricate trout fly he has made.

Now 57, Angleton got into the spy-catching business by accident. His father, a wealthy executive who ran National Cash Register operations in Italy, joined the OSS during World War II and recommended his son. Young Angleton, with a Yale degree and two years at the Harvard Business School, had just enlisted. He was interviewed, recruited, and after special counter-espionage training in England was sent to Italy in 1943, where he rose to the rank of major in charge of counter-espionage.

It was in Italy after the war that he first met the Jewish underground leaders who then were helping fellow Jews escape Europe for British-ruled Palestine. Their friendship flourished. For the past 20 years Angleton has been the CIA official with whom successive Israeli leaders have preferred to deal. Given the current Middle East situation, these contacts have given him immense responsibility—and also have caused jealousies within the US government. Some observers feel Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and CIA Director Colby have decided to gather liaison with Israeli intelligence into their own hands.

Angleton's critics accuse him of having built a virtually unassailable empire-within-an-empire. There is some truth to this. As steward of the nation's innermost secrets—even the White House tends to leave counter-espionage to career professionals—Angleton has had great authority with all US security agencies. Another charge often heard is that he is a man steeped in hostility to the Communist world, a man who sees spies under every bed.

He makes no secret in his quiet, professional way that he regards *détente* as a risky gamble and the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 as a masterly hoax. "There are installations in China that wouldn't be there," says, "if there were a real split." Since 1959, he insists, the KGB and 26 other Communist intelligence services quietly have coordinated their operations and now pool all intelligence about the US and its NATO allies. Of all US leaders, he believes, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger is the only one who truly perceives the growing Soviet military threat.

"In five more years if we go this way," Angleton says, "a crunch will come and the US will have to back down."

But those who challenge Kissinger's dream of *détente* nowadays risk thunderbolts from on high, and Angleton's career, together with those of his deputies, has wound to a close. The key question now is the transition: Who guards the portals while the guard is changing? One who surely will want to know is Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB. In the covert war Angleton has lost—not to Andropov but to a Washington weary of the Cold War.

—BENJAMIN WELLES

NEW YORK TIMES
10 February 1975

HELMS SAID NIXON SOUGHT CHILE COUP

Testimony on the Overthrow of Allende Contradicted Officials' Statements

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9—Richard Helms, the former Director of Central Intelligence, told a Senate committee in testimony released today that there was "no doubt" in 1970 that the Nixon Administration wanted to have President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile overthrown.

In the days following Dr. Allende's election in September, 1970, Mr. Helms told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a closed hearing Jan. 22, the overthrow of Dr. Allende, a Marxist, "became a thing that they were interested in having done."

'Incidents' Not Needed

Mr. Helms's flat assertion about the Nixon Administration's intentions toward the regime of Dr. Allende, who was overthrown in a bloody coup d'état in September, 1973, contradicts sworn testimony and public statements by many former officials of the State Department and other Government agencies who had insisted that the United States scrupulously adhered to a policy of nonintervention toward Chile.

Dr. Allende failed to gain a majority of the popular vote in the Sept. 4, 1970, election and, under the Chilean Constitution, his plurality had to be ratified by the Congress on Oct. 24. It was during this seven-week period, Mr. Helms testified, that the Nixon Administration sought to find ways to overthrow Mr. Allende.

"The Allende Government," said Mr. Helms, "was not even in at the time the probe was made just to see if there were any forces there to oppose Allende's advent as president. It was very quickly established there were not, and therefore, no further effort was made along those lines, to the best of my knowledge, at least I know of none."

In a telephone interview, Edward M. Korry, who served as Ambassador to Chile from 1967 until 1971, recalled that the C.I.A. was asked in late September, 1970, "to find out if there was any real resistance to Allende."

"We weren't talking about extremist groups," he said, "but sizeable forces in the political area."

WASHINGTON MONTHLY FEBRUARY 1975

The Heirs of Walter Lippmann

One of the real problems of the business of being a columnist is the slim factual basis on which most columns are written. Tom Braden, who has not been immune to this difficulty, recently demonstrated, however, how interesting a column can be when the columnist really has a story to tell, in this case about James Angleton:

Back in the late '40s he was the ideal choice for the counter-espionage work to which the late Frank Wisner assigned him. Painstaking, suspicious, quick to note deviations from the norm, he had the kind of mind one associates with the classic detective.

In addition, as those of us who were with him in CIA may recall, he had a capacity for empire-building. From the end of World War II until last week, he built his power within the agency to the point where he was virtually untouchable.

Successive directors, newly come to the pinnacle, were fascinated at their first encounter with this bespectacled, scholarly looking figure with the stooped shoulders, who walked cat-like into the office, and, when the door was closed, introduced himself with some startling and calculated revelation.

"I think you'll be interested in this," he would begin with a chuckle, and then proceed to tell his new boss exactly what his new boss's hostess had said about him after the new boss had departed her house on the previous evening.

Or he would show the new boss a copy of a private letter written by some employee or agent on the subject of the new boss. It was heady stuff, acquired by such means as the rest of us may imagine, but which only Angleton knew. A fly fisherman by hobby, he often referred to his knowledge of the personal and private as the result "of a little fishing."

With one director of CIA, himself a fly fisherman, Angleton established such rapport that the two talked of secret matters in terms of fly tying: "I caught it on a little brown bug with long antenna." Many people in CIA feared Angleton as much as successive directors held him in awe. . . .

But at some point in his long service, Jim Angleton's sharp and studious mind became confused by Jim Angleton's ideology. As the external world changed, as it became clear that Khrushchev's policies would not be those of Stalin, that the United States had won the cold war, that rumors of a Sino-Soviet split were true, Angleton found it difficult to straighten out in his own mind the agency's confused purpose.

Ideology told him the cold war must go on, that the Chinese and Russians were faking their feud, that the comings and goings of Aeroflot representatives to new nations revealed a Soviet intent on aggression in those nations, that those who had sold Mr. Nixon on detente were dupes and possibly knaves. He believed his ideology and shaped facts to fit it and his power became dangerous.

He is not the last of the ideologists to leave the agency but his departure will help CIA to straighten out its purpose: It is, after all a service, not a weapon in the cold war.

While one wishes that Braden had told us about Angleton several years ago, this is still genuinely fascinating material, much more interesting than the predictable pontificating that Braden and his fellow columnists usually turn out. One reason they have so little interesting information to give us is that they simply don't have time to dig it up. There's time for a luncheon conversation, a few phone calls and then the day's 700 words must be ground out. Too often there's no fresh research at all; the columnists rely on their memories, which unfortunately are often faulty.

Thus Gary Wills in one recent week wasted his readers' time with an attack on John Kennedy for having failed to offer to remove our Turkish missiles during the Cuban missile crisis—in fact, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin we would remove both our Turkish and Italian missiles—and an attack on Harry Truman for having started the imperial presidency in April 1948 with the "non-political" campaign train. In fact many presidents had used grand trains before, and Roosevelt, in September 1940, had used the nonpolitical campaign train.

Mr. Helms, who is now Ambassador to Iran, was summoned to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee because of seeming discrepancies in his testimony at hearings on his confirmation in 1973 over both the extent of the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile and in domestic activities inside the United States.

The former C.I.A. director conceded that he had erred in withholding information about the extent of the agency's covert operations against the Allende regime.

"I think I made one mistake in the testimony," Mr. Helms told Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, the ranking Republican committee member. "Maybe it is a serious mistake, but I should have probably asked either to go off the record or to have asked to discuss this matter in some other forum, because you will recall at that time [February, 1973], Allende's government was in power in Chile and we did not

need any more diplomatic incidents."

During his two-hour appearance before the committee, Mr. Helms was pressed to explain his previous testimony only by Senators Case and Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who is chairman of the new Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

During his confirmation hearing, the former C.I.A. chief denied that the agency had sought to overthrow the Allende regime, or had passed any funds to Dr. Allende's opponents. At one point in this hearing, Mr. Helms volunteered the following statement: "If the agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth, the election might have come out differently."

He testified in a similar vein during hearings later in 1973 before Senator Church's Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which was investigating the links between the C.I.A. and the International Tele-

phone and Telegraph Corporation and the Nixon Administration's policy toward Chile.

William E. Colby, who became Director of Central Intelligence in mid-1973, told a House committee last April, however, that the Nixon Administration had authorized more than \$8-million for clandestine activities in Chile between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for Allende to govern.

Mr. Colby said that \$1-million had been authorized for covert use in August, 1973, but that only \$50,000 was spent before Dr. Allende's overthrow and death a month later.

Mr. Helms defended his earlier testimony by telling the Foreign Relations Committee that the money authorized for Chile "went into civic action groups, supporting newspapers, radios and so forth. . . . I did not realize that [it] went into political parties. I did not think that it had, at least it was my understanding at the time. If somebody had said something else, I am prepared to stand

WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1975

CIA Wins Reversal on Book

By John P. MacKenzie
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency yesterday won back the right—at least temporarily—to suppress classified information in a book about the CIA's covert activities.

Reversing a lower court, the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that former intelligence officers Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks failed to prove that 168 deletions from their book, "The CIA the Cult of Intelligence," were improperly excised.

The burden had been placed on the government last April in a decision by U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in Alexandria.

Bryan, who heard closed-courtroom testimony from former CIA Director William E. Colby and his four top deputies, disapproved all but 15 of the agency's deletions. He said the government had shown only that the disputed pas-

sages were "classifiable" and not that they had been properly classified.

But the court of appeals said the National Security Council and an interagency committee established by presidential order, "far more than any judge, have the background for making classification and declassification decisions."

For this reason, the court held that the burden of proof established by Judge Bryan "was far too stringent." It ordered the case retried under new ground rules.

Melvin L. Wulf, the American Civil Liberties Union lawyer who represents the authors, said he will seek Supreme Court review. A petition by the book's publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., appeared equally certain.

One issue the high court will be asked to decide is whether the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the newly amended federal Freedom of

Information Act. Under the law the government must convince a federal judge that particular information was properly classified and the judge has clear authority to make his own secret examination and evaluation of the documents.

Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth Jr., writing for the circuit court, said the law should be applied to the CIA case but on the understanding that there was "a presumption of regularity in performance by public officials" who have the job of keeping government secrets.

Haynsworth, joined by Judges Harrison L. Winter and J. Braxton Craven Jr., said the government "was required to show no more than that each deletion item disclosed information which was required to be classified in any degree and which was contained in a document bearing a classification stamp."

corrected."

During more than two hours of unsworn testimony, the former C.I.A. chief also suggested that the Senators had erred in not asking him more pointed questions in 1973.

Last Sept. 19, The New York Times quoted intelligence sources as saying that C.I.A. funds were secretly funneled to striking labor unions and trade groups for more than 18 months before Dr. Allende's overthrow. Mr. Helms was not asked about that in his most recent testimony, nor was he pressed to provide an accounting of the \$5 million that was authorized for so-called "destabilization efforts" against Dr. Allende in 1971, 1972 and 1973. More than half of that money, The Times quoted its sources as saying, was used to provide strike benefits and other means of support for anti Allende strikers and workers.

After telling the Senators about the C.I.A.'s unsuccessful efforts in late 1970 to find support for the overthrow of Mr. Allende, Mr. Helms added, "I cannot understand how anyone could interpret [the CIA's efforts in Chile] as an attempt to overthrow the Government or believe that they stood a chance of doing so. So that is what I meant when I answer [the] question [by saying] there was really no effort made to overthrow the Government of Chile."

He also cautioned the committee about the words used to describe C.I.A. plans. "They sound exotic, tough, all the rest," he said. "I think when you get the entire story laid out in Chile between 1970 and 1973 you are going to regard that as a pretty pitiful affair. I mean in terms of actually accomplishing anything."

During his testimony, Mr. Helms was not asked in any detail about the recent allegations of C.I.A. involvement in domestic spying activities.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

31 JAN 1975



HENRY J. TAYLOR

Soviet Spies in the U.S.

Our battered Central Intelligence Agency is convinced that, behind the scenes, the Soviet spy activity in the United States has now reached an all-time high.

We are the only country the Kremlin really fears and the CIA knows that, without question, the U.S.A. is the Soviet's main target. To our CIA the proof—even mechanically—is self-evident. The American section of the KGB in Moscow is overwhelmingly the largest section in the entire apparatus.

KGB chief Uri Vladimirovich Andropov, 60, was Soviet Ambassador to Hungary during the Kremlin's reconquest of Hungary in 1956. Andropov became KGB chief in 1967, a year after Richard M. Helms was appointed head of the CIA. Then in 1973 Soviet Communist party First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev elevated Andropov to the ruling 17-member Politburo, the first KGB chief to be so elevated since Lavrenti P. Beria.

The CIA knows Andropov has organized the KGB into 15 directorates. Lieut. Gen. Aleksandr M. Sakharovsky commands the 1st directorate. It employs at least 10,000 secret agents abroad.

The CIA finds that Sakharovsky relies heavily on the " sleeper " method and that most "sleepers" are trained in an immense old 15th century czarist chateau at Barkov, 40 kilometers from Moscow, on the Vereyka River.

For example, the Soviet's Konon Molody ("Gordon Lonsdale") spy ring planted in the British Admiralty consumed 12 years in its " sleeper " status before starting espionage operations.

Soviet espionage calls this "regrooming." Sakharovsky's agents are first sent abroad for about a year to familiarize themselves with the target country. Then they are brought home and trained another seven or eight years—as long as that—before being returned, say, to the United States.

The made-over men are "regroomed" into U.S. citizens, equipped with false passports and other false documents: false birth certificates, driver's license, etc., in astounding variety.

Their "Rezident," operating here from a "Rezidentura," directs them into our government; the armed forces, atomic plants, scientific centers, the news media, defense or communications industries or what not.

On the side, the KGB pays its placed agents (always cash) as little as \$420 a month. Moreover, it frequently fools them by saying the apparatus will put huge bonus payments for them in a Moscow bank. Then the KGB liquidates the agent for knowing too much.

In its inside parlance this is called "implemented interrogation" and the favorite point of puncture is the back of the neck.

The 13th Directorate has a special notoriety within the CIA and other Western intelligence services. James Bond's fictional SMERSH does, in fact, exist, although the true official title inside the KGB is the Chatany Otdel group.

The killer squad is under Nikolai Koro-

NATION
8 FEB 1975

RECRUITING HISTORIANS

THE CIA IN THE JOB MARKET

RONALD RADOSH

William E. Colby's policy of building a more open CIA was evident at the annual conference of the American Historical Association, held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago from December 27 to 30. At just the time when jobs are very hard to find in the universities, the CIA made its first public appearance before the AHA by scheduling interviews for those historians who might care to work for "the agency." In addition, the AHA presented a half-hour talk and question period by John F. Devlin, deputy director of political research at the CIA.

Devlin, who was introduced as part of the "scholarly side" of the agency, presented a talk that fitted in with what *New York Times* reporter David Binder (December 29) called the CIA's need "to take defensive steps by letting the public know a bit more about the workings of the agency." It also might be seen as an attempt, in the midst of revelations about the agency's covert domestic intelligence program, to resurrect the image of the CIA as a repository of intelligent liberalism in government; an agency tolerant of heretical views and more than willing to employ the services of liberal academics.

Devlin's presentation, and his answers to critical questions, offered insights into the assumptions that lead many (Devlin noted that a few hundred historians had answered the ad placed by the CIA in the AHA's employment bulletin) to offer the agency their services. Devlin himself in no way resembled the thugs one thinks of as being employed by the agency's operational branch. A mild-mannered, soft-spoken man, with a trim white beard, he looks like a civilized academic. Originally a historian specializing in colonial America, Devlin was the perfect agency recruiter in the job-starved historical profession.

Unlike the agents who engage in foreign or domestic dirty tricks, the agency's management is scholarly and genteel. The CIA needs trained specialists, persons skilled in the techniques of historical research that are taught in graduate schools, to carry out scholarly investigations of problem areas designated by the State Department, the executive branch of government, or the upper management of the agency itself. Devlin was looking for historians to work on what he called "the entire problem of the Middle East"; the attitude of Western European nations toward politics in the age of détente, especially the scope of the entire European Left. When pressed as to what he had specifically in mind, Devlin answered that the agency needed thorough study of the politics of, the policies of and the different currents of opinion within the Italian Communist party. It also needed people to predict what would happen in Iran after the Shah's death. Devlin insisted that the work prepared for the historians was proper, scholarly and distinct from the covert action one associates with the agency. At this point, I interjected that the academic studies to be carried out would be legwork for the policies to be put into action by the operational branch. A study of the Chilean legislature in 1969, for example, might well have allowed the agency to determine which legislators to bribe to vote against Allende in the 1970 elections—a job for which the CIA doled out \$350,000. Similar acquaintance with the politics of Italian communism could serve a like task should a covert program be put into practice if Italy shifts left.

In case any of the historians present had moral qualms

about the uses to which their work would be put, Devlin assured them that their research "begins and ends with a piece of paper." They were pure scholars engaging in traditional research. At one point, a member of the audience expressed interest in employment with the agency, but feared that what he called his Marxist approach to history might make him ineligible. Devlin quickly assured him that a Marxist had a place in the CIA. As if to convince the audience that the agency held modern views, Devlin added that the CIA would employ individuals who engaged in "a moderate amount of social smoking of marijuana," although the use of hard drugs would be a bar to employment.

The majority of the fifty or more historians attending Devlin's talk, and perhaps the few hundred who had applied to the agency for a job, saw things Devlin's way. Questions centered about possibilities of promotion, opportunities to work in the field rather than exclusively in Washington, the CIA's pension program, etc. Devlin sought to make it appear that the agency was simply another arm of the government, and that individuals should seek to work within it to make policy more intelligent. "If the allegations about the CIA's covert domestic programs are true," Devlin answered to my hostile questioning—(he referred to Seymour Hersh's original story as an allegation), he found the operation "reprehensible" and emphasized that he knew nothing of it. Presumably his answer was intended to prove that one can work in the modern CIA, even hold an executive position, and yet dissociate oneself from the work carried out by the agency as a whole. Devlin did not, however, say anything critical about the CIA's continuing effort to subvert foreign governments.

To many who heard him, Devlin was himself a renewed proof of the CIA's liberalism. It has been emphasized for a long time, by commentators as diverse in point of view as R. Harris Smith and Richard J. Barnet, that the CIA is indeed managed by scholarly liberals. It was sophisticated enough to finance the work of Socialist leader Norman Thomas in Latin America during the 1960s, as well as to subsidize "liberal" magazines like *Encounter*. Reactionary members of Congress would never have approved funds for either project, but the CIA understood that subsidizing the anti-Communist Left was often the best way to gain its ends. Thus it backed European Social Democrats, and anti-Communist "third forces" like Mboya in Kenya and Bosch in Latin America. Norman Thomas' Institute for International Relations was funded from 1960 on through a CIA conduit, the J.M. Kaplan Foundation. "I am ashamed that we swallowed this CIA business," Thomas said, but "what we did was good work and no one tried to tell us what to do."

Devlin's avowed liberalism was meant to demonstrate to historians who believe in the tenets of scholarly objectivity that their professed values could be maintained when they undertook a career with the agency. The only pitfall, he thought, was that "most of the products of your research will remain in-house publications." Here Devlin was less than candid. He failed to remind his audience that the CIA's previous attempts at domestic propaganda had included the attempt to influence elite opinion by subsidizing articles written by its personnel, whose status with the agency was never announced. Thus historians employed by the CIA might find their work published under a CIA subsidy, although their affiliation would remain secret. Examples are George Carver's 1966 *Foreign Affairs* article on the "faceless Vietnamese" or the secret pub-

lication of CIA studies by the old Frederick J. Praeger firm.

The assembled job-hunting historians, should any of them gain a job with the agency, would then become in essence scholar-spies. The research they undertook would be dictated and defined by the agency, and put to such use as the CIA saw fit. Such research is meant to serve the goals of covert action. This point was made by Richard A. Bissell, former CIA deputy director of plans, in his talk before a Council of Foreign Relations study group in January 1968. (Bissell's comments are printed in full in the Marchetti-Marks book on the CIA.) Secret collection of information, he stressed, was meant to gain "timely knowledge" of "tactical significance," and served the purpose of supporting covert activities meant to subvert foreign governments. Bissell concluded that "the tasks of

intelligence collection and political action overlap to the point of being almost indistinguishable."

The historians listening to Devlin did not seem to grasp this truth. They showed Devlin the greatest respect and appreciation for coming to the AHA. When I tried to raise points in rebuttal to Devlin, the group became angry and suggested that I shut up. As I stood to argue that the AHA should be ashamed to have offered its facilities to the CIA recruitment officer, and that even in a job crisis there are *some* jobs historians should not consider, a fellow historian ran down the aisle, brandishing an umbrella whose pointed end he thrust at my face. As I ducked, I thought to myself that perhaps this young man understood the proper relationship between the CIA's theory and practice, and that he had passed the first part of his job interview. □

New Statesman 17 January 1975

Laurence Stern

The CIA Spy Circus

From his exile in Moscow the spy Kim Philby must have read with a warm collegial interest of the unhappy fate of his old professional acquaintance, James Angleton, head of counter-intelligence for the CIA. The two men often lunched together at J. Edgar Hoover's favourite restaurant in Washington during 1949 to discuss common trade interests. 'Our close association was, I am sure, inspired by genuine friendliness on both sides,' Philby wrote of Angleton in his confessional biography, *My Silent War*, 'but we both had ulterior motives . . . who gained most from this complex game I cannot say. But I had one big advantage. I knew what he was doing for CIA and he knew what I was doing for SIS. But the real nature of my interest was something he did not know.'

Angleton was dismissed recently from the senior and highly sensitive position he has held for more than a quarter of a century in the US intelligence community. His offence was apparently to have served the CIA with a zeal which seems to have exceeded certain limits of political tolerability. Who is to say which man stands in higher professional disgrace?

Angleton's dismissal was the centrepiece in a complicated plot of Byzantine institutional politics, of skimpily-documented public allegations of domestic spying excesses by the CIA, of hastily-convened presidential and congressional investigative tribunals. In a Washington atmosphere already super-heated with suspicion of CIA conspiracies abroad, the loading of the White House 'Blue Ribbon' panel with establishmentarian blue-bloods chaired by Vice-President Rockefeller was widely acclaimed as either outrage or farce. In the background there were steamy rumours of 'terminations' (assassinations), electronic buggings of prominent Washington drawing rooms and boudoirs as well as illegal CIA burglaries à la Watergate.

The strongest evidence is that the Agency did exceed its foreign intelligence charter and that the transgressions were most serious at times of free-floating presidential paranoia, first on the part of Lyndon Johnson and then Richard Nixon, over the

origins of the Vietnam war protest movement. It seems likely, for example, that the CIA targeted itself on *Ramparts* magazine, which in 1966 published the first revelations of CIA secret financing of the National Student Association.

Although the origins of the *Ramparts* story were self-evident (officials of the National Student Association felt they had been duped and decided to tell all), the CIA as well as the FBI probed for darker motives. Similarly such groups of dissidents as the Black Panthers, the Weathermen and celebrities of the Left such as Eartha Kitt and Jane Fonda proved irresistible to the intelligence service.

By 1970, as the Watergate record revealed, the sense of political beleaguement was so intense at the White House that the late FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, came under suspicion for his laggardly attitudes toward chasing communists and foreign agents. Consequently Richard M. Helms, then the director of the CIA, came under presidential pressure to participate fully in what was essentially a domestic counter-intelligence programme which everyone should have known breached the boundary of forbidden activity by the CIA.

President Nixon and his internal security advisers blithely authorised the lifting of legal 'restrictions' on telephone tapping, electronic bugging, burglaries and other activities which were strictly outlawed by federal or local statute. Such was the self-intoxication of some of the highest public officials of the United States Government during the internal security mania of the Vietnam war period.

The extent to which the CIA activity was 'illegal', as charged in some newspaper stories, is clouded by the very ambiguities of the Agency's congressional charter, the National Security Act of 1947.

The statute is a marvel of murkiness. On the one hand it disallows the CIA's subpoena powers or internal security functions within the United States. At the same time the law places upon the director responsibility for protecting national security 'sources and methods'. It also enjoins the director to carry out any assignments prescribed by the National Security Council.

In the last judicial review of the charter a federal judge held that Helms was acting within the bounds of the 'sources and methods' provision by directing an agent inside the United States to accuse the leader of an Estonian emigré group 'her' of being a KGB agent. The target of the accusation filed a slander suit and lost.

Helms, one of Washington's most common summate bureaucratic survivors and favourite at many of the city's most celebrated dinner tables, seems almost certain to become ensnared in the toils of the unravelling domestic spying controversy. He was, after all, in charge during the period of the most active transgression. But he has found in Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a vocal ally. Kissinger has let it be known that he finds deplorable the dumping of the controversy on Helms' head. Kissinger is said to have blamed his arch-rival in the cabinet, Defence Secretary James Schlesinger, and incumbent CIA director William E. Colby for Helms' present plight.

Just what this fine reticulation of friendships and animosities has to do with the underlying issues in the CIA's latest public uproar is no clearer than anything else about the entire story. But some friends and colleagues are no longer speaking. Others suspect their phones are tapped. Journalists continue probing for new leads.

Washington

NEW YORK TIMES
26 JANUARY 1975
**Drug Agency Hires
53 Ex-C.I.A. Aides;
Review Is Expected**

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25 (AP) —Fifty-three former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency now work for the Drug Enforcement Administration as agents, analysts and clerks, the drug agency has acknowledged. The two organizations routinely exchange information about international narcotics trafficking, said the D. E. A. administrator, John R. Bartels Jr.

But "by mutual consent," both organizations have canceled agreements under which Federal drug agents trained C.I.A. agents in narcotics intelligence work, Mr. Bartels said.

The drug agency's intelligence unit and the agency's relationship with the C.I.A. will probably come under scrutiny when a planned Senate select committee reviews the Government's domestic intelligence operations. A Senate vote to create the committee is expected Monday.

Robert Feldkamp, a spokesman for the drug agency, said in response to questions that 26 former C.I.A. personnel were employed in the drug agency's intelligence division, some working in the Washington office and others in field offices.

Twenty-seven more former C.I.A. employees now work in the enforcement division, most of them as narcotics agents in the United States and abroad, Mr. Feldkamp said.

The drug agency absorbed some of the former C.I.A. personnel from other Federal narcotics agencies that operated independently until all were merged into the single operation in July, 1973. Others have been brought into D.E.A. since the merger, Mr. Feldkamp said. No numerical breakdown was available.

The drug organization reports a force of about 2,400 agents and 232 intelligence specialists.

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Feb. 12, 1975

CIA Critic Testifies On Air Operations

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer
When Victor Marchetti talks, the CIA listens.

Yesterday, the ex-CIA official's forum was a witness chair in a federal courtroom here, from which he spoke almost casually about the intelligence agency's alleged role as the world's largest airline conglomerate.

A CIA representative was late for Marchetti's testimony, but Marchetti said he was sure the agency would get a report on what he had said anyway. The CIA man in a brief interview said nothing to discredit Marchetti's claim that the CIA would get such a report.

Marchetti, whose articles and books about the CIA have brought legal moves by the agency to prevent their publication, named various airlines he said were CIA fronts. The airlines were set up, he testified, so the U.S. could have quick access to planes and crews for paramilitary operations.

Marchetti was a witness in a civil suit growing out of the death of an Agency for International Development official in South Vietnam in August, 1972.

The official, Roy Ferrence, was one of eight passengers killed instantly when the China Airlines plane in which he was flying crashed into Dragon Mountain 7½ miles south of Pleiku.

His widow, Jane Ferrence of 407 Orleans Circle SW,

Vienna, is suing China Airlines and Air America—an other alleged CIA airline—in connection with the crash.

Air America says it should not be a party to the suit, since it was a China Airlines plane that crashed while flying under a subcontract to Air America.

Marchetti's testimony was heard apparently as an attempt by Mrs. Ferrence's attorney, John Gionfriddo, to show that Air America and China Airlines are both operated by the CIA and therefore are both proper parties to the suit.

The former CIA aide, who said one of his titles with the agency was executive secretary to the executive committee on air matters, was the first witness presented to the six-member civil jury before U.S. District Judge John H. Pratt.

Marchetti gave his current profession as "writer" before being asked questions about his CIA days and the world of "plausible deniability" and "air proprietary operations."

He is under an injunction from a federal judge in Alexandria not to divulge government secrets before clearing such disclosures with the CIA, and Marchetti said that he did not believe he got into any new matters in his testimony yesterday.

Marchetti told of weekly meetings of the executive committee on air matters, during which CIA officials would discuss the operations of such airlines as Air

America, Air Asia, Southern Air Transport, CAT/CAL (Civil Air Transport/China Airlines), and Intermountain Aviation.

He said the discussions even would deal with transfers of planes from one airline to another, and the purchase of new planes. Determining the exact size of the CIA's air operations was a problem, he added at one point.

He said later that one CIA official once described the air operations complex as bigger than the agency itself in terms of employees, and as having more aircraft than any U.S. airline.

Marchetti said the airline companies allegedly operated by the CIA "really did do business as part of their cover," but that their main purpose was to "provide air capabilities for CIA's paramilitary activities."

He said the airlines "fly in mercenaries, fly out wounded" and perform other such operations when American military forces do not want to be directly involved.

As Marchetti was preparing to leave the fourth floor of the courthouse, after testifying, an elevator door opened and a man carrying a briefcase got off. It was a CIA attorney, who said only that he had been called by someone in the Ferrence case to catch Marchetti's appearance on the stand.

"John!" cried Marchetti. "You're late! I've already testified."

WASHINGTON STAR NEWS
7 FEB 1975

Singer Suing CIA

Singer Eartha Kitt says she will sue the Central Intelligence Agency for allegedly compiling a dossier on her after she criticized the Vietnam war at a party at the Lyndon Johnson White House. She said the file was continued during the administration of Richard M. Nixon. "They went to people I had met and asked them about my conversation," she said in London yesterday.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 February 1975

CIA Used Local Police Credentials as 'Cover' in Area Operations

By Allan Frank
Star-News Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has, on at least two occasions, obtained credentials from local police departments for use in operations inside the United States.

During the intensive period of anti-war demonstrations in 1971, CIA security officers borrowed 20 sets of credentials from a local police department for use while infiltrating crowds gathered near CIA offices.

While the CIA has not confirmed which police departments granted the credentials, one source told the Star-News that the Fairfax County Police Department has provided CIA men with badges and badge cases to "cover" agents' activities in the county, where the CIA headquarters building is located at Langley.

THE SOURCE, a Fairfax County policeman who asked not to be identified, said the badges often were those of "sergeant and above" and were kept in reserve for the CIA by a county policeman.

Fairfax Commonwealth's Atty. Robert F. Horan Jr. said, "I've heard it suggested that there were occasions when an individual (from CIA) was given credentials as a cover."

The CIA security officials also are said to have obtained credentials on another occasion in 1971 for use in surveillance of agency employees who were alleged to have been involved in leaking information about foreign intelligence operations.

The agency has been reluctant to disclose its relationships with local police departments.

AS RECENTLY as last week, the CIA declined to identify any of the dozen or so police departments for which it has provided training, other than the five identified in a 1973 article in The New York Times. Those were the departments in New York City, Boston, Washington and Fairfax and Montgomery Counties.

However, ranking officers in Arlington and Alexandria recently verified that officers in those departments also had received training from the CIA at a federal installation in Suitland, Md.

In a Feb. 1 letter to Rep. Edward I. Koch, D-N.Y., CIA Director William E. Colby said, "It serves no useful purpose to publicize these identities at this time, for among other things, such publication could hamper current police programs and disclose the identities of certain police personnel in those programs."

AUTHORITATIVE documents obtained by the Star-News did not specify which police department, or departments, handed over credentials to the CIA, but did definitely

establish that such transactions had occurred. The credentials reportedly have been destroyed.

The CIA has stated publicly that it terminated cooperative training programs for police departments in early 1973 at the direction of then-Director James R. Schlesinger. In August 1973, Congress amended the Omnibus Crime Control Act to exclude the CIA from assisting local police departments.

While the use of local police credentials is believed to have occurred only while the agency was working with local police departments, at least one congressman believes CIA officials exceeded their authority to protect agency property or conduct surveillance involving foreigners in the United States.

KOCH SAID he believes CIA use of the credentials was illegal under the agency's charter, which precludes involvement in domestic activities. "For them to even simulate or use police credentials in any way domestically would constitute a violation of their basic legislative charter," Koch said. "They are not allowed to engage in domestic law enforcement."

"I'm not an enemy of the CIA. I believe that they have a vital role to play in the area of espionage and counter-espionage overseas," he said, "but in no way should we tolerate their violation of the law. There's no doubt that the CIA has violated both the law itself and the spirit of the law."

Horan, who learned about the possible transfer of credentials during an ongoing investigation of alleged corruption and impropriety in the Fairfax police department, said he believed CIA use of such credentials was legal.

"IT WOULD NOT be a criminal offense. I don't see anything wrong with it. I don't know what violation of personnel rules it might be," Horan said. "The CIA is a legitimate law enforcement organization and, as far as I know, there is no state or federal statute that might cover this. I guess somebody might be theoretically able to make a case of impersonating a police officer."

Angus MacLean Thuermmer, assistant to the director of the CIA, said, "I certainly don't know about that (about the credentials) and I don't know whether we would comment on that sort

LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 February 1975

Self-Proclaimed Ex-CIA Man Advertises for Job

From Reuters

CARACAS, Venezuela—A man claiming to be a former CIA agent Wednesday advertised his services here as a bodyguard.

A classified advertisement carried by the daily El Universal newspaper said: "Former CIA agent offers his services as bodyguard for an important person."

of thing. That sounds like an operational matter and we seldom, if ever, comment on that sort of thing. It is not our practice to discuss relationships between police departments and the agency, if any."

Col. Richard A. King, who became chief of the Fairfax police department at the beginning of the year, said he had "no personal knowledge" of any credentials being issued to CIA. King added: "I can't confirm or deny it. It would not be a practice I would condone."

FORMER Fairfax Police Chief William L. Durrer, who retired at the beginning of January, said, "As far as I know" the CIA did not receive any credentials. "Now, I didn't deal with them on a day-to-day basis," he added.

King confirmed that his department had no records of any of its relationships with the CIA, including any lists of the dozen or so officers it already has acknowledged were trained in lock-picking, electronic surveillance and other techniques by CIA.

While no comprehensive list of the aid CIA has given to local police departments has been made public, the agency has acknowledged it trained local police officers and occasionally provided their departments with equipment, such as a so-

phisticated machine that can detect whether a person has held a metal object within 24 hours.

Local police departments also have received a classified manual called "Where's What" that was prepared about 10 years ago by a CIA security officer to assist other federal agencies in their searches for information in the voluminous files maintained by governments, businesses, schools and other institutions.

THAT STUDY was compiled during 1965 and 1966 by a CIA employee holding a federal executive fellowship at The Brookings Institution in Washington, where classified work is prohibited. Brookings officials said they believe the man undertook the work openly and "in good faith," but that his work was classified "confidential" by CIA after he left Brookings and the agency had published the book.

The author, Harry J. Murphy, said "the original understanding with the people I worked for" (the CIA) was that the book would be classified and printed in 1,000 copies. "I don't know whether they (Brookings) knew it was classified."

Brookings officials said that had they known the reference work was intended to be classified, they probably would not have permitted Murphy to use Brookings facilities.

NEWSWEEK

27 JAN 1975

INTELLIGENCE:

Who's Got the Secrets?

The Central Intelligence Agency duty officer in Bonn studied the draft cable on his desk. It was addressed to the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., and its language was a bit pungent. Ordinarily the agent would have winked, coded it and sent it on. Last week, however, he penciled out the billingsgate and returned the draft to the spy who had written it. "I've fixed it," he reported, "so that it would look better on the front page of The New York Times."

As that remark indicates, the secret life of American spies abroad isn't so secret any more. With the press, Congress and the Rockefeller commission all threatening to throw klieg lights on their murky operations, CIA agents are trying to keep an even lower profile than usual. "There are times you feel the only ones left you can talk to are the KGB," says one frustrated agent in Western Europe. Last week, however, Bonn bureau chief Milan J. Kubic managed to interview one of "The Company's" senior officers.

Some comments by a spy in distress:

What's happening to the CIA is a demoralization of the old hands, who realize that they can't count on protection in Washington. There has been no order to reduce our activities, but I find myself more cautious. Suppose we tried to enlist a Czech official as a spy and Prague made a big public fuss. In today's atmosphere, I don't feel I have the support I would have had five years ago—so I don't do it. The question we're asking ourselves is, why can't anybody restore the respectability of our profession? The agency is on the verge of coming apart.

Our strength lies in talking to people who tell us things on a strictly confidential basis. Now, suppose I go to the West German FBI and ask them for a tracer on some prominent German, and they have reason to think that the information will show up the next week in NEWSWEEK. How much do you think they will tell me?

Suppose we go through the luggage of an American radical in a Paris hotel. Are we violating his constitutional rights? And if we don't do it, can we still keep abreast of the KGB, which is as aggressive as ever, and which still regards the U.S. as the prime enemy? I'm afraid that we're headed for an era when I'll be told to catch a spy but I'll be denied the means to catch him. It all really boils down to the question of whether an agency like ours can exist in a democratic society. [CIA director William] Colby still thinks so, but I for one doubt it.

[Young and talented agents] are just beginning to enter the service again—after the recruitment drought of the radical late '60s. One of the older hands in the Bonn station has taken it upon himself to collect all of the recent critical articles about the CIA and to circulate them among the young newcomers. It's much better to bring the whole business out in the open so they don't keep these disturbing questions to themselves and their wives. We're finally getting some first-class talent again. It would be a real blow to lose it.

WASHINGTON STAR
10 February 1975

Fairfax Confirms Police-CIA Link

By Allan Frank
Star-News Staff Writer

Fairfax County Executive Robert W. Wilson today confirmed a story in yesterday's Star-News that the county police department has allowed Central Intelligence Agency security officers to use department credentials for the security organization's operations.

Shortly after Wilson's report, the county board of supervisors voted unanimously to ban any further handing out of county credentials to persons outside the police department and to request that any credentials now held outside the department be returned at once.

WILSON SAID a detailed report on the county police relationship with the CIA, which is headquartered in Fairfax at Langley, will be released late tomorrow or early Wednesday.

The story in yesterday's Star-News said that the CIA had, on at least two occasions in 1971, obtained credentials from one or more local police departments. The story also quoted an unidentified county policeman as saying that the Fairfax department had provided badges and badge cases of "sergeant or above" for CIA agents.

On one occasion, the CIA secured 20 badges from the police department for use in infiltrating crowds gathered at anti-war demonstrations near CIA buildings. On another occasion, the CIA security officers used police credentials to watch a CIA employee who allegedly was involved in unauthorized release of information about foreign intelligence operations.

Wilson told the supervisors, "There is information that we have received this morning that needs to be brought before the board and the public." The written report, he said, will "explain exactly what happened and will contain statements by all those concerned."

WILSON SAID that denials yesterday from him and Fairfax County Police Chief Richard A. King had been based on a belief that such handling of

credentials had not happened but that further investigation today had proved them wrong. Both Wilson and King took office after the CIA got the credentials.

Both men now say that the policy of the police department will be to not hand out credentials to anyone outside the police department.

"This does not mean that we would not cooperate with federal agencies in matters of national security," Wilson said. The supervisors affirmed the policy decision by Wilson and King with a unanimous vote.

In a brief but anxious discussion, the supervisors decided not to call in any third party, such as the Virginia State police, to investigate the involvement with the CIA until the report from Wilson has been issued.

Rep. Edward I. Koch, D-N.Y., said today that he will renew a demand of his in Congress that the CIA be forced to name all of the police departments it aided in training several years ago. Koch said the story in the Star-News that Fairfax gave credentials to the CIA for domestic use "shows why it is important that they release the names of these police departments. How else are we going to find out what these people did?"

THE CIA has confirmed that it trained "about a dozen" police departments but has released only the names of five, those in New York City, Boston, Washington and Fairfax and Montgomery counties. The Star-News has learned that police officers from Arlington and Alexandria also have been trained by the CIA.

In 1973, when the story broke that the CIA was training some policemen in electronic surveillance, lock-picking and other intelligence-gathering techniques, Koch said he "suspected" that there was more to the story.

"Clearly what they were doing in Fairfax County was getting credentials," Koch said. "Unless we get this list of the 12 police departments (involved with the CIA) so that the press and others can make inquiries, we'll never really know what went on."

Investigating the CIA

Oh, swell! I was beginning to worry about what the Congress would have to do when it goes back to work this month. Now that Watergate, Rockefeller and the Rome hunger conference are out of the way, they would only have the staggering economy and the ripoff of the American consumer to deal with. My concern was premature, however—now we can look forward to months of investigations, committee hearings and moralistic

speechmaking about the evil doings of the CIA (NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Jan. 13). How fortunate we are that our elected representatives have such a clear grasp of priorities!

JAMES A. COLLINS

Tarawa Terrace, N.C.

■ The CIA once again seems to have been Caught In the Act.

GORDON M. THOMAS

Pilot Mountain, N.C.

WASHINGTON POST -PARADE
2 FEB 1975

PARADE'S SPECIAL

by LLOYD SHEARER

DEFLECTION IN THE CIA

How would you like it if the KGB, the Soviet Union's security apparatus, secretly contributed \$1 million to defeat the governor of your state when he comes up for re-election?

How would you feel if MI-6, the British Intelligence Service, bribed three of your Congressmen? Or the French Intelligence Service helped engineer a rupture between this country and Canada?

Would you not regard the interference of foreign agents in U.S. elections and domestic affairs as breaches of sovereignty?

For years, our Central Intelligence Agency has been doing exactly that—interfering in the domestic affairs of foreign nations, bribing, corrupting, influencing, stimulating revolutions, financing armies, helping those it considers friendly forces and harming those it considers enemies of the U.S.

ANOTHER'S VIEW

A former Central Intelligence Agency field officer, Philip Agee, believes that the CIA has no right to make such arbitrary decisions, has no such right to interfere abroad. He has therefore written a book in which he names his former CIA colleagues so as to "neutralize them."

The book, already published in Great Britain, is entitled, "Inside The Company—A CIA Diary," and will soon be published in this country. Galleys are circulating in the intelligence community. And Agee is granting interviews abroad to publicize the book.

Explaining that he was a field officer for the CIA in Latin America for 10 years, Agee, when asked if he didn't feel any

obligation to protect other CIA men in the field, replied: "Why should I be delicate with them? These people are promoting fascism around the world." (The CIA changed its agents in Latin America prior to the publication of Agee's book.)

Agee, who now lives in Cornwall, England, with a Brazilian beauty he claims was tortured in her own country by the secret police, has become an ardent socialist.

He says he was recruited by the CIA when he was an undergraduate at Notre Dame, subsequently was posted by the agency to Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico.

In Quito, Ecuador, he explains, he was highly instrumental in fomenting a break in Ecuador-Cuba relations and in having the far left subjugated by the Ecuadorian military in 1963.

In Uruguay he supervised operations against Cuban diplomats, learned quickly that the CIA had established an observation post overlooking the Cuban embassy and photographed via telephoto lens all those entering the embassy. The CIA, he claims, also tapped the Cuban embassy telephones.

As for the Soviet diplomats in South America, the CIA filmed them while they were conversing in the various embassy gardens. There, the Soviets conversed freely, convinced that they weren't being wiretapped or recorded via concealed microphones. The films of the Soviet diplomats conversing would then be played for Russian lip readers who in turn would reveal the secret garden conversations.

Why did Agee turn against the CIA? One reason was that he couldn't tolerate the brutal tortures which the various Latin American police practiced on their political enemies. The thought that he, in part, was responsible for such cruelty turned him off his work.

Like all CIA agents, Agee was given various

covers. In Ecuador he was listed as a civilian employee of the Air Force. In Mexico he masqueraded as a United States Olympic Games attaché. He arrived in Mexico 18 months before the Olympic Games and tried to recruit prospective agents.

Since Agee quit the CIA, he claims that the agency has tried to discredit him as an alcoholic, has used attractive women against him, that in Paris one of them loaned him a bugged typewriter, which would reveal via a secret location device where he was.

Before the CIA employs an agent it compels him to sign a contract in which he agrees not to reveal any of the agency's activities. Such protection apparently is not strong enough to safeguard intelligence secrets.

Which is why William Colby, current director of the CIA, has recommended legislation to help protect such information.

NEED NEW LAW

"There are criminal penalties for people who reveal income tax returns or census returns or even cotton statistics," Colby recently told U.S. News and World Report. "But there are no similar penalties for persons who reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an intelligence secret, unless they give it to a foreigner or intend to injure the United States."

Unfortunately for Colby, who is certainly the most open and possibly the best director in CIA history, the image of the CIA is now so damaged—the result, under Colby's predecessors, of its unwarranted interference in this country's internal affairs—that he will be lucky if the CIA is not reorganized from top to bottom, never mind Congress legislating criminal penalties against agents who blow the CIA's cover.

The belief that the CIA could supervise itself endlessly has come a cropper.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1975

New Senate Panel May Study F.B.I. Drive on Arab

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12—Efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to combat Arab guerrilla terrorism—the efforts allegedly included a burglary of the Arab Information Center in Dallas by Government agents—are likely to come under the scrutiny of a new Senate committee, according to Senate sources.

The new Committee, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, headed by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, has not begun active investigations or finished selecting a staff. But well-paced Capitol Hill sources said that the committee would be provided with evidence of F.B.I. domestic intelligence operations against alleged Palestinian terrorist groups. The evidence was said to include statements by L. Patrick Gray, 3d former director of the F.B.I.

C.I.A. Request Reported

According to sources on the now defunct Senate Watergate committee, Mr. Gray testified that as acting F.B.I. director he authorized an illegal entry of the Arab Information Center in Dallas in the fall of 1972 to obtain a list of 94 alleged Al Fatah agents. The list allegedly belonged to Dr. Seif Wadi Ramahi, the director of the center.

Mr. Gray, according to the Watergate committee sources, gave the same information to the Watergate special prosecu-

tor. It is the Watergate committee's material on F.B.I. operations that will reportedly be given to the Senate committee.

The operation was mounted, Mr. Gray reportedly said, because the F.B.I. had been told that the documents might contain a list of names of men involved in planned assassinations in the United States. The operation, which was mentioned briefly in Newsweek magazine in 1973, obtained a list of 94 names written in Arabic with addresses in the United States and Canada, according to Watergate committee sources.

The F.B.I. was acting on a request from the Central Intelligence Agency, according to committee sources. The C.I.A., in turn, was following up on intelligence received from foreign governments that believed the international Palestinian terrorists were operating in the United States, these sources said.

The Dallas operation was part of stepped-up counterintelligence activities against Arab terrorists following the massacre of Israeli athletes at Munich in the Olympic Games of 1972. At the same time, a Governmentwide operation against terrorist activities, dubbed "operation boulder," was ordered by President Nixon.

There appeared to be a link between the Dallas incident and the surveillance of Abdeen M. Jabara, a Detroit lawyer, which the F.B.I. has acknowledged in Federal court. The

F.B.I. said that it monitored 40 conversations of Mr. Jabara, an American citizen, when he talked with persons being wiretapped.

It also acknowledged asking questions about Mr. Jabara and making reports on his speeches even though it said he is not a subject of a criminal investigation.

Mr. Jabara said in a telephone interview that he was in contact with Dr. Ramahi in 1972 on "legal problems that Dr. Ramahi had."

Dr. Ramahi was a Palestinian who was employed by the Arab League to run the Information Center in Dallas. He was not an American citizen, although he was a graduate of Southern Illinois University.

Dr. Munir Bayoud, an American citizen of Palestinian descent and the present director of the Dallas office, said in a telephone interview that he did not believe that Dr. Ramahi was in any way involved in terrorist operations. "He wouldn't hurt a fly," Dr. Bayoud said.

He added that Dr. Ramahi had mentioned to him that he "lost" a briefcase that contained a mailing list of names of Arab students and others of Arab descent in the United States. "I think the F.B.I. used this list to harass these people," Dr. Bayoud said.

Recently Visa Denied

Dr. Ramahi, Dr. Bayoud said, is now chargé d'affaires in Libya for the United Arab Emirates. He said that Dr. Ramahi

Terrorism

was out of the country in the fall of 1972 on a honeymoon and was refused a re-entry visa by the United States authorities. Government sources confirmed this.

Former senior United States intelligence officers said that they believed the Dallas operation was "fully justified" in the light of information the United States had received and the acts of terrorism occurring almost weekly in this period. They pointed out that in July, 1973, an Israeli military attaché, Col. Yosef Alon, was murdered by gunmen in his home in Chevy Chase, Md., near Washington. The killers have never been found.

A spokesman for the F.B.I. declined to comment on these various activities before Clarence M. Kelley, director of the F.B.I., gives his testimony.

Mr. Jabara sued the F.B.I. in 1972, after becoming convinced that the agency had put him under surveillance, he said in the interview. He was later joined in the suit by the American Civil Liberties Union.

In answer to Mr. Jabara's "interrogatories" in his suit, the F.B.I. said that it had kept track of his activities as far back as August, 1967. The F.B.I. said that it monitored his conversations when it picked him up as a result of "lawful national security electronic surveillance conducted to obtain foreign intelligence."

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
27 JAN 1975

INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY by Philip Agee

The most sensational book ever published about the CIA and its manipulations in world affairs, this is the explosive story of a CIA secret operations officer that *Newsweek* says "will put Washington's entire intelligence community on edge." Exposing codes, naming names, unraveling the structure and enormous power the CIA wields in the world, Philip Agee's story is both a narrative of massive American intervention in Latin American politics and an explanation of exactly what happens in the CIA on a day-to-day basis. To be published in England, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Norway and Denmark. Pre-publication excerpts in *Rolling Stone*. Major Advertising and Promotion May, \$9.95 hardcover

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□ One of the most courageous writers of our time is surely Philip Agee, the former CIA man who has come clean, naming names, in *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (Penguin, 95p). I hope that he is reasonably safe where he is now living, in Cornwall; but it was daring of him to take his wife and children, for a New Year holiday, to Spain and Portugal. When he got their car off the ferry at San Sebastian they saw five cars drawn up in line, each with three men in it. These cars followed them wherever they went. At Santander they turned off to see the prehistoric caves at Altamira; the five cars went too. Once they saw one of their followers changing the licence-plate on his car. Another took their photograph with a 'robot camera' (the lens concealed in a briefcase, familiar to Agee from CIA experience). By rapid turning down side-roads, Agee managed to lose the five cars at Torrelavega. He is now (1) campaigning to identify and expose many more CIA agents and (2) writing another book analysing the relation between the level of internal repression in various countries and the level of security aid they receive from America. The two go closely together.

Tom Driberg

WASHINGTON STAR
6 February 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.: *The CIA Under Fire*

The CIA investigation unfolds, mostly in the press, and there is no doubt that the agency has become the major boggy of the day. The height of the hysteria was voiced at Yale University, by John Lindsay, who, briefly in residence there to be debriefed on his experiences in municipal affairs, attacked the composition of the Rockefeller panel, and added that he himself always knew that "the CIA would become a monster and smite us all." Presumably the CIA is to blame for the bankrupt condition of New York City after eight years of leadership by Lindsay. Come to think of it, there is no more plausible explanation for the mess in New York than that the enemies of Lindsay were secretly running the government.

There was seldom a situation in which journalistic semantics played so great a role. Thus, the newspaper sentence, "Mr. Angleton believes that anti-war efforts were backed by foreign agencies" is read by one and all to mean, "Mr. Angleton entertains the obviously absurd notion that

anti-war efforts were backed by foreign agencies."

THE SPOKESMEN for CIA have not rushed forward to give detailed accounts of the agency's activities, and that's wrong. Or, as it is usually put, the CIA has "refused to specify the basis of its allegations." But it is okay for Seymour Hersh of the New York Times to make unqualified statements on the basis of unspecified "well-placed sources." You will perhaps have observed the technique. One day Hersh alleges that the CIA has done thus-and-so. The next day he quotes his own report of the day before beginning with the phrase, "Yesterday the New York Times revealed . . ."

Then there is the subtle use of quotation marks. "Richard Helms told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he could not 'recall' whether the White House had urged the CIA to engage in domestic spying. The New York Times, quoting well-placed sources, said that the CIA had violated . . ." Why the quotes around Helms' "recall," where they

do not belong? Why not quotes around "well-placed sources" — where, according to the rules of punctuation, they do belong? Consider, for a moment, how differently these two sentences would read if the placing of the quotation marks had been reversed.

THE ONLY fresh air recently was the story in the Washington Post, quoting the former liaison man between the CIA and the FBI, who said that there are "grey areas" in the law, resulting in the CIA's crossing into domestic operations for legitimate reasons. Sam Papich blamed these murky areas on a statute that "goes from the vague to the ridiculous."

"For example, he said" — I quote the Post story — "a CIA training program for local police departments was widely thought to have been aimed at anti-war activists and therefore represented an incursion into the domestic field. In fact, its purpose was to share with local police several devices and methods the CIA had developed in its own work. One device, he said, is engaged in

the apprehension of murderers by detecting whether a suspect has held a piece of meta in the last 24 hours."

THE CHARTER says that the CIA shall have "no police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions." But, Papich reminds us, it also says that the CIA director is "responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

"A Soviet spy in France out of the blue travels to the U.S.," he said. "You don't just pick up the telephone and tell Hoover . . ."

Complexities are being lost to the ideological rigidities. One wonders whether the critics of the CIA would really demand that it reveal its files on connections between U.S. protests, and foreign money. Or — conceivably — will a thorough investigation reveal that the CIA has not done enough? Does it make sense in any case, to repeal the law of hot pursuit when the enemy is detected flying into your own territory?

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, Feb. 5, 1975

CIA Love Traps Lured Diplomats

By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

For years, the Central Intelligence Agency operated love traps in New York City and San Francisco, where foreign diplomats were lured by prostitutes in the pay of the CIA.

Through hidden one-way mirrors, CIA agents filmed the sexual adventures and later tried to blackmail the victims into becoming informants.

The stranger-than-fiction story of the blackmail operation is one of the secrets which the CIA frantically is trying to hide from congressional investigators. But we have uncovered the details and will be happy to furnish Congress with the evidence.

Significantly, the CIA used the old Bureau of Narcotics as a cover for the bizarre sex setup. In both cities, narcotics agents rented and maintained adjoining efficiency apartments. It was their responsibility to make sure the blackmail apartment had a lived-in look and was kept stocked with food and liquor, so the victims wouldn't become suspicious.

In San Francisco, the blackmail apartment was opened in the late 1950s and closed about

1965. It was equipped only with bugging devices, not observation mirrors. The New York operation lasted from about 1960 to 1966.

On the East Coast, the dual efficiency apartments were located on the sixth floor of a high-rise apartment building in Greenwich Village. On the wall of the blackmail apartment was hung a large painting of two ships. But the painting was actually a one-way mirror.

On the other side of the wall, CIA agents could watch and film the action through the see-through painting. The painting was strategically placed so that it gave the CIA observers a full view of the sofa, which opened into a bed. A Japanese screen, implanted with microphones, provided the sound for the CIA's blackmail movies.

On the other side of the wall, the one-way mirror was hidden behind a painting with hinges. The agents merely would swing back the painting like cabinet door for the peep shows in the adjoining apartment.

To stage the shows, both male and female prostitutes with a variety of sexual skills were used. The CIA possibly got the idea from Russians, who long

have used sex blackmail to entrap Westerners into spying for them.

Footnote: The narcs used the apartments when the CIA didn't need them. They would be advised to stay away on certain nights. The monthly rent for the dual Greenwich Village apart-

ments was \$160 each. The rent, food and liquor bills were paid out of a special checking account in a bank near the New York narcotics office. Our associate Bob Owens contacted a CIA spokesman who said the agency had "never heard of this."

WASHINGTON POST
5 February 1975

Staff Chief Chosen for CIA Panel

William G. Miller, a Republican foreign policy analyst, is Sen. Frank Church's choice to be staff director of the new Senate Select Intelligence Operations Committee, it was learned yesterday.

Church, (D-Idaho), who will be chairman of the 11-member committee, is expected to recommend Miller at the committee's first organizational meeting today.

The select committee has been given a \$750,000 authorization, which means an investigative staff of about 30 people. It will examine foreign

and domestic intelligence-gathering by the FBI, the CIA and Pentagon intelligence agencies.

Miller, 43, is currently staff director of Senate's special Committee on Termination of the National Emergency, which has compiled an exhaustive study of various emergency powers created over the last 40 years.

He served eight years in the Foreign Service after studying at Williams College, Oxford and Harvard. From 1967 to 1973, he was the principal foreign policy adviser to Sen. John Sherman Cooper, (R-Ky.), the period when Cooper and Church were co-sponsoring legislation to end the war in Vietnam.

Miller has written a number of articles on the Middle East and is a member of the Middle East Institute. He has "top secret" security clearance from his service as a foreign policy aide, on Capitol Hill.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
8 February 1975

CIA Reportedly Contracted With Hughes in Effort to Raise Sunken Soviet A-Sub

BY WILLIAM FARR
and JERRY COHEN
Times Staff Writers

Howard Hughes contracted with the Central Intelligence Agency to raise a sunken Russian nuclear submarine from the Atlantic Ocean, according to reports circulating among local law enforcement officers.

The operation reportedly was carried out—or at least attempted—by the crew of a marine mining vessel owned by Hughes' Summa Corp. and designed in supersecrecy by a Los Angeles firm.

The head of the latter firm denied any knowledge of such an operation.

Confidential files on the operation are believed to have been among the documents stolen by safecrackers from Summa's Hollywood offices at 7920 Romaine St. last June 5.

The thieves made an offer to return the sensitive documents, but the price tag initially was \$1 million. The amount was negotiated downward over the subsequent months but the talks were broken off several weeks ago.

In the aftermath of the unsuccessful negotiations, it was decided by authorities to take the case before the Los Angeles County Grand Jury.

Three days of hearings have been scheduled by the grand jury, beginning Tuesday.

Two of the key witnesses called to testify are Nadine Hensley, a long-

time secretary to Hughes and presently a senior vice president for Summa Corp., and Lou Gordon, described by investigators as "being involved with the movie industry."

Miss Hensley, reportedly one of the few persons to see Hughes face-to-face in recent years, will be asked to tell the grand jury what was taken in the burglary.

Gordon is scheduled to explain his role as an intermediary between authorities and a man named Donald Woolbright, whom investigators accuse of demanding the huge sums for return of the stolen items.

It reportedly was Woolbright who claimed one of the stolen documents revealed the Hughes' organization involvement in the submarine retrieval at the request of the CIA.

The ship involved is the Long Beach-based Glomar Explorer, the most advanced marine mining vessel in the world, even though it is still in the experimental stage.

It was designed and is operated for Summa Corp. by Global Marine, Inc., which has offices in downtown Los Angeles and Century City.

Global Marine Board Chairman R. F. Bauer denied Friday any knowledge of the reported sub raising.

Paul Reeve, general manager of Summa's ocean mining division, said the Glomar Explorer, commissioned last year, made no attempt to raise a

sunken submarine.

He conceded, however, that it made a 10-day shakedown cruise in the Atlantic but spent the time just off the East Coast "near the mouth of the Delaware River."

If the submarine-raising operation was indeed carried out, it is likely to have involved one of two Soviet undersea vessels:

—A nuclear-powered attack submarine of the Soviet November class, which the Pentagon believes sank off Spain in April, 1970.

—Another nuclear submarine which foundered in March, 1972, about 900 miles northeast of Newfoundland and which may have sunk. This submarine was equipped to carry three nuclear missiles.

The local investigation is being conducted jointly by the district attorney's office and the Los Angeles Police Department but neither Dist. Atty. Joseph Busch nor Police Chief Edward M. Davis would comment.

At the time of the robbery, Summa officials reported to police that \$60,000 in cash was taken but did not detail which files might be missing.

Sources close to the investigation said that Summa officials may have realized for the first time that several sensitive files had been taken when the ransom demand for their return was made.

BALTIMORE SUN
11 February 1975

What's Required Is the Truth

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms told a Senate committee in 1973 that his organization was not involved in overthrowing Chile's President Salvador Allende in 1973. He was under oath at the time, and the questions were pretty pointed. One questioner asked if the CIA were involved even to the point of providing funds to anti-Allende individuals or organizations in Chile. He said no. Last month Mr. Helms was asked again about the Chilean operation. A lot more information had since come to light. Mr. Helms's successor at the CIA, William Colby, had testified that indeed there had been American aid funneled into Chile to help anti-Allende forces, several million dollars worth, and President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger briefed a number of members of Congress on just what did happen in Chile. Mr. Helms was left in an exposed position. So he told Senate questioners this time that his first answers were wrong. What else could he do?

Mr. Helms naturally has tried to put the best face on his early answers. He says they were not "lies" but merely less than going "the whole way" in re-

sponding. Whatever he calls it, the intent was to deceive. Mr. Helms more or less acknowledges this in his new testimony. He says that he felt compelled to testify the way he did the first time because the Allende regime was still in power and he didn't think it was in the United States' interest to reveal that, as he put it, the Nixon administration "wanted" Allende overthrown.

So he did not tell the truth. At the same hearing in 1973, Mr. Helms was asked about the existence of a domestic spy plan involving the White House and intelligence agencies. He denied any knowledge of it. Mr. Helms now says he just had a "memory lapse." Yes, he says now, he did have knowledge of such a plan. So, whatever the cause, he did not tell the truth on that point, either.

The best face that can be put on it is that Mr. Helms twice failed to give the full truth while under oath—once out of patriotism and once out of faulty memory. Thus, his credibility, if not his reputation, has been besmirched. Yet another victim of a system gone awry, yet another able and dedicated public servant compromised.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 February 1975

BALTIMORE SUN
7 FEB 1975

SECRET 1948 ROLE -DISCLOSED BY U.S.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 11—The State Department has just published documents showing that President Harry S. Truman was so concerned over a possible Communist take-over in Italy in 1948 that he approved a secret recommendation that the United States "make full use of its political, economic, and if necessary, military power" to prevent it.

The latest volume of documents in the series "The Foreign Relations of the United States" contains National Security Council reports that were designed to help the pro-Western Government of Premier Alcide de Gasperi turn back the Communists in the elections of April, 1948.

The volume does not indicate what, if any, role was played by the new formed Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the recommendations.

Other, unofficial publications have reported that the agency was authorized to help finance the political and information campaigns of anti-Communist forces in this period.

There are unexplained deletions in the National Security Council reports, as published by the State Department volume, that suggest they may refer to these secret activities.

One report, dated Feb. 10, 1948, lists eight recommendations. The fifth, ending with a deletion, says: "Actively combatting communist propaganda in Italy by an effective U.S. information program and by all other practicable means [rest of sentence deleted]."

Another report, dated March 8, recommends "efforts by all feasible means [deletion] to detach the Italian left-wing Socialists from the Communists."

The same report recommends, with an additional deletion: "Continue to assist the Christian Democrats and other selected anti-Communist parties [deletion]."

William M. Franklin, director of the State Department's Historical Office, was asked whether the deletions were about clandestine activities. He declined to discuss what had been deleted.

He did volunteer, however, the following in answer to questions in discussions with the State Department's outside advisory panel on the foreign relations series:

"It has been agreed that we cannot cover in the foreign relations series, clandestine operations, covert intelligence reports or any matters having to do with secret weapons or nuclear programs other than those that could be specifically declassified."

Mr. Franklin said that this policy was agreed upon so that crucial documents that might otherwise be denied publication could be published, albeit with deletions.

The State Department's for-

Nick Thimmesch

Establishment Gang Backs Helms

Washington.

Some establishment folk here, especially those afflicted with "Locust Valley lock-jaw" (a speech affliction endemic to old Ivy Leaguers) are worried sick that one of their own, Richard M. Helms, may get zonked in the investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency, which he once headed.

Mr. Helms is on the spot, particularly because of discrepancies in his sworn testimony over CIA involvement in the Chilean elections and the admitted CIA spying on U.S. civilians, in apparent violation of the law. Mr. Helms seems to be in the same kind of jam some members of Mr. Nixon's White House staff were in during the most intense hours of the Watergate scandal.

When the Nixon gang was in trouble, establishment folk enjoyed it, because Richard M. Nixon viewed this crowd with disdain, and the feeling was mutual. When the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, was similarly in trouble at one point in Watergate, the establishment folk rallied to him, because he, like Mr. Helms, is one of them.

Now we are indebted to William Greider for his recent article in the Washington Post describing an "intimate dinner party" given last week for Mr. Helms by Tom Braden, the columnist. If the idea was to have Mr. Helms's friends demonstrate their loyalty and affection for him in his hour of travail, fine.

According to Mr. Greider, one of those honoring Mr. Helms was Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, which is studying a possible perjury by Mr. Helms on the Chilean matter. Mr. Symington toasted the "splendid job" Mr. Helms had performed for the CIA, and W. Averell Harriman, an elder statesman, seconded that sentiment.

Mr. Kissinger joined the toast of Mr. Helms at the party, and was quoted as saying that Mr. Helms is "an honora-

ble man." The Post story had Mr. Kissinger expressing dismay about what happened to Mr. Helms and offering private words of rebuke for the present CIA director, William E. Colby, and the Defense Secretary, James R. Schlesinger, for their parts in launching internal investigations of the CIA.

Mr. Kissinger was similarly irked when William D. Ruckelshaus, as acting FBI director, revealed that Mr. Kissinger helped initiate the FBI wiretaps on his own staffers and journalists on grounds of "national security."

The most impassioned speech for Mr. Helms, according to the story, was delivered by a former defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, who wanted one and all to know that, whatever Mr. Helms did, over the line or not, Mr. McNamara supported him fully.

Some guests wept, but there is no report that Barbara Walters of NBC's Today show shed a tear. Nor did the Israeli ambassador, Simcha Dinitz (a good man who represents a courageous, Spartan country), who should know better than to get mixed up with this establishment bunch.

It was not startling that, a few days later, the host wrote in a column that poor Mr. Helms never realized that one day he would be judged wrong for carrying out the orders of the President of the United States.

"Does a soldier quit the field of battle when the general orders a foolhardy attack?" the column asked, in defending Mr. Helms.

This kind of defense also must mean that H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, John N. Mitchell, John W. Dean 3d, Jeb Stuart Magruder, Egil M. Krogh, Jr., Charles W. Colson—well, name the Watergate sinners—were only following orders, just like Mr. Helms. Tsk, tsk.

And can you imagine the ruckus in this town, if, during the height of the Watergate furor, the late Murray M. Chotiner would have given "an in-

terview that "the real problem is that the National Security Council is being very sticky about releasing documents."

This, in turn, he said, has delayed publication of the series, which is now up to 1948.

Agencies can refuse to allow publication of a document for up to 30 years old if it contains "information or material disclosing a system, plan, installation or specific foreign relations matter, the continuing protection of which is essential to the national security." In addition, refusal can be based on the

intimate dinner party" for, say, Haldeman and would have invited, say, Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Mr. Kissinger, Melvin R. Laird and Walter Cronkite to come honor the poor, bedeviled guests? Laughter and expressions of outrage would have followed.

Mr. Symington's integrity on the CIA investigation is now as skinny as a cigarette paper. Mr. Kissinger, with his close link to Nelson A. Rockefeller, who supposedly is heading a presidential investigation of the CIA, makes the Vice President look bad. And Miss Walters has forfeited her right to speak as a journalist about the CIA affair, now that she toasted Mr. Helms, who is being investigated.

What we have here are establishment folk showing that they are just as human and fallible as the Nixon gang, and no better. If it is bad for Mr. Nixon's aides to claim they were only following orders in an apparent violation of the law, it has to be just as bad for Mr. Helms to make the same claim. Else, this is truly Alice in Wonderland.

As for Mr. Kissinger, he should be worried, too. He did not tell the truth when asked, under oath, to tell what he knew about the White House "plumbers." He appears not to have told the truth on the question of CIA involvement with Chile—again when he was under oath.

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Helms are really in the same leaky boat, only the establishment searchlight now plays only on Mr. Helms in this career-saving effort. Does President Ford know what is going on?

ground of "disclosing intelligence sources or methods."

Grounds For Longer Delay.

If a document is more than 30 years old, it can still be denied publication if the department concerned decides that "continued protection of the records is essential to national security."

Historians of the postwar period are seeking to establish the role of the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies to understand how American foreign policy was made and carried out.

In Italy, for instance, the C.I.A. has been reported to have played a significant role as part of the American effort in 1948 to support the de Gasperi Government.

In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs Quarterly, for instance Harry Rositzke, a former C.I.A. official, said:

In 1948, spurred by the Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia and the Italian political crisis, the National Security Council gave the C.I.A. the responsibility for "political, psychological, economic and unconventional warfare operations."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
19 JAN 1975

Report CIA sought N.U. aid to check student trips

By Harry Kelly

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON—In 1970, when the White House was demanding more information about campus dissidents, the Central Intelligence Agency asked Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill., and reportedly other schools to notify the CIA routinely of all foreign travel by faculty and staff.

CIA's approach to Northwestern—which said no—came within three weeks after White House aide Tom Charles Huston wrote in a "top secret" memo to Richard Helms, then CIA director, that "CIA coverage of American students [and others] traveling or living abroad is to be increased. At that time the White House was spurring intelligence agencies to learn if United States protests were inspired and financed by Communist countries.

A source at another large university said he understood from other college administrators that the CIA request of Northwestern was not unique. A CIA source acknowledged this was true.

THE CIA HAS come under fire recently on charges that it conducted illegal domestic intelligence activities during the late 1960s and early 1970s. President Ford has authorized an eight-member panel under the chairmanship of Vice President Rockefeller to investigate the charges.

The agency is also expected to be the subject of hearings by several congressional committees. Senate Democrats may act on Monday to empower a special committee to conduct investigations centering on the charges against the CIA.

A CIA spokesman said the agency's request to universities for travel information may have been intended as an effort to carry out a domestic program CIA Director William E. Colby described to senate subcommittees last week as a routine intelligence gathering operation.

COLBY explained to inquiring senators last week that one of the CIA's U. S. activities included its domestic collection division:

"Its representatives contact residents of the United States who are willing to share with their government information they possess, on foreign areas and

developments." These include businessmen, journalists, and teachers who have traveled to certain areas abroad.

The CIA spokesman said he had been assured the approaches to Northwestern and other universities had "no connection whatsoever" with the so-called Huston plan for domestic surveillance, which called for wiretappings, mail covers, and break-ins.

The Huston plan was blocked by the late Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover. But it was implemented piecemeal, according to secret memos placed in the record of Senate and House Watergate investigations.

AN INTERAGENCY committee on intelligence, which included FBI, CIA, military, and National Security Agency representatives, gave special attention to campuses in a June, 1970, report proposing the elimination of many restrictions on domestic surveillance—a report that resulted in the Huston plan.

"To a substantial degree, militant new left and antiwar groups in the U. S. are composed of students, faculty members and others connected with educational institutions," the report noted.

The report warned that public disclosure of the CIA's funding of the National Student Association had been an embarrassment which "contributed to a climate adverse to intelligence-type activity on college campuses and with student-related groups."

But the 1970 report also observed "restrictions currently in force limit certain other elements of the intelligence community access to some of the most troublesome areas—campuses, college faculties, foreign and domestic youth groups, leftist journalists, and black militants."

IN A JULY 23, 1970 memo to Helms on the plan for domestic surveillance, Huston said in one of the paragraphs that coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups was to be increased. All restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA coverage of American students [and others] traveling or living abroad is to be increased." Copies of the memos went to President Nixon and his chief aide, H. R. Haldeman.

In asking universities such as Northwestern to report all overseas travel of all faculty and staff members, the CIA

was requesting a substantial expansion of an existing program, according to university sources.

Government contracts required universities to report to the U. S. Industrial Security Office when an employee with a government security clearance planned to travel to a Communist bloc country or to an international meeting at which Communist bloc representatives would be in attendance.

THESE REPORTS were also sent to the CIA.

In his statement to Senate subcommittees, Colby acknowledged the CIA may have overstepped its charter in some domestic intelligence operations, including the planting of agents among dissident groups in the nation's capital.

Colby said that while the Huston plan was not implemented, the Interagency Evaluation Committee (IEC), coordinated by White House counsel John W. Dean, was established. The IEC included representatives from FBI, CIA, NSA, and Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense. Its purpose was to provide coordinated intelligence estimates and evaluations of civil disorders, said Colby.

"Pursuant to this," he added, "CIA continued its counter-intelligence interest in possible foreign links with American dissidents."

TO MAINTAIN security on this CIA operation, Colby said, "the program was conducted on a highly compartmented basis. As is necessary in counter-intelligence work, the details were known to few in the agency."

Colby suggested that the CIA counter-intelligence files were thick with the details of who knew whom and when and how; who met whom and where:

"The backbone of an intelligence operation, particularly a counter-intelligence case, is detailed information—thru which one can begin to discern patterns, associations, and connections.

"In this sphere, therefore, any professional intelligence organization tries to systematically record all scraps of information."

"Thus, whenever a name—anyone's name—a date, a place, a physical description, appears anywhere in any operational report, it is usually put into a cross-referenced master index."

GENERAL

BALTIMORE SUN
11 February 1975

Analysis

U.S., Soviet shown perilously unfamiliar

By MICHAEL PARKS
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—The month-long post-mortems on the collapse of the Soviet-American trade agreement now are complete, and the principal lesson is not the fragility of detente but of how dangerously little the two superpowers know about each other.

Accounts provided by Soviet and American officials familiar with the lengthy negotiations and backroom politicking to get the agreement implemented make it clear that the major cause of the collapse was a complete misreading in each capital of the other's intentions.

"If this had been a matter of war or peace," said one American, "we would not be sitting here analyzing it all. All those buttons probably would have been pushed."

A Soviet specialist on the United States put it in less dramatic terms, but agreed that the trade snafu had been "a classic case of diplomatic misinterpretation."

"Even after three years of detente and four summit meetings in this era of rapprochement, we still make crucial misjudgments," he said. "We make them partially out of ignorance and partially out of the suspicion that 25 years of the cold war bred."

The Soviet misjudgment was compound: The Kremlin underestimated the strength of forces opposing trade concessions and the residual distrust in the United States of Soviet motives. It overestimated the strength of the Ford administration, of Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, of the business supporters of increased Soviet-American trade. Finally, it believed that detente was far more important than it is to the average American—or the average congressman.

"It was not until the first week of December, or perhaps even a little later, that people here took as a serious possibility the prospect that the Congress would pass such highly restrictive legislation," a well-informed Soviet source said.

"The leadership thought it had firm assurances from both President Ford at Vladivostok and later from Mr. Kissinger in Washington that the compromise would be upheld. The feeling is very strong that Ford and especially Kissinger reneged or deliberately misled us. But there were serious political misjudgments on our part, too."

On the American side, the fault was not only Mr. Kissinger's promise to deliver what he could not, but a complete misreading of the gravity with which the Kremlin viewed the proposed American legislation.

The Soviet leadership repeatedly warned, both publicly and privately, that it could not accept any overt American interference into what it regards as one of its internal affairs—Jewish emigration. The only assurances that Soviet officials ever gave Mr. Kissinger, according to well-placed sources here, were that the emigration issue would not stand in the way of improved relations and probably could be resolved completely in two years.

"Mr. Kissinger listened when they gave the assurances on emigration, and he spun these into an elaborate agreement with Senator [Henry M.] Jackson, but he just tuned out when the Soviets warned on interference—overtly and badly tying trade to emigration," one prominent American businessman who was deeply involved in the behind-the-scenes negotiations said.

"Kissinger just dismissed it as face-saving declarations for internal consumption. It was a complete misinterpretation, and it makes you wonder about the foundation of some of the other agreements Kissinger has negotiated, like the strategic arms treaties."

Because of Mr. Kissinger's assertions that a compromise had been reached, American business leaders and other Ford administration officials did not take the Soviet protests seriously—even when delivered by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the

Communist party leader—until December 18 when the Kremlin declared in an official statement that there was no agreement as portrayed by Mr. Kissinger, whom it virtually accused of lying to the American public.

But then it was too late to rewrite the Trade Reform Act, which was adopted finally December 20 and signed by President Ford January 3.

The Soviet government, also realizing that the trade agreement negotiated two years earlier was collapsing, warned Mr. Kissinger through its ambassador in Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, who met with the secretary of state December 18. He said Moscow could not accept the American terms and thus could not ratify the 1972 agreement.

Mr. Kissinger apparently told no one of this warning just as he had kept secret a letter handed him October 26 in Moscow rejecting his portrayal of assurances he had received on Jewish emigration.

"If he told President Ford about these warnings, he so minimized them that the eventual Soviet rejection came as a surprise to Ford, too," one prominent American businessman reported after discussing the matter with the President and with White House aides.

One analysis is that Mr. Kissinger deliberately kept these warnings secret lest they fuel American suspicion about the extent and degree of the Soviet commitment to detente and provide ammunition for critics contending that the Russians cannot be trusted.

Another is that he kept hoping that last-minute compromises would resolve the Soviet objection and those of Senator Jackson (D., Wash.).

This apparently was still his hope when Ambassador Dobrynin informed him January 10 that Moscow would not ratify the trade agreement because Washington had failed to fulfill the requirement to lower tariffs on Soviet exports.

The secretary of state asked the Russians not to announce their action until after President Ford's State of the Union address, January 15—a delay meant to reduce the President's embarrassment but also to give Mr. Kissinger a little more time. He approached the Soviet Union, Senator Jackson and Jewish lobbyists through intermediaries in futile search of a compromise.

One conclusion that Soviet officials have drawn in their

assessment is that they must rely on much more than Mr. Kissinger in future dealings.

The Soviet examination of the whole affair was not the sweeping reassessment predicted by Mr. Kissinger—a statement greatly resented here, for it implies, in Soviet eyes, that a switch from detente is under consideration.

Moscow's decisions are not fully known yet, but the Kremlin is emphasizing repeatedly that it wants to improve relations with the United States and will proceed at the same pace despite the trade setback.

Trade plateau

As for trade, it probably will remain in the range of \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion until Moscow gets most-favored-nation treatment and government-backed credits. In contrast, trade with West Germany and Japan probably will soar to \$2.5 billion this year and \$3 billion next year.

"It will be up to the United States to straighten all this out," one well-informed Soviet source said. "We have gone as far as we can and any further compromises would be impossible for Brezhnev and the leadership as a whole."

Soviet officials here say that there can be a short-term improvement in trade relations if Congress repeals the tight restrictions it has placed on U.S. Export-Import Bank loans to finance Soviet purchases of American goods, but no complete resolution until most-favored-nation status is granted to Soviet goods imported into the United States.

Soviet sources here said that repairing the damage will be one of the key topics discussed by Mr. Kissinger and Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, when they meet next week in Geneva for two days of talks.

But, as one specialist on Soviet-American relations here noted, "The real problem, the basic problem, is one of communications. The damage done to trade can be taken care of, and it is not so important. The lesson we have learned is that we have to broaden and deepen our relations, something that was hardly necessary during the cold war."

For example, he continued, detente has improved Soviet-American relations to the point that "when we say something no one pays much attention in America because everyone assumes things are fine, getting better and, anyway, dealt with by Kissinger. At least in the

past we got headlines in American papers that said, 'The Kremlin Threatens Washington,' and people paid attention.

"It is ridiculous," he added,

"to have to declare an end to detente to get Americans above all the secretary of state, to take what we say as being serious. I am certain de-

tente can survive this trade agreement business. What we all should worry about is whether it can grow without better mutual understanding

and better communication because all the hopes we have for a peaceful world depend on these."

WASHINGTON POST

7 February 1975

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

Checking Nuclear Spread

Fred Ikle, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is plugging hard these days to get people in and out of government to worry more about the spread of nuclear bombs, and every sane citizen among us ought to be urging him on.

It's a tough topic—nuclear proliferation—to get hold of. It has a kind of 1960s ring: too many people think, wrongly, the matter was disposed of by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). It does not enjoy consistently high political, bureaucratic or journalistic glamor ratings, as SALT does. Requiring the cooperation of smaller countries which tend to ask if non-proliferation is not a great-power plot to keep them down, it is in a sense harder than talking SALT with the Russians. To cope with proliferation, moreover, takes a certain imaginative leap, since the countries or cabals which might acquire bombs don't have them yet.

But it's scary.

In his public statements, Ikle now regularly points out that by its Atoms for Peace program initiated in 1954, the United States unwittingly but unwisely facilitated the prospect for nuclear proliferation by spreading peaceful nuclear technology abroad:

"There is no question that nuclear technology would have spread in any event—the question is how fast. In the

1950s this rather practical question was being confused with more philosophic issues of science and secrecy: whether scientific discoveries could be kept secret and, indeed, whether it was morally right to keep them secret, would that be possible. This was not the policy question. Instead, we ought to have asked ourselves whether or not the need for nuclear power, then a distant prospect, justified the spread of these building blocks for making nuclear bombs."

Such is the pace of the nuclear power industry in these energy-anxious times, however, that Ikle figures that in 20 years just the amount of fissionable material in foreign transit each year will be enough to make 20,000 bombs. That is to say, the world's appetite for power in the next generation may compound the problem—the problem of all that nuclear stuff out there vulnerable to military diversion by governments and theft by fanatical individuals—to which the United States inadvertently contributed by its carelessness in the last generation.

In return for our Atoms for Peace aid, we induced recipients to set up an organization (International Atomic Energy Agency) and establish certain physical controls ("safeguards") to prevent countries from building bombs. But the IAEA is not only an international agency, one in which American influence is marginal, but a users' agency, one largely run by countries which want help but not intervention from the nuclear powers.

So though the United States wants the IAEA to tighten safeguards, increasingly it seeks alternative ways—especially agreements among the suppliers of nuclear peaceful aid—to balk military diversion. Since the suppliers are also each other's commercial competitors (a reactor can cost \$500 million) and, one way or another, each other's political rivals, this is not so simple. At Martinique last December, however, the communique hopefully recorded that the presidents of France (not an NPT signatory) and the United

States "explored how, as exporters of nuclear materials and technology, their two countries could coordinate their efforts to assure improved safeguards of nuclear materials."

Meanwhile the United States acting on its own, both in proposing new nuclear power agreements as with Egypt and Israel (these are now politically stalled) and in renewing old ones, is trying to tighten controls, to close perceived loopholes and in general to set new and higher safeguard standards both for other suppliers and for the IAEA.

Washington will also be pressing non-nuclear countries, at a conference to be held in Geneva next May, to review the non-proliferation treaty, to sign up. India's example, however, is discouraging here. Its status as a "non-aligned" and less-developed country kept many Third World states from deploring its "peaceful" explosion last May. The desire not to chill political relations muted both the Soviet and American responses.

Closer to home, Ikle notes that American strategic doctrine and weaponry are designed to deter nuclear attacks from one or two known and rational countries. But "in a world of widespread nuclear proliferation, certainly one and perhaps both of these premises would be shattered." We'd know what hit us but perhaps not from what country or from what terrorist band it came.

"Ten years from now," Ikle said in a recent speech, "the Secretary of Defense will have to cope with the danger that devastating destruction could reach the United States from a great many countries all over the world."

Or, as Libya's President Qaddafi put it the other day: "Soon the atom will have no secrets for anybody. Some years ago we could hardly procure a fighter squadron. Tomorrow we will be able to buy an atom bomb and all its parts. The nuclear monopoly is about to be broken."

Scared?

WASHINGTON POST

6 February 1975

Jack Anderson Column Is Found 'Inaccurate'

NEW YORK, Feb. 5 (AP) — The National News Council said today a syndicated Jack Anderson column entitled "The Torture Graduates" made biased and inaccurate use of quotations from source letters.

Accuracy in Media, a Washington-based group, had filed the complaint against the column with the National News Council, a private organization that investigates allegations against the national news media.

The column, which appeared in The Washington Post Aug. 3, 1974, asserted that "students at the International Police Academy, a school run by the State Department to train foreign policemen, have developed some chilling views about torture tactics."

Accuracy in Media charged that statements from papers written by five students at the academy were taken out of context to support the assertion

of its staff examined the five papers and "found that the quotations by Anderson do in fact misrepresent the attitude of the students toward torture as set forth in their papers."

The papers were written in 1965-67, a fact that was not mentioned in the column, the council findings said.

Anderson said in a letter dated Dec. 30 that the statements in the column were supported by sources whose identities

he could not reveal. The council said that if support exists, it was Anderson's responsibility to develop and publish it.

Anderson could not be reached for comment on the council's findings. However, reporter Joseph Spear, who researched the story, said, "We think they are absolutely wrong. They have not yet done a thorough job. We feel justified in what we wrote."

Eastern Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
3 February 1975

Soviet Jews fear being cast in scapegoat role

By MICHAEL PARKS

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—A deep despair now grips most of Moscow's Jewish community in the wake of the Soviet rejection of American congressional demands that it relax restrictions on emigration.

Many of those who have applied to leave for Israel feel that their chances of emigrating have diminished considerably and that they will remain in their jobless limbo much, much longer now.

Many of those who had considered applying have burned their emigration forms and their invitations from the Israeli government, according to Jewish sources.

There is widespread fear that Soviet Jews will become unofficial scapegoats for the collapse of the Soviet-American trade agreement in which not only the Soviet leadership but the average Russian had placed so much hope.

There is also bitterness—anger over the way the issue of Jewish emigration has been handled by American politicians and reproach for the way they had believed the Kremlin would capitulate.

Rate has not declined

A few activists try to lighten the overall mood with expressions of hope that the Kremlin will not restrict emigration further, now at a rate of fewer than 1,000 Jews a month.

Professor Alexander Lerner, a cyberneticist and a leading Jewish activist, said the rate of emigration has not declined since the announcement that Moscow would not ratify the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement because of the conditions imposed by the U.S. Congress.

"We feel that the level will remain about the same as it has been recently," he said. "The general handling of the visa applications does not seem to have changed for the worse. The authorities seem to

be saying that they are not going to be affected, one way or the other, by the American action."

Although this attitude is shared by most other prominent Jewish activists here, many of the average Jews seeking to emigrate feel that it is overoptimistic.

"Sure, they can say things have not changed much because they are sure of getting out, sooner or later, because they are known in the United States and the West and foreign interest will get them out," said one would-be emigrant, a Moscow cabinet-maker.

"But who knows or cares about me and my family in America or England? No one is going to write long articles in the papers about me, and why should they? I am just an average guy who wants to take his family to Israel. But now I cannot see how that is going to happen."

"Oh, sure, I might be one of the fellows the visa office selects to meet its monthly quota, but frankly I think I am worse off now than before. I am not alone in feeling this way."

A Leningrad mathematician expressed similar sentiments. "There are many, many people who have applied, myself and my family among them, because our hopes were raised and there were serious expectations we would be permitted to leave," he said.

"All those have turned to nothing. The result is a lot of people who have lost their jobs. They have the choice of withdrawing their applications and begging for their jobs, any jobs, or remaining non-persons hoping against hope they will eventually be able to leave."

Soviet propaganda on the matter has been focused carefully so as not to encourage anti-Semitism, according to both Jewish and semi-official sources here, but Moscow Jews have said the feel none

the less that many fellow citizens blame them for the collapse of the trade agreement, which many here saw as ushering in a new economic era with modernized industry and increased production of consumer goods.

"I do not want to emigrate, never have and probably never will, but yet people ask me why—we—meaning Jews—oppose Soviet-American economic co-operation and whether we are satisfied now," a Jewish engineer said.

There is much criticism of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), the chief sponsor of the American legislation tying trade concessions to increased emigration.

"He is either a completely naive fool to think that he could force such insults upon a very proud country like the Soviet Union, another superpower," a Jewish political scientist said, "or he is a completely unscrupulous, immoral politician who deliberately used the issue of Jewish emigration to further his own ambitions. Why American Jewish leaders were so taken in by such a man is hard to understand. Perhaps now that Jackson has moved on to other issues the damage can be repaired."

A Moscow fashion designer waiting for permission to emigrate commented, "We never believed the Soviet press when they described this Jackson as such a monster. We thought it was just the usual propaganda. But, my God, he has managed to deceive the whole American Congress and to undo everything that had been accomplished over four years."

Senator Jackson and the Jackson amendment to the 1974 Trade Reform Act have their defenders among Jewish activists here, but a number of these have written American Jewish leaders privately urging that they dissociate themselves from the Washington Democrat.

"As long as Jackson is involved, the emigration problem will not be resolved," a leading activist said last week. "We think that after the fuss dies down the authorities will let the flow rise again. But Jackson and all his trumpeting will kill this hope, too."

The activists also are pushing American, British and Canadian Jewish groups to reduce considerably their support for Soviet Jews who do not go to Israel—a number that is rising.

Soviet authorities have told Jews here that a principal reason that the number of emigrants was cut from more than 35,000 in 1973 to about 21,000 last year was the increasing number going to other countries.

"Emigration to Israel can be justified on humanitarian grounds here," a well-informed Soviet source said, "but emigration to the United States or Canada or Britain is viewed differently. It is political. Those people are leaving not for religious reasons but because they oppose the Soviet system. That poses problems here, considerable problems."

Soviet officials said last week in the authoritative journal *New Times* that emigration was likely to decrease further because, they said, the number of applications from Jews was declining.

The *New Times* article said that the current backlog was only 1,420 applications, each apparently representing a family of four to six persons. "The number of such requests [to emigrate to Israel] is continually decreasing," the article said.

The Jewish lobby in the United States during the debate over the Jackson amendment had said there was a backlog of 100,000 to 130,000, a figure based on the number of Soviet Jews who had written for Israeli government invitations.

Western Europe

WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1975

The Turkish Arms Cutoff

NOW THAT CONGRESS has forced the President to halt arms deliveries to Turkey, a new debate is arising over the effects of what Congress did. Mr. Ford at once charged publicly that the suspension would impede Cyprus negotiations, jeopardize the American position in Europe, the Mideast and the Mediterranean, and "raise grave doubts about the conduct of American foreign relations even among countries that are not directly involved in that area." These are not unthinkable results, for all that the President may exaggerate them and the Congress may minimize them as the debate goes on. It is only natural at this moment of great global uncertainty that the prospect of continued executive-congressional collision over foreign policy will raise serious alarms.

These alarms, however, do not emanate exclusively from the executive branch. They are shared by many legislators, including those who led the successful effort to force the administration to honor the law requiring arms recipients to use the arms only for Alliance and self-defense purposes. These men are neither know-nothings nor puppets of domestic voting blocs. They are no more narrowly devoted to institutional prerogative in foreign-policymaking than the administration. By no less than eight votes in the House and nine in the Senate over half a year's time, the Congress patiently warned the administration that Turkey must return to the framework of arms legislation. Aware of the stakes, the Congress was almost desperately eager to find enough trace of Turkish compliance to justify further deferral of the arms cutoff. But the administration could not deliver. In the end, we think, no self-respecting Congress could have acted differently.

The important thing now, responsible people at both

ends of Pennsylvania Avenue agree, is to see enough Turkish movement to give Congress grounds to lift the cutoff. The Turks' reaction will, of course, be crucial. Their chief of staff frankly concedes that it is out of the question for an army so utterly dependent on American supplies to turn, say, to France. This kind of realism may sober the Turks, after they have satisfied the initial demands of nationalistic outrage. Concessions on Cyprus may conceivably come more easily to the military men who are moving to the political foreground in Ankara, than to the civilian politicians who are fading back. Then, to Washington, Archbishop Makarios may be a slippery character, but he is his country's elected president and the only man who can possibly induce his fellow Greek Cypriots to accept the bitter compromises that a settlement will require. The Karamanlis government in Athens has its own powerful reasons to facilitate compromise. We are not sanguine. But we think it premature to conclude that the parties, especially the Turks, cannot recognize where their own best interests lie.

As for the administration, it must swallow its anger and apprehension and treat Congress with reasonable respect. It must avoid impugning the motives and political intelligence of legislators with whom it disagrees, and it must try to understand better the Congress' unwillingness to accept the old executive contention that considerations of legality and constitutional privilege must invariably yield to a presidential concept of "national interest." Otherwise the administration risks shredding its basis for expecting responsible congressional participation in making foreign policy, and exacerbating the very political tensions that it is in the nation's real interest to ease.

WASHINGTON STAR
5 February 1975

Communists Discover Bug in London Office

LONDON (AP)—British Communist party officials have found a listening device at their headquarters in London and one official said it could have been eavesdropping on them for almost 30 years.

The bug was discovered when decorators stripped away office woodwork. It consisted of a small battery-operated transmitter with a metal case acting as aerial.

The battery was still working, but it was not

known whether the bug was transmitting.

"The device is of obsolete manufacture and it would have been difficult to place behind the woodwork after the room was last decorated in 1948," said the party's press chief, George Matthews. He said he suspected British intelligence services or possibly the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1975

Swede Confronts 'Hamburger Culture'

STOCKHOLM, Feb. 7 (UPI)—Swedish Communists are trying to bring down McDonald's "Golden Arches."

Arne Soederkvist, chairman of the Communist representatives on the Stockholm city council, said yesterday that "The hamburger culture is a danger to the working people."

He accused "the American cultural imperialism of spreading food not native to Sweden," and he said the hamburgers didn't have essential vitamins and minerals.

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES
9 February 1975

Open Diplomacy, Dry Water

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—Secretary Kissinger's forthcoming Middle East shuttle in search of a glimmer of Arab-Israeli peace is the most urgent and most difficult of his negotiating career. Threats of war resounding through the Palestine area are, despite diplomatic tranquilizers, fundamentally more ominous and more heavily supported by masses of modern armament than ever before.

Mr. Kissinger's remarkable pacifying success to date can, in a sense, be measured by standards long defined by experts. For example, in the seventeenth century François de Callières, chief diplomat for French King Louis XIV, recommended:

"The negotiator must possess the patience of a watchmaker and be devoid of personal prejudices." Mr. Kissinger maintains an air of patient optimism and he doesn't often permit his prejudices to slip into public. Moreover, he is by training a professor, not a lawyer (like many of his predecessors). Callières believed: "In general, the training of a lawyer breeds habits and dispositions of mind which are not favorable to the practice of diplomacy."

Nevertheless, despite his skill, Mr. Kissinger is at a disadvantage in approaching the new round of negotia-

tions. To begin with, Sir Harold Nicolson wrote: "A democracy, when dealing with a despotic system, is always at a disadvantage, since its decisions can never be either so secret or so quick." The real "other side" in present Middle East talks is the Soviet Union, which we regard as "a despotic system."

Finally the new era of "open diplomacy," so strongly emphasized by President Wilson after World War I, has now become an embarrassment to Washington, its sponsor, Congress is trying to get its oar into U.S. foreign policy; not just its financing or its goals, but its operations. Nicolson warned more than twenty years ago:

"The theory that diplomacy should proceed always frankly and in the public view has led to negotiation being broadcast and televised, and to all rational discussion being abandoned in favor of interminable propaganda speeches."

More important is publicizing of secret exchanges. Secretary Kissinger has already suffered damage both to his cause and to his prestige by disclosure—either through political inquisitiveness or press leakage—of highly confidential aspects of negotiations in midstream. This has been true of talks on a Vietnam settlement, on the Middle East, and on trade and détente with Russia.

I certainly cannot agree with that brutal cynic, Stalin, who claimed: "Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water, or wooden air." And I do agree with those who want the public of a democracy to know what foreign policy is being blueprinted for their national and collective fate.

Yet I do not believe such things can or should be revealed prematurely for reasons of internal politics or individual argumentation. That only serves to make "sincere diplomacy" impossible and produces stalemate, if not worse.

"The day secrecy is abolished, negotiation of any kind becomes impossible," Jules Cambon, a great French envoy (including to the United States), wrote earlier this century. And a retired American career diplomat, John Alden Bovey Jr., later remarked:

"Civil servants stumble from one Mideast capital to another, engaging in 'frank consultations,' while peace plans appear in the newspapers before their beneficiaries have had time to look at them." He ironically observed that often both parties in a negotiation go to extraordinary lengths to reassure the public that they are doing nothing in private to avoid a looming crisis.

According to Mr. Bovey: "It was a black day for diplomacy when President Wilson was persuaded to mount the gangplank of the George Washington en route to the Versailles peace conference. One consequence of that counterproductive voyage was the modern age of summitry."

Louis XI's great negotiator, Philippe de Commines, thought, however: "Two great princes who wish to establish good personal relations should never meet face to face." Nixon and Mao? Ford and Brezhnev?

That long-enduring, medieval complex has, in any case, been overcome. "Princes" now meet so often that such an event is no longer generally even notable. But when one "prince" is the head of a democracy or its foreign minister—he should at least have his own rear protected.

He must be shielded from legislative usurpation of his executive functions on behalf of the President. He must, also, be protected from the great and excessive American tendency to kibitz at diplomatic games—and then tell the opponents what cards our negotiator is clutching to his chest.

contract appears to be a program to provide a local defense force," he said. "We're the only ones who've raised an inference of a threat."

Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, D-Minn., also called yesterday for a congressional investigation.

"What is needed is for the Defense Department to reveal details of the contract to Congress," Humphrey said in a telephone interview from his home in Waverly, Minn. "I think the armed services committees of the House and Senate should promptly look into it and see what it involves."

HUMPHREY added: "The possibility of having American forces training another country's troops in the Mideast is fraught with danger. I really don't think we should engage in it."

Meanwhile, the former American

Saudi Troop Training Brings Call for Probe

By Peter Arnett
Associated Press

Two senators have called for congressional investigation of a Defense Department contract with a private firm to train Saudi Arabian troops to guard oil wells in the Persian Gulf.

"You can be sure there will be an investigation," Sen. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., said yesterday. "I'm going to move right away on it tomorrow."

He said he would ask Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to hold hearings on the matter. If for

some reason Stennis cannot, Jackson said, his own permanent investigations subcommittee would convene hearings.

Jackson said he was "completely baffled" by the matter.

"ONLY A SHORT time ago the President and secretary of state indicated the option of U.S. military action might be considered under certain circumstances in the Middle East," Jackson said in a telephone interview.

"It's a bit confusing to me and to the American people — this private

soldiers hired to train Saudi Arabian forces said they believe they can do a better job in the Persian Gulf than the U.S. military did in Southeast Asia.

"From a professional point of view we have a lot more going for us this time around," said retired Army Col. William G. Walby, 49, of Pebble Beach, Calif. He is training director for the Los Angeles-based Vinnell Corp., the first private contractor ever asked by the Defense Department to train a foreign army.

LIKE MOST of the several hundred former military men being recruited, Walby is a veteran of military service in Vietnam. He believes the \$335 million contract between the Saudi Arabian government and the Pentagon to train King Faisal's 26,000-man internal security force will have a greater chance of success than in Southeast Asia for these reasons:

- The Americans have a three-year contract to train the Saudis to fire their weapons and fight wars, and it is "Congress-proof" because the Saudis are paying the bills. Normally, U.S. military training programs abroad are scheduled for only a year at a time and are subject to scrutiny and frequent monetary change by Congress, as in Southeast Asia.

- The former U.S. soldiers going to the Persian Gulf will have operational control of the training programs, whereas in Southeast Asia they were only advisers with no control over local troops. "Over there we will be in command," Walby said.

- The Bedouin tribesmen who make up the internal security forces are believed to be intensely loyal to Faisal, "so we won't have to try and teach loyalty to the local leaders, as we tried and failed to do in the countries of Southeast Asia," Walby said.

- Tactically, the high desert of Saudi Arabia will be ideal to implement conventional American military tactics. "All those wide open spaces and no rivers — what a change from the jungles of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos," Walby said. The Americans will also teach street fighting.

The Vinnell contract to train three newly mechanized infantry battalions and a 105mm howitzer artillery battalion of similar size is the latest example of a rapidly increasing U.S. stake in the Persian Gulf region.

The Saudi Arabians are already using oil profits to buy American Northrop F5E jet fighters, Bell helicopters, and Cadillac Gage armored cars.

AROUND 3,000 American civilians are already in

Saudi Arabia to maintain this equipment, and the Vinnell Corp. will swell civilian ranks with 1,000 more.

American corporations are also heavily committed to Iran, where another small army of civilian advisers is in place to teach the shah of Iran's forces to use the billions of dollars worth of sophisticated military equipment he is buying.

Neighboring Oman has also received a shipment of U.S. antitank missiles, the first known direct arms sale from Washington to the small, conservative, oil-producing nation. Two U.S. military men went along to provide instruction.

Of all the American companies in the Persian Gulf region, only the Vinnell Corp. will actually train soldiers to pull triggers and fight wars.

THE PROGRAM begins in July at a camp near the Saudi capital of Riad, and Vinnell executives are hurriedly putting together teams of specialists.

Training director Walby joined the corporation just three days after he retired as commander of the 4th Advanced Individual Training Brigade and Training Command at Ford Ord, Calif. He was 30 years in the U.S. military, and has a chestful of ribbons.

Typical of the military men Vinnell is looking for is former U.S. Army Lt. Col. George Gaspard, who as a 17-year-old Marine scouted the Japanese-occupied island of Okinawa before the U.S. invasion in 1944. He hasn't missed a major American military venture since.

As one of the first U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers sent abroad, Gaspard regularly crossed enemy lines in the Korean War. Later, in Vietnam, he served with a top-secret U.S. Army unit that dispatched and recovered South Vietnamese agents operating in North Vietnam.

"I GUESS I've trained palace guard units over the years in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos," said the 47-year-old Gaspard, who retired from the military 18 months ago and has been working unhappily as a real estate agent until his new assignment.

The Saudi Arabian royal family security guards will be drawn from the units the Americans will be training.

WASHINGTON STAR
2 February 1975

The Case for Providing Arms Aid to Pakistan

By Alvin J. Cottrell

Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell is director of research at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. He recently returned from a visit to Pakistan which included a private interview with Prime Minister Bhutto.

The visit here this week of Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto should remind us of the tenuous situation in South Asia. And it should bring to mind that instability there also threatens the adjacent region — now more fashionably among our concerns — of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

This growing linkage is largely due to Iran's concern over the future of Pakistan which, in addition to being a Moslem brother, is vital to Iran as a buffer on its eastern border.

Many of the potential dangers in the subcontinent have their roots in the internal weaknesses of both Pakistan and India.

The problems that face Pakistan most acutely are those of military weakness compared with India, and internal unrest; the latter is being exacerbated by the former. The two problems are related, for protest movements within Pakistan — both in Baluchistan and in the North West Frontier Province — have been encouraged by the feeling that since her defeat in the war of December 1971, the regime in Islamabad is incapable of exercising efficient control.

The dangers are compounded by the combination of India's greater military strength and her abiding internal troubles, particularly economic ones. History abounds with examples of rulers and governments opting for external adventurism in order to deflect the attention of their citizens from internal woes.

The great outburst of domestic adulation for Indira Gandhi following India's victory over Pakistan in 1971 has been dissipated by the rapid deterioration of the economy. Thus it is possible to envisage a scenario in

which India might intervene in Pakistani problems.

For example, new troubles might flare between Afghanistan and Pakistan over their remote border regions. In the event of a large-scale uprising in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, near Afghanistan, mobilization of Indian forces might take place on the Pakistani border near Lahore. Such a mobilization would force Pakistan to mass its forces against this threat, thus enabling the uprising in the North West Frontier Province to proceed more strongly against the weakened Pakistani national garrisons in that area. Should India then choose to follow up its threat with a thrust into the Punjab through Lahore (Pakistan's second largest city), Pakistan could be virtually wiped out as a national entity.

Under those circumstances, the Shah could not be expected to sit idly by: Iran almost certainly would move to confront India on the ground. Action in the Indian Ocean by Iran's new navy might also occur. Thus, an escalating and spreading conflict would be set in motion — one that easily could lead to superpower involvement.

Prime Minister Bhutto has invoked precisely this danger in his warnings against India's ambitions and in his pleadings for a redressing of the military balance.

"Pakistan will never accept the concept of Indian hegemony on the Subcontinent, but it is also against India's own real interests. Since her economy cannot sustain the role of dominant power, she would have to depend to a large extent on outside assistance, and her preeminence would be virtually that of whatever superpower she chose to ally herself with at a given time. It is therefore in the interest of the global powers, as much as of the neighboring countries, to see that a just balance is established in the Subcontinent."

The omens already are there to be seen. Pakistan does not fear an unaided Afghanistan but Bhutto has admitted that Pakistan would face a serious problem if Afghanistan were to receive significant amounts of Indian or Soviet assistance and support, or a combination of both. In May 1974 he voiced the fear that such external aid was already the subject of a variety of clandestine dealings.

Although Pakistan recognizes that the support which she is receiving from Tehran is important to her, many Pakistanis are understandably concerned about placing the defense of their state's territorial integrity in the hands of another state — no matter how closely the interests of that

country may currently correlate with their own. But such dependence may be necessary given the current imbalance of military force between Pakistan and India.

Of course, if India now goes on to deploy a nuclear weapons capability, Pakistan's apprehensions about Indian military pressures and temptations to intervene would be immeasurably heightened.

If major trouble should break out in the region, perhaps along the lines described here, it remains to be seen how the Soviet Union and China would react. Pakistan, for one, is unsure how China would react. Some point to China's failure to aid Islamabad in the case of the breakaway of Bangladesh, but they acknowledge that this was a different and somewhat awkward scenario for Peking because the Bangladesh rebellion had at least the trappings of the kind of "national liberation war" that Chinese policy and ideology are pledged to support. There are some indications that the Chinese would not sit quietly by in the case of an imminent defeat of West Pakistan, and might at least stage diversionary attacks against India in the east. These issues reportedly were discussed during Prime Minister Bhutto's May 1974 visit to China.

Moscow, for her part, might well feel inclined to get involved in a major conflict in South Asia, particularly if Washington chose to commit itself in some form, e.g., by sending a naval task force, as was the case in 1971. Peking is in any event very concerned about the developing close relationship between India and Russia, and especially about the 20-year treaty for defense and cooperation signed by the two countries in 1971. This treaty also causes some alarm in Tehran.

Despite the threats and uncertainties on the international plane, Bhutto's administration is succeeding in halting a deteriorating internal situation in Baluchistan. The task has been a difficult one too, in the North West Frontier Province. Local government needs to be strengthened, corruption removed and economic development requires greater government encouragement.

Centralizing policies adopted by Bhutto can be justified in terms of their greater efficiency, their lower administrative costs, and their greater emphasis on democratic rule.

The latter point deserves examination. One misunderstood element in the Baluchistan situation is that the rebellious tribal leaders are basically fighting to retain their particular and traditional base of political power. Their interests are not in democracy

and representative assemblies as such but in preserving the tribal basis of their influence. Some of the dissident Baluchi students are indeed striving for greater democracy, but the identity of interests between them and the tribal leadership is very small.

This division in the Baluchi autonomy movement is meaningful, but it is of little help to the central authorities. The tribal leaders cannot envisage any reduction in their influence and so oppose all attempts by Islamabad to diminish their power. The students who wish to see an end to the dominance of the tribal leaders and who, in this respect, share many of Bhutto's aims, have no power base from which they can work. Under these circumstances — and taking into account the intensity of intertribal rivalries — there can be little hope of spectacular political progress in the immediate future.

* * * *

The Pakistani government will seek closer ties with the Arab world while still hoping for greater United States support.

In view of the nature of United States' interest throughout the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region, Washington might be well advised to lend a sympathetic ear to Pakistani requests for our helping in strengthening and equipping her armed forces. Unless the security of Pakistan can be improved, democracy in that state will come under increasing pressure, and this development could lead to some alarming consequences.

In Pakistan the problems are great and time is pressing. Prime Minister Bhutto does not demand that Pakistan be made the military equal of India, a country with nearly ten times Pakistan's population, but he does wish that Pakistan's armed forces should receive modern conventional equipment so that Pakistan's sense of security and her ability to deter a surprise attack would be restored.

The great danger is that the failure by the United States to assist Bhutto in his legitimate desire to strengthen his armed forces may result in his regime being subject to greater and greater pressure by the military in Pakistan. The possibility of a new military regime coming to power in Islamabad cannot be discounted if Bhutto is unable to restore the loyalty and self-esteem of his officer corps.

East Asia

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 February 1975

Thieu's sabotage of Saigon aid

President Thieu sabotages his request for more American military aid when he squelches the fledgling trend toward freedom of the press in South Vietnam. By shutting down five opposition newspapers and arresting a number of journalists, he flagrantly reminds the United States that such self-serving violations of the Paris peace agreement may put U.S. aid in the position of violating this specific provision:

"Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnam-

ese people."

Certainly aid to a government that suppresses the opposition can be said to be helping to impose that government on the people. For Thieu's repressive measures to make U.S. aid serve this purpose is to defy the principle of self-determination that has justified American aid.

If a growingly resistant Congress is to approve President Ford's request for more aid to Saigon, it will want at least some show of concern by him for the free speech, free press, and other

freedoms that were to be ensured "immediately after the cease-fire," according to the now two-year-old Vietnam agreement. And President Thieu would be well advised to reverse course if he hopes to get increased aid.

There had been some prospect that he was moving in the direction of a free press. A world survey of freedom found South Vietnam and South Korea the two places where freedom had made greatest progress in Asia.

Now, by setting back freedom again, the Thieu government virtually challenges America to support it no matter what it does.

WASHINGTON POST
31 January 1975

Philip A. McCombs

My 'Exclusive' Interview

SAIGON — Foreign correspondents dream of getting exclusive interviews with powerful heads of state who will reveal for their publications alone the great secrets of the day.

During the past week, President Nguyen Van Thieu has ably played upon the egos of the members of Saigon's small press corps and a number of outside correspondents to wage a stunning publicity campaign in the United States as the Congress considers the crucial issue of further military aid for Saigon.

Thieu was reportedly advised in planning his campaign by U. S. Ambassador Graham Martin, who summoned at least two correspondents to his office and suggested to them that he had been instrumental in getting exclusive interviews for them.

"I was told [by the Vietnamese] that I was exclusive and first," exploded Frank Mariano of ABC News who flew in from Hong Kong to film Thieu for more than an hour Wednesday morning. Mariano said he was "disgusted" to learn a day later that Time magazine and The Washington Post had each had exclusive interviews with Thieu on Monday.

The point about exclusivity is that a publication or a network is likely to give better display to an interview if its own correspondent is alone and first with it.

By yesterday, when Thieu seemed to wind up his campaign by breakfasting with nine correspondents, it became clear that at least half a dozen had been led to believe that they would be alone and first in "scooping" the world.

The possible scoop seemed all the better because Thieu had apparently

not granted an interview to a foreign correspondent since two years ago when Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci conducted her famous lively exchange

Mr. McCombs is The Post's Saigon correspondent.

with him.

I thought my own interview with Thieu was the first in two years, so it was a slight comedown to learn last night from Peter Ross Range of Time magazine that he was being ushered out one door of the President's office only minutes before I was ushered in. Range's material, of course, will have to wait until next week's issue of Time.

Said Range: "I was given to believe I was the first in two years, and I had no idea my exclusivity would last only 10 minutes."

We also learned that French television had interviewed Thieu last week.

The News Business

The new Chicago Daily News correspondent in town, Robert Tamarkin, also thought he was going to be first and alone with Thieu. Tamarkin said he thought he had had "beginner's luck" during his first week in town when Information Minister Ho Van Cham assured him at a cocktail party, "No problem, I can get you an exclusive interview."

The Wall Street Journal's Peter Kanh received an urgent cable in Hong Kong from the Vietnamese government advising him to come to Saigon quickly.

Both Tamarkin and Kann were in-

cluded in the large breakfast group. "I didn't think I'd have a worldwide exclusive," said Kann, "but I thought it would be a small group." Had he known the situation, Kann said he wouldn't have come to Saigon.

James Markham of The New York Times said, "As a consolation prize I was allowed to sit at the President's right hand" at the breakfast.

Despite the bashing of journalistic egos, most of the correspondents seemed glad that Thieu had finally emerged from his seclusion.

Kann found him "charming," even if the subject matter was a bit "dreary." Over Vietnamese noodle soup and omelettes Thieu exchanged jokes with the correspondents and revealed some details of his personal life.

Despite his disappointment at not scooping the world, ABC's Mariano said he had "a very, very warm interview, very nice" in which there were poignant moments.

For example, said Mariano, Thieu said that if he doesn't get \$300 million in emergency U.S. military aid, "it would psychologically break the backs of the Vietnamese people."

Mariano asked Thieu about Cambodia, and the President reportedly replied, "How can I help Cambodia when I can barely help myself?"

While Thieu spoke competently in English, most of the correspondents found that, as one put it, "His English has gotten worse since the Americans left." If he keeps on giving "exclusive" interviews, it could improve with practice.

WASHINGTON STAR

4 February 1975

Crosby S. Noyes: *Abandoning an Ally*

For those few of us who are still a bit squeamish about the spectacle of the United States deliberately and coldly abandoning an ally, this is a painful period. Because if all of the readings of the mood in Congress are correct, this is precisely what we are preparing to do in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

There is not even much of an attempt to disguise the betrayal. Leave aside the fruitless debate over the origins of the war or the wisdom of our part in it. Surely, at this point there can be no question that as a nation and as a government we did everything that we could—and possibly much more than we should have done—to encourage the South Vietnamese to resist the effort of North Vietnam to establish its control in the South.

SURELY, there can be no question either that under the Paris agreements of 1973, we assumed an obligation to aid South Vietnam to resist continuing Communist military pressure. The government in Saigon signed the agreement, permitting the withdrawal of American forces from their country and the continued presence of at least 100,000

enemy troops within their borders, on the firmest assurance that they would be supplied with the means of defending themselves.

The obligation, furthermore, has been formally ratified by the American Congress. Last year, the administration asked for \$1.4 billion in military and economic aid for Indochina. The Congress, in its wisdom, took the affirmative action of authorizing \$1 billion. And then, with an even more dazzling display of sagacity, it decided that \$700 million—one-half the original request—would be enough to fulfill what was a recognized obligation.

It wasn't. Today, with a buildup of enemy forces now exceeding 170,000 in South Vietnam, backed by large stockpiles of Chinese and Russian equipment, the government in Saigon is in desperate military straits. The administration, which has not come close to resupplying South Vietnam on a one-to-one basis over the last year, has returned to Congress with a request for the additional \$300 million which Congress originally authorized. The almost universal prediction is that the request will be refused.

TWO SCHOOLS of thought, in the country and the Congress, have combined to produce this likely result, neither of which reflects much credit—or even much humanity—on its adherents.

The first consists of those who have long believed that there was something morally wrong about this resistance of South Vietnam to conquest by the North. These people go a very long way toward embracing the classic Communist theory about "wars of national liberation" which says, in effect, that any military action that promotes "socialist ideas" and the political spread of the Communist system is automatically a just war, deserving the support of all progressive peoples. And conversely, as the Soviet "Red Star" put it recently:

"A war is unjust and reactionary if it is a continuation of a policy aimed at suppressing the revolutionary struggle, freedom and independence of any particular peoples and working peoples' socialist achievements . . ."

The other school, which normally does not greatly favor promoting the "cause of socialism and communism,"

has come to the simple conclusion that any further support of South Vietnam is useless and that the cause to which so much American effort has been devoted is lost. This possibly tenable conclusion however, is bolstered by a number of utterly specious arguments.

IT IS SAID, for instance, that the United States, having expended 50,000 men and some \$150 billion defending the South Vietnamese, can now demand that they survive entirely on their own, without further outside help. It is implied that the South Vietnamese are no longer worthy of our support (in contrast, say, to the Israelis who make more efficient use of the arms and money they receive). It is suggested that help from us at this point is simply prolonging the agony and that all would be well if the Vietnamese were left alone to "settle their differences between themselves."

Yet there are still some Americans around who can recognize double-talk when they hear it and who are not much impressed by rationalizations for the most disgraceful sell-out in American history. One suspects that they will be heard from, now and then, in the months to come.

WASHINGTON STAR

4 February 1975

Raymond Price:

Vietnam and Equity

Pat Moynihan, whose return to Harvard cost the government one of its most perceptive and original minds, used to lecture his fellow officials about what he called the "counter-intuitive principle" — the rule that in complex matters of public policy, the natural intuitive judgment was usually the wrong judgment. By the same token, connoisseurs of political babble should tack up on their walls what might be called the Counter-Rhetorical Rule: The more appealing the rhetoric of a political proposal, the less likely its wisdom.

The reason, of course, is simple. Politicians are drawn toward schemes that sound attractive in the short term: the way honey draws flies, and the most pervasive conflict of interest of all in Washington is the perennial conflict between what the national interest requires and what political interests dictate.

As a defense against pernicious demagoguery, therefore, it might be worth scaling the burden of proof any proposal should meet according to its political attractiveness. For example, as a general rule a much heavier burden of proof should fall on those urging a tax cut than on those urging a tax increase, with a special, extra burden on those urging that taxes be reduced for

most of the voters by raising them for a few of the voters.

Currently, the counter-rhetorical rule has special pertinence to the debate over President Ford's request for increased aid to South Vietnam. Against the backdrop of intense national weariness with all things unpleasant, the fight for such aid is bound to be uphill. Those crying, "Not a penny more!" are guaranteed huzzahs. A lot of those on Capitol Hill who are busily denouncing the request quite genuinely believe that Congress was right last year in slashing the administration's request in half (from \$1.4 billion to \$700 million), and quite genuinely believe now that instead of restoring a part of that cut, it should be cut further. But this also happens to be a seductively popular — and rhetorically attractive — position, given the present state of the national mood. Therefore, a special burden of proof attaches to the aid-cutters, and a special measure of respect is due the arguments of the aid-increasers.

Two years after the Paris accords were signed, North Vietnam — heavily supplied by its allies — is still pressing the war in the South. Two years after the American withdrawal, the South Vietnamese — confounding their American critics — are still defending them-

selves with valor and with skill. They neither ask nor need American troops, but they do ask and need arms and economic support in order to carry on. To withhold that support, at this stage, would be as deliberate and consequential an act as to withhold insulin from a diabetic.

Some critics of continued aid are at least honest enough to face this consequence. They shrug off the subjugation by force of a valiant ally as simply "putting an end to the killing."

If, say, Germany were invading France, it would be simple enough to make clear the high moral distinction between "ending the killing" by cutting the French lifeline and thus precipitating a French collapse, and ending the killing by giving France the arms needed to repel the German invasion. The second would take more time and cost more lives, but we at least would recognize that this was quintessentially a decision to be made by France, not imposed by the United States. Part of the psychopathology of the Vietnam issue is the difficulty of getting this point across, in the face of a widespread, often inchoate yearning to make the whole traumatic experience of America's involvement go away.

Measured against the size of the

federal budget, the present Ford request for \$300 million in additional aid is a pittance. As a percentage of what the U.S. has spent in Vietnam, it is minuscule. The drive to cut U.S. aid is not an economy measure, but a political measure. To a depressing degree, it represents on the part of many a deep desire to punish the South Vietnamese, to make them suffer because the U.S. has suffered — and to act out a still-

smoldering hatred toward everything connected with the Vietnam war. This is mean, petty, vindictive and, in a historical sense, extremely small-minded and short-sighted.

As a nation, South Vietnam has a right to life. As a great power, the United States has a vital interest in ensuring that the measure of stability brought by its longest war is not washed away on a tide of revulsion against the

costs of that war. As a compassionate and principled people, we also have a profound moral obligation both to the South Vietnamese and to ourselves. The weight of responsibility for deliberately inducing the defeat of a valiant and beleaguered ally is not one that this nation should invite on its conscience, however it might salve, for a time, the yearnings of those who wish that history could be undone, and all unpleasantness made to vanish.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 February 1975

Sticking With It

ESSAY

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — A Communist rocket, fired with the intent of killing civilians in the capital of Cambodia, exploded in a school and slaughtered a score of children.

Shocking pictures of the bodies of the children appeared on nightly television news and on front pages, bringing all the horror of war once again into the American living room.

Had the rocket been supplied by United States aid, or fired by recipients of United States aid, the anguished uproar would have been heard in the halls of Congress and in every cranny of the land to "stop the killing" and deny the murdering attackers one more round of ammunition.

But it was a Communist rocket, financed in Peking or Moscow and launched by the Khmer Rouge, who are trying to overthrow a non-Communist government. Therefore, after a humanitarian wince of pain, the reaction here is muted. We shudder and turn away.

That is because we are bored with Southeast Asia's endless warfare, frustrated by our inability to end it once and for all; a large Congressional group now seriously proposes to let it end by cutting off supplies to our allies so that they will lose and be quiet.

They tell us that our allies are at fault for the killing that comes with their continued resistance to overthrow; that our word is our bondage, and the United States is somehow to blame for the continuance of warfare, since we are unwilling to dictate a surrender; that our allies are more evil than the enemy they are fighting.

That final assertion—that President Thieu is a "corrupt dictator" unworthy of our aid—is made by longtime doves with a vested interest in his downfall, because they predicted his collapse the moment we pulled our troops out of Vietnam. But there he stands, two

years later, an obstacle to takeover by North Vietnam and—worse yet—a reproof to those who were so certain he had no indignant support.

One basic fact stares us in the face: There are no South Vietnamese troops killing anybody in North Vietnam; there are over 100,000 North Vietnamese troops fighting today in South Vietnam. It is still the South that is defending itself from sustained attack from the North.

Forget about that, says a weary majority; America did its bit. If the South Vietnamese cannot defend themselves by themselves now, we cannot be expected to support them forever. That goes for the Cambodians as well.

Foolishly, responsible officials in the United States repeat the light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel argument; just another year's aid, just a billion or so more, and we'll win. That's misleading, as is President Ford's desperate promise to end all aid in three years, no matter what.

We should know by now that Communist aggressors, financed and supplied from outside, are prepared to fight on for decades until they win. The non-Communist majority in those countries seems prepared to fight on just as grimly for just as long, provided we match the supplies from outside. Our allies may be weary, but they are not bored; shall we now tell them we are no longer willing to match the Soviet contribution to their enemies, and they should plan for defeat?

Moreover, there is the possibility that we will be embarrassed by the

severity of the local consequences of Communist victory. This is that hoary chestnut, the "bloodbath argument": When Nelson Rockefeller raised it recently, he was roundly denounced by people who are absolutely certain that no wholesale executions will follow Communist victory. Such certainty must be comforting, since it runs contrary to much experience.

The reason why the United States should continue aid to people fighting Communist take-over is because we are on the side of human freedom. Not because we lost 50,000 men in Vietnam; or because the Congress authorized current aid; or even primarily because our support tells the world that our word to our allies is at least as good as the Soviet's.

Why are we so afraid to assert that what we are doing to help others defend themselves against Communist-sponsored aggression is the right thing to do? Costly, painful, nerve-cracking, and when Mr. Thieu jails journalists, infuriating—but essentially moral.

The measure of our success is not in making peace, since the Communists want victory and not peace, but in helping our allies to continue to resist as long as the pressure is on.

As Senator Jackson begins to waffle on Vietnam, just as Senator Percy finds it expedient to waver in support of Israel, we ought to ask ourselves what kind of a people we are becoming. Do we stand ready to help allies help themselves, or do we let them go hang after a certain length of time?

Much more is at stake here than the fate of one regime, or the expenditure of several hundred millions, or the justification of past positions. Either America will remain a strong force against worldwide totalitarian coercion or she will turn inward and head downward.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 January 1975

U.S. Envoy Said to Protest Swedish Criticism on Asia

Dispatch of The Times, London

STOCKHOLM, Jan. 30—The United States Ambassador has reportedly protested an outspoken Swedish Government statement strongly criticizing American policies in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Foreign Ministry said Robert Strausz-Hupe, the Ambassador, met for 90 minutes yesterday with Sven Andersson, the Foreign Minister, in connection with a speech the Minister delivered Monday. In it Mr. Andersson said President Ford's proposal to increase military assistance to Saigon and Pinom Penh would only add to human suffering and prolong the

war.

The United States Embassy declined to comment but well-informed sources said the Ambassador had orally protested sections of the address that the State Department believed were one-sided.

Singled out was Mr. Andersson's charge that only the United States and Saigon were violating the Paris accords. He

referred to violations by the other side as "alleged" and did not mention the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 February 1975

Hesitancy and Confusion Blamed in Saigon Defeat

By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 31—Diplomats and military analysts here have managed to piece together an account of the fall three weeks ago of Phuoc Binh, the first provincial capital to be captured by the Communists since their 1972 spring offensive, despite Government efforts to seal off from the public and press the soldiers who got out alive.

It appears, according to these experts, that while some defenders fought bravely, many ran away; that the South Vietnamese Air Force, reluctantly called in to what it considered a hopeless fight, killed many Government troops with imprecise high-altitude bombing, and that the North Vietnamese further refined tactics intended to lose as few of their own men as possible.

"It is a shame to us all—not only to us, but to any other military man of any rank who had something to do with this battle," said an officer who was sent to defend Phuoc Binh.

Several South Vietnamese military sources paint a similar picture—one of indecisiveness and confusion at the highest command levels, uncertainty about whether the North Vietnamese intended to take Phuoc Binh or slowly strangle it, bad information on the size and quality of the opposing forces in the rolling plantation country around the encircled town. These sources argue that decisions were made with less con-

sideration than is now believed. Beginning in mid-December, the North Vietnamese easily took four Government-held district capitals and one base camp in Phuoc Long Province, which had never been far from their complete control. Only the isolated province capital, with a garrison of regional and provincial forces totaling 3,000 men remained.

The first Government reinforcements—a battalion of regular troops and three reconnaissance companies, or about 800 men—were reportedly sent into Phuoc Binh on Dec. 28, when the North Vietnamese were already within mortar range of the town, which lies 75 miles north of Saigon near the Cambodian border.

On the first day of the new year, the North Vietnamese chased a small garrison of Stieng tribesmen off the top of Ba Ra Mountain on the southeastern edge of the town.

From this point on, in the

opinion of several military analysts, the battle was lost. The North Vietnamese could shell the town at will, which they began to do with great accuracy. Reliance on heavy artillery bombardment rather than ground troops characterized the North Vietnamese tactics, as it has in other battles recently.

Civilians—the province capital had a largely montagnard population of 26,000—began to slip out of the town, crossing the Daklung Bridge over the Song Be. So did many montagnard militiamen and some regular soldiers.

Tanks Move In

The first ground attacks came on Jan. 3, but the North Vietnamese put few troops behind their T-54 tanks. Demolition troops cleared obstacles for the tanks.

Many defenders reported later that their American-made, shoulder-fired rocket launchers were useless against the tanks, which had penetrated the southern edge of the town.

"We took aim on one of them, waited, waited until it was well in good range and then fired," said one officer. "Oh, it did not explode. It did not stop."

"To our amazement, the turret was moving, the big gun was pointing toward our trenches. Oh God, we sank down to the bottom of our trenches, crawled away like rats, with our mouths open in amazement."

In their analysis of the battle, Americans believe that the defenders fired the rockets at a range that was too close; to destroy a tank, they must be fired from 30 feet away, they say.

There is considerable uncertainty over the number of tanks

knocked out by the defenders. Official and semiofficial counts range from 14 to 29, but while some tanks were certainly hit, one well-placed source said that aerial reconnaissance photos showed no destroyed tanks.

By Jan. 3, the Foreign Ministry in Saigon was preparing a press conference to announce the loss of Phuoc Binh. But the next day the Government sent into Phuoc Binh by helicopter two companies of the elite 81st Airborne Rangers — which fought well around Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive and at An Loc during the 1972 offensive.

To their dismay, the 200 rangers found that the situation on the ground nowhere resembled the somewhat confident picture sketched by Col. Nguyen Thong Thanh, the commander of the town, in his bunker.

According to one ranger, the colonel described various positions around the town that were being held by battalions and companies that had in fact been reduced to handfuls of men who were looking for a way to escape.

Meanwhile, forced to altitudes of 10,000 feet or higher by intense 57-mm. heavy machine-gun fire, Government fighter-bombers were unable to provide significant support. Still they bombed.

"Never before had I seen such heavy casualties inflicted on our own lines by our own air force," said one member of the 81st Rangers. "The hospital was bombed, three or four military doctors were killed and hundreds of patients were killed, or wounded for a second time."



NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1975

South Korean Army's Loyalty to Park Shows Signs of Cracking

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea Feb. 1 — The loyalty of the South Korean Army to President Park Chung Hee has begun to show cracks that jeopardize his hold on power.

So far, signs of discontent have been scattered and sporadic, running from open defiance to private murmurings against the President's autocratic rule. But these have been enough to make the Government more than usually sensitive to any hint of disloyalty in the armed forces.

Whether a coup is planned is impossible to know as any plotters must operate in total secrecy to avoid detection by the elaborate apparatus. But the evidence suggests that the army would probably not fire on Korean civilians in a showdown with Mr. Park.

Changes Sought

The pressure on Mr. Park to revise the Constitution that gives him unlimited power for as long as he likes has grown in recent months, with opposition politicians, Christians, students and intellectuals calling for changes.

The President has called a national referendum on the issue — the date has yet to be announced — but his critics say that will settle nothing. So a confrontation seems possible this spring.

Since President Park, then a general, came to power as the leader of a military coup in 1961, the army has remained his base of power. He has systematically undermined or demolished such governmental institutions as the Cabinet, the National Assembly, the bureaucracy and political parties.

Some senior Government of-

ficials say that Mr. Park's call for a referendum was partly motivated by fear of a military coup. Another reason, they said, was to prevent a student revolt. Both might be stopped by a strong show of popular support.

Some senior military officers, in private conversation, suggest that President Park should, "prepare" to retire, but leave open just when. In Tokyo recently, a former Chief of Naval Operation, Adm. Lee Yong Un, openly called for the President to resign. Admiral Lee, who was imprisoned by Mr. Park in 1961, is the most senior military officer to break openly with the President.

The Unhappy Colonels

Several sources here reported discontent among the colonels who graduated from the Korean Military Academy, the equivalent of West Point, in the mid-nineteen-fifties. These officers,

who are of a different generation from Mr. Park and who did not take part in his coup, are said to feel no personal loyalty to the President.

Some received training in the United States and were exposed to American views on both politics and the role of the military, views that differ from those of President Park.

At least one conspiracy to overthrow the President has been uncovered. Lee Tae Il, retired colonel in command of the reserve officer training corps at Korea University, led an attempted coup in April, when students were planning demonstrations. Another retired colonel, Kim Pyong Gi, a classmate of Colonel Lee at the Korean Military Academy, was arrested with him.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
5 February 1975

Tales of Americans With Viet Reds Still Crop Up

But Group Charged With Tracing Men Missing
in Action Still Isn't Sure Such Defectors Exist

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
TIMES STAFF WRITER

Last fall, 28 young officers wrote a critical letter to a Newsweek correspondent here and asked that it be published with their names, an act that would surely have resulted in their court-martial. The magazine withheld their names.

At the same time, young officers reported a riot at one base when military policemen were called to break up a political meeting.

An army lieutenant recently took out an advertisement in the Dong-A Ilbo, a leading newspaper, to support it in its struggle against Government suppression.

President Park has always sought to prevent military commanders from plotting against him by moving them from assignment to assignment so that they do not build up personal loyalties within any unit.

But the Government's nervousness now is such that shortly after the President announced the referendum, senior military officers were called in to pledge their allegiance.

When Admiral Lee called for Mr. Park's resignation in Tokyo, the Korean Government protested to the Japanese Government for permitting him to speak out.

After security agents discovered the existence of the letter to Newsweek, they broke into the hotel room of one of the magazine's correspondents, Paul Brinkley Rogers, and interrogated him for five hours. He did not yield the letter or disclose the names of the signers.

The Government responded to the Lieutenant's advertisement in Dong-A Ilbo by holding and interrogating the paper's advertising manager and two others for four days in an attempt to find out the officer's name. They did not know and were released.

Christian chaplains in the army are reportedly under surveillance by security agents who fear they may be channels of communication between civilian Christians who oppose Mr. Park and sympathetic elements in the army.

Antiaircraft batteries in Seoul have fired in recent months at American and South Korean planes mistakenly flying into forbidden air space over the city. The batteries have been placed atop tall buildings supposedly to fire at any North Korean intruders. But knowledgeable sources here say the President's main concern is a bombing attack on his official residence by the South Korean Air Force.

SAIGON—In a remote area of Quang Ngai province some weeks ago two North Vietnamese soldiers entered a little hut and asked the woman there for water. They were accompanied, so the woman said, by a white man—a man with lightish hair and obviously not a Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese woman was a lowlander who had been abducted some time earlier by the North Vietnamese in a sweep of her home village. In due course she found her way home and subsequently talked to the South Vietnamese military authorities.

She said that the light-haired man who entered the hut with the two North Vietnamese soldiers said nothing. She had asked the soldiers about him and they had said he was an American who had chosen to stay behind and "join the valiant struggle" or some phrase like that.

She asked if he had done any fighting and the North Vietnamese soldiers told her no, that the man had other duties in the rear. Then they left.

Was the story true? No one knows. The report filtered down to Saigon and was finally passed on to the Americans at what is known as the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).

Headquartered in Thailand but with a few officers in South Vietnam, the JCRC is charged with keeping track of those Americans listed as missing in action (MIA). It also gets reports of possible deserters and anyone else who might turn out to be an American serviceman.

There are some 2,400 Americans still listed as either missing in action in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia or men whose bodies have never been recovered but who are known to have died.

To the queries that continue to come in, the commander of the JCRC, Col. John P. Vollmer, gives the official reply: "We have no firm evidence that any Americans listed as MIA in Southeast Asia remain alive."

That is the official reply.
Other responsible American offi-

cials, with access to all kinds of information, some of it pretty far out, will say privately that the official reply is correct if you insist that the evidence be genuinely hard, law-court stuff. If you are willing to accept somewhat less convincing evidence, these officials say, there is plenty of esoteric and often second-hand information that some Americans are "on the other side" or have simply blended with the local scene, whatever that might be.

Privately, some officials believe as many as five Americans may be defectors who for one reason or another have chosen—or been forced to accept—continuing anonymity.

At any rate, the report of the woman in Quang Ngai was only one of a small but continuing trickle of such reports. Such reports have come in off and on throughout the long American involvement in South Vietnam. It is probably useless to place much value on the rate at which these reports arise. But for what it is worth, they seem to have been increasing slightly in the past few months.

In the Saigon area there was a report from Long Khanh province a few months back of two blacks, wearing nondescript military clothing, who stopped a bus and robbed the passengers. Another version had them as members of a Viet Cong unit which stopped the bus. At any rate, the local police have never been able to find a first hand witness to the incident.

There was a similar report of a "Caucasian" seen with a North Vietnamese unit in the Central Highlands. And there have been renewed reports of a black and a white—referred to by those who have followed their mysterious outcroppings as "salt and pepper"—also in the central part of the country.

There have been other reports of the same sort, all "equally woolly," according to one official.

Since the ill-observed Paris ceasefire agreements were signed two years ago, the North Vietnamese have been silent on the subject.

Latin America

Tuesday, Feb. 11, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

Andean Pact Nations Split on Key Issues

By Joanne Omang

Washington Post Foreign Service

LIMA, Feb. 10—The six Latin American nations of the Andean Pact are expected to agree on denunciation of the U.S. foreign trade act and on little else in their week long meeting that begins Tuesday in the Peruvian capital.

Recommendations on crucial allocations and policy involving petrochemical, fertilizer, and automotive plants are up for discussion by the governing council, but sources close to recent working sessions at the staff level say consensus does not appear likely.

Colombia, Peru, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia signed the

Cartagena Agreement forming the Andean group in 1969 to work toward a common market that would counter the vastly greater economic strength of neighboring Brazil and Argentina. Venezuela joined in 1973.

The recently enacted U.S. trade bill, which excludes Venezuela and Ecuador from trade concessions because of their membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was viewed by most Latin governments as an insult. It contributed to the cancellation earlier this month of the foreign ministers' meeting with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that had

been scheduled for March, in Buenos Aires.

The tone of any denunciation of the bill from the Andean Pact could indicate the emergence of a joint policy toward the new U.S. law, a policy the Latin nations were unable to come up with in time to present Kissinger with a joint front.

The difficulties that the six nations along the Andes mountain chain have had in breaking down trade barriers are illustrated by the fact that Bolivia and Chile only resumed diplomatic relations this past weekend after 13 years.

The group has implemented 1972 metalworking industry agreements that assigned each country responsibility for production of certain amounts of machinery, tools and parts, electrical equipment and some consumer goods.

Decisions allocating production along these lines in the automotive industry are expected to cause the most friction this week. Venezuela, with half the market for automobiles and parts, has made known its displeasure with staff recommendations assigning it only a third of regional production capacity.

BALTIMORE SUN
13 February 1975

'The Witch' builds power in Argentina

By RICHARD O'MARA

Sun Staff Correspondent

Buenos Aires—In a recent wire service report from Spain, Jose Lopez Rega was described as "a man with excessive ambition," who, though "hated in Argentina, commands and governs."

No newspaper here printed it. Mr. Lopez Rega may be hated in Argentina, and is feared as well.

President Isabel Peron's social welfare minister and intimate confidant, he shared the

last eight years of Juan Peron's 17 years in exile in Spain. Since General Peron died last July, Mr. Lopez Rega's power in the government of Mrs. Peron has grown inordinately, to the dismay and alarm of many Argentines.

Recently his position within the government has provoked much speculation, and he has been kept busy advertising his good relations with the armed forces.

His purpose was to scotch persistent rumors that the military is trying to oust him from his Cabinet post, to detach him from the side of Mrs. Peron.

This speculation grew most intense after Mrs. Peron moved out of her summer house at Chapadmalal and onto a nearby naval base—"for protection," as one observer put it.

Then Mr. Lopez Rega reappeared (he had been missing

for four days), dismissed as "unfounded those versions over Cabinet changes and the deterioration of my relations with the armed forces."

The rumors subsided. Mr. Lopez Rega—"El brujo" (the witch)—was credited with having survived another maneuver against him.

Whether the rumors this time were founded in fact most Argentines regard as unimportant. It is well known that elements within the Argentine military want Mr. Lopez Rega out of the government. They are buttressed in this desire by the Radical party, the country's second largest party after the Peronists, and by certain sectors of the labor movement.

Yet Mr. Lopez Rega endures, and no one has been able to explain satisfactorily the source of his strength.

The extent of Mr. Lopez Rega's influence over Mrs. Peron, and the nature of it,

inspires the spiciest conversations. Some believe he controls Mrs. Peron the way Svengali controlled Trilby. Others prefer the comparison to Rasputin, the mystic monk of Russia who retained the confidence of the Empress Alexander despite all efforts by her other advisers to discredit him.

Mr. Lopez Rega is the spiritual leader of the right wing of the Peronist movement. He has been accused (not publicly) of inspiring some of the right-wing terrorism which has only recently died down in Argentina, especially the depredations of the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, a right-wing death squad.

Suspensions of his involvement with such extremists, the general unwholesome atmosphere he lends to the government and his tendency to accrue personal power—these are some of the reasons he is opposed by so many people.